US embassy cable - 05BAGHDAD3455

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 003455 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/23/2025 
TAGS: IZ, PGOV, PHUM, PINS, Kurdish Alliance, Shia Coalition, Parliament 
SUBJECT: PUSHING THE SHIA AND KURDS TO IMPROVE THE DRAFT 
CONSTITUTION 
 
REF: BAGHDAD 3449 
 
Classified By: Pol Couns Robert Ford, reason 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
1.  Summary:  After a vigorous debate, Shia and Kurdish 
political leaders agreed to consider changing the draft 
constitution to fix our demand for clearly stated individual 
freedom of religion and to clarify that there should be a 
goal of no less than 25 percent representation of women in 
the National Assembly, rather than a strict quota, as well as 
textual changes on federalism and de-Baathification aimed at 
garnering at least some Sunni Arab support.  Deputy President 
Abdel Mehdi and Kurdish leader Rowsch Shaways initially were 
sanguine about having a Shia-Kurd constitution deal in hand; 
they seemed uninterested in discussing anything further with 
even Ayed Allawi's Iraqiya bloc (the third largest in the 
National Assembly), much less the Sunni Arab negotiators. 
After DCM pushed hard, they agreed to meet with the Sunni 
Arabs on August 23 evening.  Our initial readout of that 
meeting was that the atmospherics were good but there were no 
deals on anything in the text.  We will track to make sure 
the changes we want on religious freedom and women's 
representation are put in the text on August 24 while we also 
push again for Shia-Kurd engagement with the Sunni Arabs. 
End Summary. 
 
 
2.  (C)  DCM and poloffs called on Deputy President Abdel 
Mehdi, National Assembly Constitution Committee Chair Shaykh 
Humam al-Hamudi, Constitution Committee member Sherwan 
Wa'ili, Deputy Prime Minister Rowsch Shaways and Constitution 
Committee Vice Chair Fuad Masum (the first three Shia 
Islamists, the latter two Kurds) August 23 to discuss 
improvements to the draft of the Iraqi constitution.  The 
first issue of contention concerned which copy of the draft 
represented the latest version.  The DCM asked the Iraqi 
interlocutors what draft they considered to be the final 
draft.  When none of our interlocutors was absolutely 
certain, the DCM urged them strongly to get a definitive 
draft ready as quickly as possible.  They all agreed. 
(Comment:  The multiplicity of draft texts, and the total 
breakdown of confidence between the Shia and Kurd drafters 
has made updating and tracking the drafts exceptionally 
difficult.  End Comment.) 
 
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Pushing for Individuals' Religious Freedom 
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3.  (C)  DCM then urged the group in the strongest terms to 
change the language in Section 2, article 41 to include 
individual freedom of religion.  (The article would then read 
"Every individual has freedom of thought, conscience and 
religion.")  This language mattered to the President and the 
Secretary, and the August 23 editorial in the New York Times 
 
SIPDIS 
showed it was reaching a broad American audience as well, he 
underscored.  After a moment of silence, Sherwan Wa'ili said 
Islamic Law does not allow a Muslim to leave the Islamic 
faith.  DCM and poloff emphasized that this language was 
found in international pacts, and Iraq could not hope to 
pretend to be a leader on human rights without it.  Abdel 
Mehdi accepted the point and promised to take our proposal to 
the Shia Coalition full leadership. 
 
4.  (C)  DCM also raised the ambiguous language we had seen 
concerning the quota reserved for women in the future 
national assembly and recommended a technical fix to clarify 
it.  He also noted that the constitution needed to make clear 
that the draft's guarantee of all human rights provided for 
in international treaties had to be unconditional, as any 
attempt to circumscribe these rights through provisions of 
the constitution would constitute unilateral  amendments to 
Iraq'a treaty obligations, which is prohibited under 
international law.  Abdel Mehdi understood the improvements 
and said they would try to get these approved also. 
 
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Federalism:  Worth Getting Sunni Support? 
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5.  (C)  DCM then raised the issue of federalism laid out in 
section five.  He highlighted the importance to the U.S. and 
Iraq of broad support, including from the Sunni Arab 
community, for the draft constitution.  From our many 
meetings with Sunni Arabs, he observed, it is obvious that 
federalism is the most sensitive issue.  The DCM noted that 
simpler language in section five, devoid of all the detail, 
would make it easier for Sunni Arab leaders to convince their 
own constituencies.  It was especially important, he 
underlined, that the future national assembly have a role in 
determining the shape of federalism in Arab parts of Iraq. 
DCM suggested specific fixes to the section that might make 
it more palatable to at least some Sunni Arabs. 
 
6.  (C)  Abdel Mehdi pushed back hard:  the Sunni Arabs were 
impossible to deal with, and changing one part of the draft 
constitution might look easy but would cause dissatisfaction 
in the Shia community.  DCM agreed that the Sunni Arab 
negotiators were hard to work with, but that was not a good 
reason for the Shia and Kurds to have avoided meeting them 
until almost too late in the process.  We also noted that 
Shia and Kurdish credibility among the Sunni Arabs, never 
high, had plummeted; the Sunni Arabs noticed that U.S. 
diplomats met them more often than their fellow Shia and Kurd 
negotiators.  Above all, DCM underscored, the draft 
constitution should have some measure of Sunni Arab support. 
Abdel Mehdi asked whether we could guarantee that support. 
DCM responded that while we could not guarantee support, if 
the Shia and Kurds made no effort to meet some core Sunni 
Arab demands we could guarantee the Sunni Arabs would not 
support the constitution. 
 
7.  (C)  Kurdish leader Rowsch Shaways remained apparently 
unmoved and said the draft constitution deal was structured 
such that changing one section could unravel the deal in 
other parts.  Abdel Mehdi then emphasized that the Shia 
Coalition leaders want the right to set up one or more 
regional entities like the one the Kurds have.  PolCouns 
noted that we have stressed the Sunni Arabs must acknowledge 
the right of governorates to join into regional entities even 
if the actual implementation is delayed.  Abdel Mehdi swept 
this aside.  The next national assembly is an "unknown" in 
terms of who would dominate it.  Ultimately, however, he and 
Rowsch agreed to take the language back to their leaders. 
 
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De-Baathification Language Not Necessary 
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8.  (C)  Lastly, DCM urged that the language in section 6, 
article 145 about the continued operation of the 
de-Baathification commission be removed.  The commission is 
already working, he noted, and its operations do not depend 
in any way on the constitution.  Sunni Arabs have highlighted 
to us, however, that this article is provocative to Sunni 
Arabs seeking language that instead promotes national 
reconciliation.  We suggested alternate language that calls 
for the Iraqi judicial system to punish those responsible for 
crimes committed against the Iraqi people during the previous 
regime in accordance with Iraqi law.  Abdel Mehdi argued that 
elements in the Shia community would not support the 
constitution without such language.  DCM said there was less 
a question about support for the constitution among the Shia 
community than among the Sunni Arab community. 
 
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Comment 
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9.  (C)  None of the Shia and Kurds appeared interested in 
engaging even Ayed Allawi's Iraqiya group, the National 
Assembly's third-largest bloc, on refinements to the draft 
constitution, much less engaging with the Sunni Arabs. 
Instead, they appear to have concluded that they control the 
National Assembly now and can take the text to the referendum 
where they are certain the Sunni Arabs cannot muster a 
two-thirds vote in three governorates to block its passage. 
After the Ambassador weighed in to Abdel Mehdi with a phone 
call, the Shia Islamist Deputy President agreed to host a 
group of the Sunni Arabs to dinner August 23.  Shia 
independent Ali Debbagh, also at the dinner, told PolCouns 
late August 23 that the atmospherics were good, but no deals 
were reached.  Sunni Arab negotiator Salah Mutlak said the 
initial discussions were unpleasant but as the dinner wore on 
the atmosphere improved and by the end the Shia and Sunni 
Arabs had agreed on much.  He concluded that the two sides 
are "not far" apart on agreed language on federalism.  We 
have heard such kinds of optimism before only to see apparent 
deals founder, and the gaps this time appear to be very wide. 
 We will be vigorously tracking both the textual changes and 
the discussions between the Shia, Kurds and Sunni Arabs on 
August 24. 
Khalilzad