US embassy cable - 05VIENNA2827

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 VIENNA 002827 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EUR, EUR/SE, EUR/ERA AND EUR/AGS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/23/2015 
 
TAGS: PREL, ECIN, TU, CY, AU, EUN 
SUBJECT: DEMARCHE ON TURKISH EU ACCESSION: AUSTRIA SUPPORTS 
 
 
OCTOBER 3 START DATE 
 
REF: A) STATE 150087 B) VIENNA 2752 (AND PREVIOUS) 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires a. i. Carol van Voorst 
 
Reasons: 1.4 (B) AND (D) 
 
1.  (C)  Summary:  The Austrian Foreign Ministry's Southern 
 
Europe head and its director for Common Foreign and Security 
 
Policy told us August 22 that Austria considers the October 3 
 
start date for Turkey's EU accession talks absolute.  Austria 
 
is seeking language in the negotiating framework that 
 
"clarifies" alternatives to membership, although, in view of 
 
Turkish objections, Austria will not use the phrase 
 
"privileged partnership."  In any event, Austria has no 
 
support for its position, and will likely follow a consensus 
 
to leave the negotiating framework as is.  Austria opposes 
 
links to Turkish recognition of Cyprus, and does not/not seek 
 
a linkage between the Turkish and Croatian talks.  By 
 
proposing language for the negotiating framework, Austrian 
 
Chancellor Wolfgang Schuessel wants to show his constituents 
 
that he has represented the views of up to 80 percent of the 
 
electorate who oppose Turkish membership in the EU.  He does 
 
not have to win this fight, and does not necessarily expect 
 
to do so -- but he has to show that he has made the effort. 
 
End summary. 
 
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No Question:  Talks Start October 3 
 
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2.  (C) Economic-Political Counselor and Pol Unit Chief 
 
discussed ref (a) points with MFA A/S-equivalent for Southern 
 
Europe Clemens Koja on August 22.  Koja confirmed Embassy's 
 
analysis (ref b).  He stated categorically that Austria would 
 
not support a delay of the start of Turkish EU accession 
 
negotiations from October 3.  Neither would Austria support a 
 
link between the start of the accession negotiations and 
 
Turkish recognition of the Republic of Cyprus.  The 
 
resolution of Cyprus issue would have to be the result of the 
 
UN-sponsored peace process, Koja said, and links to Turkey's 
 
EU accession talks could disturb that process. 
 
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No Link to Croatia 
 
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3.  (C) Koja emphasized that Austria did not seek a linkage 
 
between the candidacies of Turkey and Croatia.  Austria 
 
remained convinced that Croatia belonged in the EU.  However, 
 
Austria would address Croatia separately. 
 
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Wants "Clearer" Language on Alternatives to Membership 
 
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4.  (C) Koja said Chancellor Wolfgang Schuessel continues 
 
personally to determine Austria's policy on Turkish EU 
 
accession.  Koja noted that Schuessel thought the EU had 
 
headed down the wrong road by offering eventual membership to 
 
Turkey.  However, Koja said, Schuessel had worked to bring 
 
about the European Council decision of December 17, 2004, and 
 
stood by the terms of that decision.  Still, Schussel would 
 
seek "clearer" language in the negotiating framework about 
 
possible alternatives for Turkey in case the negotiations 
 
failed to culminate in membership.  Koja rejected the phrase 
 
"privileged partnership" out-of-hand, calling it a "non-word" 
 
since the Turks had ruled out the formulation.  That said, 
 
Austria recognizes that the goal of accession talks is full 
 
membership in the EU.  The question of alternative outcomes 
 
would arise only if accession talks failed. 
 
5.  (C) Koja noted that Schuessel faced a tough election in 
 
2006.  Only "ten percent" of the Austrian public supported 
 
Turkish EU membership, he said.  This made it imperative for 
 
Schuessel and Foreign Minister Plassnik to show that they had 
 
fought hard to press the views of the Austrian public 
 
majority in EU councils dealing with Turkish accession. 
 
Schuessel could not afford to let the other Austrian parties 
 
portray him as weak on Turkey.  On the other hand, Schuessel 
 
was under no illusions about the extent of Austria's clout. 
 
In fact, Koja acknowledged, no other EU member state 
 
currently supports the Austrian position.  When we asked what 
 
Austria would do if it failed to win support for its proposal 
 
on language in the negotiating framework, Koja admitted that 
 
Austria would probably fall in line with a consensus of the 
 
major EU states. 
 
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Tight Timing Leaves Little Room for Maneuver 
 
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6.  (C) Koja and (separately) MFA Common Foreign and Security 
 
Policy Director Andreas Riecken pointed to the August 31 
 
COREPER and the September 1-2 "Gymnich" ministerial as the 
 
next venues for discussions on the EU Commission's draft 
 
negotiating framework.  The next regular GAERC, on  October 
 
3, would allow no time for recovery if the Turks found the 
 
language objectionable.  Koja alluded to a conversation in 
 
which Turkish MFA Under Secretary Tuygan specifically asked 
 
Schuessel to refrain from pushing for the "privileged 
 
partnership" formulation. Tuygan had also asked that the EU 
 
Council not delay action until October 3, saying that might 
 
force Turkish officials literally to walk away from talks. 
 
7.  (C) Our contacts noted that any EU Ministerial, including 
 
"technical" ones, could approve the negotiating framework as 
 
an "A-point" (without debate).  However, they thought this a 
 
poor option, because the "optics would be bad."  They 
 
believed the UK Presidency would try to organize a meeting of 
 
the 25 EU Foreign Ministers on the margins of the UNGA in New 
 
York in September.  If the necessary consensus emerged, the 
 
FMs could then "put on their GAERC hats" to pass the 
 
negotiating mandate. 
 
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Comment:  Domestic Considerations Impel Effort 
 
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8.  (C) It would not be accurate to say that Austria is 
 
seeking new conditions for starting accession talks with 
 
Turkey.  Schuessel considers the start of talks on October 3 
 
to be a done deal.  However, he wants to show his 
 
constituents that he has done something to represent their 
 
skeptical view of Turkey -- especially since they "blamed" 
 
him for helping to seal the December 17 agreement to set the 
 
date for the Turkish talks.  Schuessel has settled on the 
 
issue of additional language in the negotiating framework as 
 
a battle he must fight -- and probably lose -- to maintain 
 
his domestic political standing. 
 
van Voorst