US embassy cable - 05THEHAGUE2318

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 THE HAGUE 002318 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/25/2005 
TAGS: NL, VE, PREL, PGOV 
SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/VENEZUELA: DUTCH WILL RAISE VENEZUELA 
PROFILE IN EU 
 
REF: A. A) SOBEL-BURNS E-MAIL 
 
     B. 8/22/05 
     C. B) THE HAGUE 2309 
     D. C) THE HAGUE 2136 AND PREVIOUS 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR CLIFFORD SOBEL FOR REASONS 1.4 (B,D) 
 
1. (S) Summary.  The Dutch are increasingly concerned about 
Venezuelan activities and see their engagement as a first 
step in putting these concerns on the EU's agenda.  The Prime 
Minister and key members of his cabinet are seized with the 
issue and willing to elevate discussion within the EU.  The 
working level remains skeptical that the EU can be moved in a 
more positive direction, and is worried about "provoking" 
Chavez.  Further high-level consultations are needed to 
develop clear objectives and strategies for engaging Dutch 
and EU energies most effectively.  End Summary. 
 
2. (S) In a series of meetings with Ambassador Sobel and 
visiting WHA/AND Deputy Director Bruce Friedman on August 23 
and 24, senior Dutch officials from the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Justice, and the 
Prime Minister's Office reiterated Dutch concerns about 
growing Venezuelan interference in the Dutch Antilles, 
destabilizing Venezuelan activities in the region, and 
Chavez's undermining of civil society inside Venezuela.  The 
Dutch made clear that they are committed to a "dialogue" with 
Chavez, with FM Bot planning to visit Caracas as part of a 
regional tour in October, and a possible visit by Prime 
Minister Balkenende in November.   The Dutch intend to use 
this dialogue both to deliver critical messages to Chavez and 
to elevate the profile of their concerns regarding Venezuela 
within the EU.  Hugo Siblesz (POLDIR, MFA) and Rob Swartbol 
(Senior Foreign Affairs advisor to the PM) separately 
confirmed that the Dutch hope to get Venezuela on the agenda 
of upcoming GAERC and EU Council meetings, using the Dutch 
visits as a trigger.  Ambassador Sobel and Friedman stressed 
that Chavez has a history of misrepresenting his contacts 
with European leaders to his advantage; Siblesz made clear 
that the Dutch were aware of this problem and would consider 
how best to avoid this outcome. 
 
3. (S) In response to Friedman's remark that the U.S. did not 
truly appreciate the nature of Chavez' ambitions in the first 
few years of his regime, Swartbol opined that the Dutch are 
only now starting to grasp the problem, and the rest of the 
EU remains asleep at the switch.  He noted that the Dutch 
cabinet has only in the last few months begun to consider as 
a whole the implications of Venezuelan meddling in the 
upcoming Antillean elections.  But, he added, the Prime 
Minister is now seized with the issue, and is supported by 
Foreign Minister Bot, Defense Minister Kamp, and Kingdom 
Affairs Minister Pechtold. 
 
4  (S) Minister of Justice Donner, who will visit Venezuela 
and Colombia next week, told Ambassador Sobel and Friedman 
that the Dutch want to increase counter-narcotics cooperation 
with Venezuela but are concerned about Chavez's recent 
severing of ties with DEA and other steps suggesting a lack 
of commitment in countering narcotics trafficking.  He, and 
other senior Dutch officials, are also looking at ways to 
increase assistance to Colombia and other at-risk regional 
states, and would be willing to consider U.S. proposals on 
how to do this most effectively (for example, by providing 
support for the demobilization of paramilitaries.) 
 
5. (S) Although the Dutch are prepared to elevate discussion 
of Venezuela to the ministerial level at the EU, it is also 
clear serious concerns remain at the working level about how 
forceful the EU will be in addressing the issue.  Marion 
Kappeyne de Coppello (Head of the MFA's Western Hemisphere 
Department), stressed that getting the EU to take a tougher 
line would be "difficult" given the economic interests of 
several EU states in Venezuela, and also warned against 
"provoking" Venezuela by gestures such as U.S. ship visits to 
the Antilles.  (Ambassador Sobel countered that the EU's 
economic interests in Venezuela also provided leverage to 
influence Chavez's behavior, and noted that Antillean PM Ijs 
clearly supported the ship visits.) 
 
6. (S) British Ambassador Sir Colin Budd similarly stressed 
that getting the EU to take a more forceful interest in 
Venezuela would be difficult.  The issue was simply "not on 
the radar screen" of most EU members -- including the British 
presidency.  Given the resistance of the working level to 
address the issue, he stressed, a high-level approach to the 
British Presidency would be necessary to get London's 
attention; he suggested approaching Ambassador David Manning 
or POLDIR John Sawers at the P level would be a good place to 
start.  Even with the UK and Dutch on board, however, moving 
the EU in a more positive direction would require a "critical 
mass" of at least 4-7 "important members"  (Note:  Both Budd 
and Kappeyne de Coppello made clear they did not consider the 
ten new EU members to be "important" in this regard.)  Budd 
was doubtful that many states would have the stomach to 
challenge Spain on a Latin American issue, although he 
acknowledged that the Caribbean interests of the UK, 
Netherlands, and France gave them a certain amount of weight. 
 He added that those opposed to taking a tough line on 
Venezuela were aided by apparent discrepancies in U.S. 
evaluations of the threat (i.e., whether or not a "smoking 
gun" linking Chavez to FARC arms supplies exists) and general 
doubts about the quality of U.S. intelligence in the wake of 
Iraq. 
 
CONCLUSION: 
---------- 
 
7. (S) The Dutch are increasingly focused on Venezuela and 
see their dialogue with Caracas as the best mechanism for 
raising the profile of their concerns within the EU.  While 
they understand that Chavez will seek to "pocket" any 
European contacts to his advantage, they see no alternative 
to engagement.  Given this fact, we should continue to 
consult and work with the Dutch to ensure that their 
engagement helps shift Dutch and EU policies in more 
favorable directions, including helping to develop consistent 
EU policies on arms sales to Venezuela, containing Chavez' 
negative influences in the region, and promoting the growth 
of democratic institutions in Venezuela.  In this regard, the 
Dutch -- and EU generally -- are much more likely to respond 
to a "positive" agenda focused on shoring up pro-democracy 
forces in the region through education and other assistance 
programs, and countering narcotics trafficking, than on an 
overtly confrontational approach.  The Dutch can be very 
useful in helping us define a set of specific achievable 
objectives for the EU, and in developing a strategy for 
building core groups within the EU to heighten awareness of 
the problem and enhance constructive engagement. 
 
SOBEL