US embassy cable - 05LJUBLJANA610

C O N F I D E N T I A L  LJUBLJANA 000610 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
DEPT FOR EUR/NCE, EUR/RPM, 
NSC FOR D. WILSON 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/23/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, MARR, ECON, SI 
SUBJECT: SLOVENIA: LUNCH WITH PM: MOVING FORWARD ON 
PRIVATIZATION, CHALLENGES ON IRAQ 
 
REF: A. LJUBLJANA 438 
 
     B. LJUBLJANA 449 
 
Classified By: COM Thomas B. Robertson for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
 1.  (C) Summary:  In one-on-one lunch August 23, PM Jansa 
said he would continue in September to try to move his 
coalition toward accepting a deployment of trainers/mentors 
to Iraq, noting that political progress on the Iraqi 
constitution should make his job easier.  He reported that 
that day he had approved a decision to waive the port and 
transportation costs for Hungarian T-72 tanks on their way to 
Iraq.  The PM made clear that it was in Slovenia's interest 
to continue to support the beginning of EU negotiations with 
Croatia as early as possible, and that the GOS would do all 
it could to avoid exacerbating relations over the sensitive 
border issue.  On privatization he said the government was 
favorably disposed toward an EBRD pre-privatization plan for 
Slovenia's telecom and that steps might be begun in that 
direction by the end of September.   End summary. 
 
Back Down from the Mountains and Ready to Meet CJCS 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
2. (SBU) The lunch came about as a result of COM's request to 
speak to the PM before COM's departure to Washington, and 
before the visit of CJCS General Myers in early September. 
COM had last met Jansa high in the Slovenian Alps when they 
had climbed Mt. Triglav together August 7.  During that time 
Jansa had mentioned GOS concern with rescuing Slovenian 
climber Humar, trapped on the wall of Nanga Parbat in 
Pakistan, and had asked about possible US assistance.  COM 
took advantage of beginning of lunch to tell Jansa about US 
offers at that time to support Pakistani rescue efforts if 
necessary.  Told about General Myers trip, the PM agreed to 
free up his schedule to meet with him September 5-6. 
 
Iraq 
---- 
3. (C) Asked about his strategy to get Slovenian trainers 
into Iraq (Ref. A), PM Jansa told COM that he still had 
difficulties with his coalition.  He had begun discussion of 
the issue in early July in the cabinet but continued to face 
resistance from the Slovenia People's Party (SLS) and the 
Pensioners party (DeSUS). Minister of Defense (and President 
of DeSUS) Erjavec was on board with such a deployment, 
however, he could not move his party's membership on the 
issue.  While Jansa might be able to force through a positive 
decision within the cabinet, the subject would certainly be 
raised in Parliament, and a decision could unwind if that 
happened, as coalition parliamentarians might raise 
opposition.  Interestingly, Jansa said Social Democrats 
president and opposition MP Borut Pahor had told him that he, 
personally, could support such a deployment, but only if 
Jansa had his own coalition on board.  (Jansa smiled that he 
knew how that was:  he himself had spent a long time in the 
opposition.)  That said, Pahor admitted he would not be able 
to deliver his party, either.  Asked by COM what he could do 
to help, Jansa volunteered that COM's meeting upon his return 
from the States with SLS party President (and Environment 
Minister), Janez Podobnik, and Erjavec might help.  Jansa 
said discussions would continue within the government when 
they convened again in September.  He stressed that Slovenia 
had a number of fine officers who looked forward to 
participating in such a deployment. 
 
4. (C) Jansa volunteered that he was happy to see the 
Slovenian media reporting the Iraqi negotiations over the new 
constitution.  This had a much more positive impact on the 
public than the endless coverage of the insurgency, showing 
that real progress toward a democratic state was going 
forward.  He agreed with COM that if a large segment of the 
Sunni population could be brought on board with the 
constitution, and it appeared likely for approval by the 
population, this could significantly affect popular views of 
the situation there.  Most importantly, Jansa said it would 
make easier his job to get his coalition on board for a 
deployment of mentors/trainers into Iraq. 
 
Good News:  GOS to Waive Fees for Delivery of Hungarian T-72s 
to Iraq 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
 
5. (C) The PM noted that he did have good news for COM on 
Iraq front.  He had just spoken to MOD Erjavec and agreed 
that the GOS would waive the costs of transportation and port 
 
 
costs of the Hungarian T-72s to be shipped to Iraq.  COM 
expressed thanks for this good news and asked what the costs 
were associated with this, which Jansa said was 500,000 EUROs. 
 
Croatia 
------- 
 
6. (C)  Jansa reiterated that it was a key interest of 
Slovenia's to have negotiations begin as soon as possible for 
Croatia's entry into the EU.  While Slovenia fully supported 
the timely beginning of negotiations with Turkey, beginning 
those negotiations without a prospect for Croatia's 
negotiations to begin soon would result in a very difficult 
political situation in Croatia.  PM Sanader had campaigned on 
getting EU negotiations started, and if he had nothing to 
show for it by the time of the next elections, he would pay 
the price.  Asked about Gotovina, Jansa expressed the opinion 
that he was in Herzegovina and that he could move around more 
easily since he had a French passport.  Gotovina was less of 
a problem for Croatia's EU negotiations than was the 
continued presence of bad intelligence agents in the country. 
 Sanader had tried to clean some of them out and had made 
changes, but there were still more who had to go.  He said 
the British had had a terrible time earlier in Croatia, since 
some of these Croatian intelligence agents had undermined 
what the Brits there were trying to do. 
 
7. (C)  On the recent announcement of Italian-Croatian 
agreement on an eco zone in the Adriatic, Jansa said the 
press was mistaken that the GOS had known nothing about it. 
Italy and Croatia had been negotiating for over two years on 
this.  As for Slovenia, the former GOS had agreed with Italy 
two years ago to assume the lines drawn between Italy and 
Slovenia that went back to the original Italian-Yugoslav 
agreement.  It was impossible to conclude an eco zone 
agreement with Croatia while the border was still disputed. 
For this reason Slovenia would be cautious in any positions 
on this it would take, making note of the fact that Slovenia 
and Italy had agreed earlier to their division, while not 
attempting to make any declaration that would appear to have 
executive validity and that politically would only undermine 
the delicate Slovene-Croatian relationship.  Jansa 
volunteered that the "lines are open" to Croatian PM Sanader, 
that Sanader had in fact informed Jansa of their agreement 
with the Italians, and that generally Sanader was acting 
"with good will" towards Slovenia, although he had elements 
in the HDZ that made his life difficult.  Interestingly, 
Jansa said the GOS had not yet gotten confirmation from Italy 
that the agreement was in fact concluded, but they expected 
it within days. 
 
Privatization:  Moving Forward with Telecom 
------------------------------------------- 
 
8. (C) COM told Jansa that he had had lunch the day before 
with EBRD reps to Slovenia and Croatia, and that they 
appeared to have a pre-privatization package for Slovenia 
Telekom that might help the GOS go forward.  He reiterated 
EBRD points that Slovenia not make the mistake Croatia had 
made, namely selling off part of telecom (in that case to 
Deutsche Telekom), but then delaying sale of the rest while 
the price continued to drop.  The lesson was to strike early 
in order to get the best price.  After all, given the rapid 
changes in technology, one had to wonder what the current 
Telekom would even be worth ten years from now.  Jansa was 
clearly in the loop and said that the GOS was reviewing 
favorably the EBRD plan, and he thought that something might 
go forward by the end of September. 
 
Other issues 
------------ 
9. (C) 
 
--Denationalization:  Jansa agreed there had been no progress 
made on US cases since last meeting (ref b), but underscored 
that Justice Minister Sturm would introduce legislation 
concerning the State Defender that would make it easier to 
proceed more quickly. 
 
--FDI:  PM highlighted that the GOS decision to gradually 
eliminate payroll tax was directed at improving atmosphere 
for FDI. 
 
--Referendum on Slovenian television law:  Admitted that it 
was too early to tell whether referendum to kill the recent 
 
 
GOS law would be successful, saying it would depend on 
turnout.  Underscored that changes would "rationalize" state 
TV, noting that RTV Slovenia had four times as many employees 
as similarly sized private television networks. 
 
--Changes in MOD:  Jansa suggested that he had not been 
involved in replacement of key MOD personnel, saying he did 
not have enough time to micromanage the ministry.  He noted, 
however, that there was considerable "deadwood" at MOD and in 
the Armed Forces, particularly in senior ranks. 
 
--Recent flooding:  Jansa did not think the GOS would have to 
request EU assistance to deal with recent flooding in the 
Southeast.  He reported that heavy rains this August would 
affect negatively GOS wine production, whatever weather 
September might bring. 
 
--Vega:  Further changes in Mobitel management over the 
coming several months might make a settlement with Vega more 
likely.  For that reason he did not believe the situation 
would drag on for years in the courts. 
 
--Troubles in textiles industry:  Previous government had 
allowed the continuation of subsidies to keep these 
industries afloat, when funds would have been more wisely 
spent in investments for retraining of employees to other, 
more viable industries and business. 
 
 
10.  (C)  Comment:  Asked what COM might deliver as a message 
from the GOS to his interlocutors in Washington, Jansa 
quickly responded, "Tell them that Slovenia is a friend and 
ally that will do what we can to support the United States." 
Jansa is a leader who understands that NATO membership means 
stepping up to contribute to stability in crises whenever it 
is needed.  His doubling the GOS contribution to ISAF, 
commitment to triple Slovenia's contribution to KFOR by end 
of 2005, and scheduling an increase in its EUFOR contingent 
in Bosnia reflect this commitment. 
ROBERTSON 
 
 
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 2005LJUBLJ00610 - Classification: CONFIDENTIAL 


 
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