US embassy cable - 05BAGHDAD3438

C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 003438 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/22/2025 
TAGS: PGOV, PINS, IZ, Shia Coalition 
SUBJECT: SADRIST PARLIAMENTARIAN WORRIES ABOUT NATIONAL 
UNITY 
 
Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR ROBERT FORD FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND 
(D). 
 
1.  (C) Sadrist Parliamentarian Sami Jasim Attiyah al-Askari 
told PolCouns on August 20 that no more than three provinces 
should be permitted to form a region.  Askeri, who is from 
An-Nasiriyah, said that many Shia fear that Najaf and Karbala 
would dominate a single region encompassing all Shia-majority 
provinces.  Southern Iraqis would want more local rule.  He 
further argued that it would be easier for Iran to exert its 
influence over one Shia region rather than several.  He 
evinced skepticism about the utility of regional units in 
general, a viewpoint he said many in the Shia Coalition 
share.  He also conceded that much of the pressure from 
Basrah to form a region was easing now that it was clear it 
would not mean an immediate oil revenue bonanza.  (Comment: 
Sadr-associated groups organized small demonstrations in 
Baghdad and Samawa against federalism on August 20.  End 
Comment.) 
 
2.  (C)  In response to our probing about the importance to 
the Shia Coalition of keeping de-Baathification language in 
the constitution, Askeri at first called it essential.  Many 
Shia, he said, worry that without the permanent constitution 
legalizing the de-Baath commission, it might disappear. 
PolCouns noted that the existing transitional national 
assembly could also just pass a law defining the status of 
the de-Baath commission.  This would enable the constitution 
to avoid mentioning the de-Baath commission while keeping the 
body functioning.  In this way, it might be possible to 
attract some more Sunni Arab support for the draft 
constitution.  Askeri understood the logic and concluded this 
might be workable for the Shia.  (Comment:  Askeri is one of 
the most vehement anti-Baathists in the current assembly. 
End Comment.) 
 
3.  (C)  Askeri mentioned there is also some unease among the 
Shia about the general direction of Iraq and the risks of the 
country coming apart.  Kurdish insistence on control of oil 
does not bode well, he mentioned.  Pointing to the Kurdish 
insistance on the continuation of the pesh merga, Askeri 
observed that regional security forces under local control 
would merit careful treatment.  He anticipated that a Shia 
region would quickly follow the Kurdish lead and form "local 
security forces" loyal not to Baghdad but to the regional 
government center.  These forces might be little more than 
political-party based militias, he speculated.  Any disputes 
between regions, such as border and water disputes, could 
lead to local armed clashes.  He was especially concerned 
about the disputed border between Sunni-dominated Al-Anbar 
and neighboring Shia provinces, highlighting problems between 
Anbar and Karbala and Babil.  He discounted the possibility 
of armed conflict between different Shia "local security" 
groups, saying that there are no important border disputes 
among Shia-majority provinces. 
 
4.  (C) Askeri recommended that it would be important to 
limit the size and shape of regional security forces, 
allowing them to have only weapons needed for  "internal 
security."  He said that regional militias should not be 
allowed to possess tanks, artillery and aircraft.  He claimed 
to believe that local security forces should be loyal to 
regional governments, not political parties.  (COMMENT:  He 
made no specific reference to the future of the Sadrist 
"Mahdi Militia."  END COMMENT) 
 
 
Khalilzad