US embassy cable - 05THEHAGUE2309

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 07 THE HAGUE 002309 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/18/2025 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PTER, ECON, EAID, NL, EUN, USUN 
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S PARTING THOUGHTS ON TAKING THE DUTCH 
TO THE NEXT LEVEL 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR CLIFFORD SOBEL FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D). 
 
1. (S) SUMMARY:  With the EU divided and its direction 
uncertain, the Dutch serve as a vital transatlantic anchor in 
Europe.  As one of the original six EU members, the Dutch 
ally with the British to counter Franco-German efforts to 
steer Europe off a transatlantic course.  The Netherlands' 
solid European and international credentials create a 
powerful "multiplier" effect.  In Iraq, Dutch forces provided 
the physical and political cover for Japan to deploy and the 
Dutch are using their NATO Training Mission commitment to 
push others to do more.  In Afghanistan, the Dutch drove much 
of the Phase III planning for ISAF and deployed Dutch troops 
in combat operations for the first time in more than 30 
years.  The Dutch have led Europe in launching pilot projects 
to strengthen international counterterrorism cooperation, and 
initiated the U.S.-EU dialogue on terrorist financing which 
laid the groundwork for a proposed major international 
Terrorism Financing Conference in 2006. 
 
2. (S) (SUMMARY CONTINUED) The Dutch are expanding their 
leadership beyond Europe.  Dutch strategic interests in the 
Caribbean make them logical partners to counter Venezuelan 
meddling in the region.  They are expanding their military 
involvement in Africa, in part to provide a secure 
environment for their robust development assistance program, 
and in part to add "eyes and ears" on the ground.  In the 
Middle East, the Dutch enjoy good relations with Israel and 
the Palestinians and would welcome a more active role; they 
quickly promised funds for an expanded Multinational Observer 
Force (MFO) and might, under the right circumstances, commit 
troops.  Even in areas where we disagree, such as drugs and 
trafficking in persons, Dutch views may be shifting.  As the 
headquarters for major international legal institutions, the 
Netherlands offers a unique opportunity for advancing foreign 
policy goals far beyond Dutch borders. 
 
3. (S)  (SUMMARY CONTINUED)  The coalition government, headed 
by PM Balkenende, is naturally inclined to work closely with 
the U.S.  The balance could shift toward Brussels, however, 
if a center-left government comes to power in 2007 (or 
earlier), as predicted by most polls.  The nearly one million 
Muslim immigrants are largely non-integrated, which is 
forcing the Dutch to question long-standing assumptions about 
Dutch "tolerance" and "identity."  The murder of Theo van 
Gogh focused attention on Islamic extremism, and the Dutch 
feel they are ahead of much of Europe in addressing this 
growing problem.  Strengthening U.S.-Dutch ties across the 
political spectrum is necessary to ensure that the Dutch 
continue to enlist others to pursue interests in line with 
the U.S., especially in the political-military sphere.  Early 
and active consultations are the key to harnessing Dutch 
energies in enhanced pursuit of U.S. interests.  END SUMMARY. 
 
 
LEADERS IN EUROPE 
----------------- 
 
4. (S)  Along with the British, the Dutch form a strong, 
reliable transatlantic anchor in Europe.  As a founding 
member of NATO, one of the original six members of the EU, 
and Britain's strongest ally on continent, the Dutch are an 
influential voice in Europe despite having a population of 
just under 16 million.  Prime Minister Balkenende states 
often that the Dutch "take their responsibilities seriously" 
and therefore expect to be heard.  While the Dutch "no" to 
the EU's constitutional treaty embarrassed Balkenende, the 
vote revealed that the search for EU integration and 
consensus has its limits, capping a trend that started in the 
90's with then Liberal Party leader (and later EU 
Commissioner) Fritz Bolkestein's proposals to redefine the 
scope of European integration to protect Dutch national 
interests. 
 
5. (S) With the French-German engine of European integration 
stalled, German elections pending, and the EU unable to agree 
on finances, leadership opportunities for the Dutch are 
growing.  This trend is enhanced by the gravitation of EU 
decision making to smaller groups, as Dutch participation can 
make or break internal groupings.  The Dutch and Italian 
refusal to attend a "group of six" meeting recently proposed 
by Schroeder, for example, effectively squelched his 
initiative.  The British Ambassador here recently confided 
that Blair sees the Dutch as essential to pursuing his 
European objectives and ensuring that transatlantic relations 
remain high on the European agenda.  The leaders of the 
Netherlands, UK, Norway, Denmark, and Sweden already meet 
quietly several times a year to coordinate positions prior to 
EU Council and other high-level EU meetings. 
 
6. (S) Dutch leadership within the EU does not weaken their 
commitment to NATO, where they are "go-to guys" for resolving 
potential EU-NATO conflicts.  Their active, if often behind 
the scenes, support for NATO SYG (and former Dutch Foreign 
Minister) Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, as well as their commitment 
to the NRF (and SRF, ISAF, and NTM-I), have helped push back 
efforts, such as Tervuren, which might otherwise create 
tensions between the NRF and EU battlegroups or other 
emerging ESDP capabilities.  Foreign Minister Bot recently 
proposed restructuring NATO's decision-making and funding 
mechanisms to make them more effective.  The appointment of 
Herman Schaper, the former deputy director general of 
political affairs at the Dutch MFA and a good friend of the 
U.S., as the new Dutch permrep to NATO should create more 
opportunities for productive cooperation. 
 
POLITICAL-MILITARY COOPERATION BEYOND THE EU 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
7. (S) The Dutch are increasingly aware that strategic 
interests outside Europe warrant their attention and 
leadership, especially in the political-military sphere.  For 
example: 
 
- Venezuela:  The Dutch have strategic interests in the 
Caribbean (i.e., the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba) and are 
deeply concerned about Chavez' meddling in the region.  As a 
Caribbean power, the Dutch have good reasons to lead an 
effort to balance traditional Spanish dominance on Latin 
American issues in the EU, but the U.S. and others will need 
to push them to take this role.  The Dutch are active 
partners in regional drug enforcement efforts, and recently 
demonstrated their ability to deploy military forces (F-16's) 
on short notice.  Persuading the Dutch to counter Chavez's 
destabilization efforts more actively would give us a 
reliable European partner in the region. 
 
- Afghanistan:  According to CENTCOM, the Dutch took a strong 
lead in organizing and soliciting forces to staff ISAF Phase 
III, and are now preparing to deploy up to 1,400 personnel in 
conjunction with British, Canadian, and possibly Australian 
forces.  Separately, the Dutch deployment of Special Forces 
in a combat role represents a major shift in Dutch priorities 
away from peace-keeping to combat missions for the first time 
since the 1960's.  The Dutch remain a strong supporter in the 
war on terrorism in Afghanistan.  We should encourage them 
both to continue to make significant contributions, and to 
push others to do more. 
 
- Africa:  Senior Dutch military officials say they are 
considering expanding their military presence in Africa to 
include Burundi, Rwanda, Eastern Congo, Botswana, Zambia, and 
Ivory Coast, adding new "eyes and ears" on the ground.  The 
Dutch have requested embedding a cell at EUCOM (similar to 
that already operating in CENTCOM) to coordinate their 
actions with the U.S. and other allies.  One objective of the 
Dutch military deployments is to provide a secure environment 
for what is already one of the most ambitious assistance 
programs in the world.  The Dutch are the fourth largest 
provider of assistance to Africa world-wide.  In 2005 they 
established a 110 million Euro Stability Fund for security 
sector reform in the African Great Lakes Region and Sudan (as 
well as Afghanistan and Iraq.)  Dutch deployments in Africa 
have solid support in Parliament, while the focus on security 
as an aspect of development provides an attractive 
justification for potential European partners.  We should not 
only encourage the Dutch to increase their direct involvement 
in Africa, but also explore whether the Dutch could act as a 
"clearinghouse" for other interested parties. 
- Iraq:  The Dutch were instrumental in providing early 
logistic support to U.S. forces in Iraq (including permitting 
transshipments through Rotterdam when other ports in Europe 
would not.)  The Dutch deployed 1,200 troops directly to the 
southern province of al-Muthanna for 20 months, including two 
controversial extensions.  Although the Dutch have since 
withdrawn from al-Muthanna, their presence provided the 
political and military cover necessary for Japan to commit 
forces.  The Dutch provided 25 trainers for the NATO Training 
Mission in Iraq, and have offered to provide up to 100 if 
other countries would make comparable contributions.  We 
should urge the Dutch to continue to push their EU and NATO 
partners to do more in Iraq. 
 
- Middle East:  The Dutch enjoy a reputation for "balance" 
almost unique in Europe, as they are strong supporters of 
Israel, yet trusted by Arabs.  Given Foreign Minister Bot's 
expressed willingness to take a more active regional role. 
We should look for opportunities to harness Dutch interest 
through participation in the Forum for the Future and other 
initiatives.  The Dutch have already promised to make a 
financial contribution to an expanded Multinational Observer 
Force (MFO) if asked, and, under the right circumstances, 
might be prepared to send peace-keepers to the region as well. 
 
8. (S) These commitments demonstrate how the Dutch "take 
their responsibilities seriously" in practice by committing 
real resources -- money, troops, hardware, and political 
capital -- to tackle real problems, as well as their 
"multiplier" effect in the political-military realm. The fact 
that the Dutch are providing the head (Peter Feith) and 
observers to the EU's new monitoring mission in Aceh is the 
latest example of their assuming leadership of an important 
international mission in a region where they feel special 
ties (as witnessed by FM Bot's historic decision this year to 
attend the commemoration of Indonesian independence, the 
first such visit by a senior Dutch official since Indonesian 
independence). 
 
9. (S) The Dutch have one of the largest, most geographically 
diverse deployments of military forces in the world, with 
more troops deployed as a percentage of their total forces 
than any other ally.  Defense Minister Kamp and CHOD Berlijn 
recently restructured the Dutch military to eliminate layers 
of bureaucracy, including independent service chiefs, thereby 
creating a leaner, more deployable force.  Kamp and Berlijn 
believe firmly in the "use or lose" principle, and have 
accordingly sought increasingly challenging operations -- 
such as the Special Forces deployment to Afghanistan and 
potential operations in sub-Saharan Africa.  Their desire to 
maximize the military's capabilities and their preference for 
U.S. equipment, even when alternative European suppliers 
exist, make the Dutch strong supporters of the Joint Strike 
Fighter (JSF) program.  The Dutch are one of only two 
countries (Italy is the other) whose financial contributions 
merit Tier II status in JSF development.  Berlijn is pushing 
to lock in an early commitment for 50 planes (out of a total 
of 85) to prevent JSF from becoming an issue in the 2007 
elections.  The Dutch are also seeking Tactical Tomahawks for 
Dutch frigates, additional lift capacity (CH-47, C-130, 
KDC-10), and are continuing to update their remaining 
hardware (AH-64D, F-16's, Patriot Missile System, etc.) all 
of which are focused on meeting their Prague Capability 
Commitment objectives as well as their ability to sustain 
extended expeditionary operations outside the European 
theater. 
 
COUNTERTERRORISM COOPERATION 
---------------------------- 
 
10. (S) Faced with growing threats in their own country, as 
witnessed by the murder of Theo van Gogh in November 2004, 
the Dutch believe they are in the forefront of Europe with 
regard to counterterrorism, arguing that legislation and 
other steps earlier adopted by the Dutch are only now being 
considered in countries like the UK and Italy.  Led by 
Justice Minister Donner and Finance Minister Zalm, the Dutch 
were the first in Europe to implement the Container Security 
Initiative (CSI), Radiological Gates, DOE's Megaports 
program, U.S. Customs' Green Lane Program, and, soon, Trusted 
Flyers.  China has engaged the Dutch on next generation 
protocols and standards for transport security, includng RFID 
technology.  It will be important to monitor and work with 
the Dutch as they work with China.  The Dutch have also 
expressed an interest to participate in DHS's "Centers of 
Excellence."  While the EU was arguing with us and itself 
over releasing personal records to airlines, the Dutch 
allowed U.S. immigration teams (IAP) to operate at Schipol 
airport.  The Dutch were instrumental in pushing the EU in 
2003 to designate Hamas in its entirety as a terrorist 
entity; an EU-wide designation of the Dutch branch of the 
Al-Aqsa followed.  During their EU Presidency the Dutch 
hosted an EU-wide seminar to raise awareness of terrorist 
financing issues and have offered to host a major 
international conference on the same subject in 2006. The 
Dutch continue to push for EU designation of Hizballah in its 
entirety and to strengthen the EU's "Clearinghouse" 
designation process.  Given their record, we should continue 
to look to the Dutch to launch joint pilot programs in 
Europe, and, more generally, to push counterterrorism issues 
to the top of the European agenda more generally. 
 
DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE 
---------------------- 
 
11. (S)  The Netherlands is among the world's leading aid 
donors, having budgeted USD 4.2 billion (0.74 percent of GDP, 
with a target of raising it to 0.8 percent) in assistance in 
2004.  It is a top donor of unearmarked assistance to UN 
humanitarian programs.  In 2003, the Netherlands introduced a 
more focused aid strategy, which phased out smaller aid 
programs in wealthier countries.  Dutch bilateral aid is now 
directed to 36 partner countries, including 18 in Africa.  In 
2003, President Bush and Prime Minister Balkenende signed an 
MOU to coordinate HIV/AIDS programs in Ghana, Zambia, Rwanda 
and Ethiopia that emphasizes public-private partnerships. 
Balkenende recently expressed interest in using the 
Millennium Challenge Corporation as a model for promoting 
public-private partnerships world-wide.  USAID's involvement 
with a Heineken AIDS treatment and education program in 
Rwanda has been particularly successful, and the World Bank 
has adopted it as a model.  Dutch creativity and credibility 
in development makes them good potential partners for future 
joint initiatives with the U.S.  We should also take 
advantage of their experience and insights to help shift 
global aid efforts in the direction of sustainable long-term 
development. 
 
CENTER OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
12. (S) With the International Court of Justice (ICJ), 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY), the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA), the 
Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal, the International Criminal Court 
(ICC) and other international legal institutions all located 
in The Hague, our ability to have an impact in the 
Netherlands on international issues ranging from Iraq to the 
Balkans is unique.  With a historical interest in 
international law dating back to Grotius, the Dutch view 
themselves as natural defenders of international legal norms 
and practices.  This tradition made them the perfect hosts 
for a conference of Iraqi judges in The Hague in 2004, and 
has pushed them to the forefront of international efforts to 
train a new generation of Iraqi jurists.  While their 
legalistic approach can be frustrating, they are flexible. 
Their concerns about U.S. interpretations of the Geneva 
Protocols have not prevented their Special Forces from 
deploying in Afghanistan.  The Dutch also helped sway the EU 
to vote against the Cuban-sponsored resolution on Guantanamo 
at the Human Rights Commission last year despite concerns 
about the treatment of detainees.  But, as Foreign Minister 
Bot told Deputy Secretary Zoellick recently, over the long 
run Dutch human rights concerns must be addressed to ensure 
that public and parliamentary support does not erode; we and 
the Dutch need to work together to resolve this concern. 
Finally, the Dutch combination of seeking pragmatic solutions 
while remaining true to their legal principles could make the 
Dutch an important asset in resolving our differences with 
the EU over the ICC and article 98 agreements under the right 
circumstances. 
 
ECONOMICS AND TRADE 
------------------- 
 
13. (S) Balkenende shares our interest in promoting an open 
international trading system and has been an ally in U.S.-EU 
trade disputes such as Boeing-Airbus and the Foreign Sales 
Corporation Tax.  The Dutch share with the British a vision 
of a market-friendly Europe driven by free trade.  They are 
the third largest investor in the U.S. and the fourth largest 
recipient of U.S. investment world-wide.  Their efforts to 
shift the Lisbon agenda in a more cooperative direction and 
to promote innovation and competition are creating additional 
opportunities for U.S. investors in Europe.  Because the 
Netherlands has one of the highest broadband penetrations in 
Europe, emerging research efforts in the areas of 
nanotechnology, life sciences, and other IT-related areas, 
and a new tax treaty, the country offers U.S. companies an 
important gateway into Europe.  If consulted early and 
regularly, the Netherlands can also be an important ally in 
navigating the EU's regulatory environment and removing 
obstacles. 
 
DRUGS AND TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS 
-------------------------------- 
 
14. (S) Narcotics and trafficking in persons remain areas of 
difficulty.  Despite fundamental differences regarding "soft 
drugs" and legalized prostitution, the Balkenende government 
has worked to prevent these differences from defining our 
relationship.  There are also signs that Dutch attitudes may 
be shifting.  The Dutch remain a major producer of synthetic 
drugs.  On the other hand, Dutch Health Minister Hoogevorst 
recently signed a precedent-setting MOU with the U.S. to 
share information on the health risks of new strains of 
marijuana with higher concentrations of THC, which may 
convince the Dutch to rethink their approach to "soft drugs" 
in general.  The Dutch are addressing drug tourism -- a 
recent proposal to restrict the sale of marijuana to Dutch 
passport holders in Maastricht, for example, could cut down 
on cross-border smuggling and other drug-related crime.  We 
should support such initiatives actively. 
 
BALKENENDE SOLID INTERNATIONALLY... 
----------------------------------- 
 
15. (S)  We are fortunate to have in the Balkenende 
government an outward-looking partner for whom working with 
the U.S. and the U.K. comes naturally.  Balkenende and FM Bot 
take pride in building bridges between the U.S. and Europe. 
Nowhere was this more evident than during the Dutch 
presidency of the EU.  On two issues of great importance to 
the U.S. -- the China Arms Embargo and accession talks for 
Turkey -- the Dutch moved, with our active urging, from 
following an EU "consensus" set by others to redefining the 
issue on their, and our, terms.  In both cases, Bot and 
Balkenende overcame initial skepticism and concluded that 
Dutch and U.S. interests coincided -- a pattern we have seen 
repeated on other less important issues.  FM Bot began the EU 
presidency telling us that lifting the Arms Embargo was a 
"done deal."  Later, however, he actively intervened to 
prevent a lift on "his" watch, saying that he did not want 
the blame for causing a rift between the U.S. and EU. 
Despite Balkenende's personal skepticism about bringing 
Turkey into the EU, he and Bot (a former Ambassador to 
Turkey) worked hard to ensure that Turkey got its date to 
start accession talks with the EU during the Dutch 
presidency, and want to see the agreement they helped 
negotiate successfully implemented.  We will want the Dutch 
to continue to draw on the relationships they developed 
during the presidency to coax both sides to move in the right 
direction as October 3 approaches. 
 
16. (S) Specific U.S. policies provoke squalls of anger and 
frustration here, but President Bush's visit to the 
Netherlands in 2005 to commemorate V-E day at the WWII Dutch 
American Cemetery at Margraten was met with universal acclaim 
and provoked remarkably little protest.  Even Dutch opposed 
to U.S. policies warmly welcomed the visit as a reminder of 
enduring, shared values forged in the crucibles of World War 
II and the Cold War.  This mission has pursued an ambitious 
program of outreach to future Dutch leaders to ensure that 
these emotions are passed to the next generation.  In this 
effort, the President's youth roundtable in Maastricht and 
former Secretary of State Powell's town hall meeting with 
young leaders in The Hague were notable successes, which can 
serve as models for future efforts.  Given the 
disproportionate influence wielded by the Dutch in 
international fora, we should expand our active exchange 
programs (including the Fulbright and International Visitor 
Leadership Programs) to help shape the successor generation. 
 
...BUT FACES DOMESTIC CHALLENGES 
-------------------------------- 
 
17. (S) Unfortunately, the outward-looking, transatlantic 
orientation of the Balkenende cabinet is offset domestically 
by strong strains of Euro-centralism and Dutch-provincialism. 
 This division will become more pronounced as the parties 
prepare for local elections in March 2006, and national 
elections in May 2007.  Current polls show that Balkenende's 
center-right coalition (his second government) is falling in 
the polls, while the main, center-left opposition Labor party 
(PvdA) and fringes on the right and left are gaining. 
Balkenende is gambling that his economic reform agenda will 
pay dividends in time for the 2007 elections, but that is 
uncertain.  There is a strong chance that a center-left 
government dominated by the PvdA will come to power in 2007 
-- or earlier if the 2006 local election results prompt 
national elections. 
 
18. (S) Although U.S.-Dutch relations should remain 
fundamentally sound despite a shift to the center-left, a 
PvdA-led government would present new challenges.  PvdA 
leader Wouter Bos has made clear his tendency to look to 
Brussels first in setting Dutch international priorities.  He 
sees the Netherlands less as a transatlantic "bridge builder" 
than as a follower of EU consensus.  As with Schroeder in 
Germany, Bos might also find it tempting to adopt a critical 
attitude toward the U.S. during elections to lock in his left 
flank.  The PvdA is already raising allegations of U.S. 
abuses to challenge the rationale for Dutch deployments in 
Afghanistan, and does not support the JSF program.  It is in 
our interest both to support the current government's 
transatlantic orientation and to engage actively with the 
opposition to shift them in a favorable direction. 
 
THE ISLAMIC FACTOR 
------------------ 
 
19. (S) A new, but potentially serious factor in Dutch 
domestic politics is its large, poorly integrated Muslim 
population, currently numbering just under 1 million, or 5.8 
percent of the population.  USG-sponsored polls show that 83 
percent of Dutch Muslims identify much more strongly with 
their religion than with their host country, while 51 percent 
have little or no faith in the Dutch government as an 
institution.  While the problems of Dutch integration 
captured international headlines following the van Gogh 
murder, the Dutch believe they have an early start on the 
rest of Europe in seeking creative ways to address these 
concerns.  Their strong interest in sharing and soliciting 
ideas has opened up opportunities for Embassy and USG 
outreach and consultations throughout Dutch society, 
providing insights into a growing problem throughout Europe. 
We expect our experiences here will provide good indications 
of broader European trends as well as opportunities to 
influence their direction. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
----------- 
 
20. (S)  The Netherlands is a complicated, multi-layered 
society.  Prevailing myths about the Dutch -- e.g., they are 
homogenous, universally tolerant, pacifist, etc.-- do not 
accurately gauge differences within society or reflect Dutch 
potential to influence international events.  While the Dutch 
prefer to see themselves as "balancing" between Europe and 
the U.S., this balance can shift due to domestic and 
international factors. 
 
21. (S) The key to maximizing Dutch effectiveness is to 
involve them early through high-level consultations and 
exchanges.  Dutch pragmatism and our similar world-views make 
the Netherlands fertile ground for initiatives others in 
Europe might be reluctant, at least initially, to embrace. 
 
22. (S) As multipliers, the Dutch should be encouraged to 
play an increasingly prominent role on the global stage. 
Coaxing the Dutch into the spotlight can take effort, but 
pays off royally.  Dutch credentials, credibility, and 
capabilities make them effective leaders across a wide range 
of geographic regions and substantive issues. 
 
23. (S) The Dutch are actively and favorably involved in 
Afghanistan, Africa, Iraq, the Middle East, the Balkans, the 
Caribbean, Indonesia, and elsewhere.  They are our best 
partner in developing pilot projects in the counterterrorism 
area, and are world leaders in development, free trade, 
international law and human rights.  In pursuit of U.S. 
interests in all these areas of interest and leadership, we 
should build upon our successes to date to take the Dutch to 
the "next level." 
SOBEL