US embassy cable - 05CAIRO6447

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CAIRO 006447 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/21/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PTER, KPAL, EG, IS, IZ, Visits 
SUBJECT: CODEL HOEKSTRA'S MEETING WITH EGYPTIAN GENERAL 
INTELLIGENCE SERVICE DIRECTOR SOLIMAN 
 
 
Classified by Charge Stuart Jones for reasons 1.4(b) and (d). 
 
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Summary 
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1.  (C)  In an August 20 meeting at the Egyptian General 
Intelligence Service (EGIS), Congressman Hoekstra, 
Congresswoman Wilson, Congressman Shadegg, and Charge 
discussed Gaza withdrawal, terrorism in the Sinai, Iraq, and 
Iran.  On Gaza, Soliman stressed the need to prevent Gaza 
from becoming a prison.  On Iraq,  Soliman urged the U.S. to 
focus on quelling violence and improving the lives of Iraqis 
rather than rushing to hold elections.  Finally, Soliman 
urged the USG to engage with Iran.  End summary. 
 
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CODEL Hoekstra's meeting at EGIS 
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2.  (C)  Peter Hoekstra (R-MI), Chairman of the HPSCI, 
accompanied by Heather Wilson (R-NM), John Shadegg (R-AZ), 
HPSCI staff members Michael Meermans, Chris Donesa, Michael 
Ennis, and Jamal Ware met EGIS Director Soliman at EGIS 
Headquarters in Cairo on August 21 for over 90 minutes.  The 
CODEL was accompanied by CDA Jones, ORA Deputy Graiss and 
poloff as Embassy notetaker. 
 
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Gaza Withdrawal 
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3.  (C) Soliman said that Gaza withdrawal presents both 
challenges and opportunities for the region.  Withdrawal is 
significant, Soliman noted, because it is the first time the 
GOI unilaterally decided to withdraw from the occupied 
territories, because it will give hope to Palestinians, and 
because it could potentially minimize the capabilities and 
popular appeal of radical Palestinian organizations.  He 
added that because Egyptians are agitated by the ongoing 
deaths of Palestinians, ensuring a peaceful withdrawal is 
also important to Egypt's internal security.  To that end, 
Soliman advised that the GOE will continue to support the 
Palestinians after withdrawal by training their security 
services and maintaining an Egyptian presence with new 
Palestinian battalions in Gaza to diffuse tension among 
factions. 
 
4.  (C)  As for the future, Soliman warned that Gaza must not 
become a prison.  Gazans should have access to sea/air ports, 
efficient land border crossings, and links with the West Bank 
for work, trade, and study.  Without this openness, Gaza will 
not be attractive for investment and may become a "Gazastan" 
rather than the "Gazapore" the GOE wants it to become. 
Soliman said that when he shared this objective with PM 
Sharon in a recent meeting, Sharon responded that he plans to 
design a fast train link between Gaza and the West Bank.  The 
potential for further Israeli withdrawal, from the 
Philadelphi strip in particular, will depend on making the 
GOI feel secure.  Soliman said that the GOE aims to build 
this sense of security by using professional border guards 
(and not police officers) to secure the border and stop the 
smuggling through border tunnels.  Congressman Hoekstra 
thanked Soliman for the positive role the GOE and EGIS is 
playing in Gaza. 
 
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Sinai Terrorist Incidents 
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5.  (C)  Linking the Palestinian situation to the terrorist 
incidents in Sinai in October 2004 and July 2005, Soliman 
expressed optimism that withdrawal would weaken the "small" 
Jihadi groups based in Sinai that support Palestinian 
extremists.  Soliman said that these groups easily recruited 
locals sympathetic to the Palestinian cause, and directed 
their terrorist acts against Israeli tourists because they 
found it difficult to cross into Israel.  According to 
Soliman, the GOE arrested many, but not all, of the Jihadis 
and local sympathizers following the October 2004 attacks in 
Taba.  He speculated that those not arrested launched the 
July 23 bombings in Sharm el Sheikh to avenge the arrested. 
Soliman shared that the GOE has a plan to "rid Sinai" of the 
remaining Jihadis, and noted that a more positive outlook 
among Palestinians following a smooth Gaza withdrawal, will 
help in this plan by reducing Jihadi appeal among Sinai 
locals. 
 
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Iraq 
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6.  (C)  The priorities for Iraq, Soliman explained, should 
include keeping it united, stopping terrorism, and improving 
the lives of Iraqis.  Regarding the need for a united Iraq, 
Soliman expressed concern that the Kurds may be hoping to 
gain "privileges" from the new constitution and flagged the 
division that granting such privileges would cause among the 
factions. 
 
7.  (C)  Soliman stressed that ending the violence should 
take precedence over the USG's political goal of finalizing a 
constitution and pressing for speedy elections.  He offered 
two suggestions on how to stop terrorism.  First, he urged 
the USG to consider (and offered to assist with) opening a 
back channel to Sunni insurgents, who he alleged are the 
well-trained ex-soldiers responsible for approximately 70 
percent of the violence.  Although he denied knowing the 
insurgents' demands, Soliman said they may want the release 
of prisoners or a delay in the constitutional drafting 
process.  If the requests raised by the Sunnis are 
unreasonable, the U.S. can simply reject them, Soliman said. 
On the other hand, he argued, the dialogue may lead to an 
understanding between the Coalition and the Sunnis that would 
convince the Sunnis to stop their violence.  Soliman 
clarified that he had raised, and the U.S. had rejected, the 
back channel proposal on numerous occasions in the past. 
 
8.  (C)  A second approach to stopping the violence, Soliman 
argued, would require the Coalition to control Iraq's 
borders, which he described as a "disaster."  He offered that 
any arrested foreign terror suspect will admit that that he 
entered Iraq through its open borders.  If, however, the 
Jihadis from Saudi, Kuwait, and Syria see that it is hard to 
cross, they will stop trying, Soliman argued.  Soliman 
predicted that until the Coalition breaks the cycle of 
violence, the Iraqi people will not focus on the constitution 
or elections and will blame the Coalition, not the insurgents 
for the violence. 
 
9.  (C) Bolstering development programs to improve the lives 
of Iraqis, Soliman pressed, must be a priority because it is 
critical to improving the Coalition's image and to creating 
an environment in which Iraqis can think about their future 
and their government and not just their security.  He 
suggested that water, electricity, and road projects should 
proceed immediately in peaceful areas such as Basra to show 
the Iraqis that their lives are better and to encourage them 
to support the Coalition. 
 
10.  (C) Congressman Hoekstra, Congressman Shadegg, and 
Congresswoman Wilson all pressed Soliman to use his influence 
to persuade the Sunnis to participate in the constitutional 
drafting process and elections.  So doing, Wilson noted, will 
promote stability and quell the violence.  Regarding the need 
for development projects, Congressman Shadegg agreed that it 
would be impossible to "win" without first improving the 
lives of Iraqis.  In response to the request for further GOE 
support, Soliman said "not now," citing the need to stop the 
violence before engaging further.  He also declined to commit 
to encouraging Sunni participation in the government under 
present circumstances, explaining that the Iraqi people are 
not interested in the political process because they are not 
yet secure. 
 
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Iran 
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11.  (C)  In response to Congresswoman Wilson's request that 
Soliman share his thoughts on Iran, Soliman stressed that he 
has always advised the USG to "dance with" Iran.  Forcing 
Iran into a corner, he cautioned, will harm the entire region 
because Iran will react by becoming more radical. Soliman 
explained that engagement, by contrast, may allow Iran to 
make a deal that would let it escape from its currently bad 
situation.  He added that a dialogue with a known source of 
terrorism and funding for terrorists would also be useful. 
 
12.  (U)  The Codel did not have an opportunity to clear this 
cable. 
 
 
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JONES