US embassy cable - 05BANGKOK5393

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 005393 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EAP, EAP/MLS 
NSC FOR MORROW 
DEFENSE FOR OSD/ISA (STERN, POWERS) 
PACOM FOR FPA HUSO 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/21/2015 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, MARR, TH 
SUBJECT: THAKSIN COMES TO LUNCH 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Ralph L. Boyce.  Reason 1.4 (a and d) 
 
 1.  (C)  Summary.  Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra is 
confident and focused as he prepares for his September 19 
meeting with the President.  He is prepared to discuss 
ongoing separatist violence in Southern Thailand and his 
policy towards Burma.  He welcomes the upcoming Thai-U.S. 
Dialogue on strategic issues and offered to work to remove 
bans on U.S. beef prior to his visit.  He also promised to 
try to seek conclusion of an Open Skies agreement.  However, 
he seems to have backtracked from statements FM Kantathi made 
to the Secretary indicating Thailand will soon sign the 
Proliferation Security Initiative, now indicating that the 
RTG awaits another ASEAN nation other than Singapore to sign 
first.  On F-16, Thaksin said that Thailand is prepared to 
spend approximately 400 million USD on mid-life upgrades to 
F-16s already in the fleet, but hinted that pressure from 
Russia might make him purchase some SU-30s.  Thaksin remains 
indispensable to our efforts at reaching a FTA with Thailand: 
 without his personal involvement on the issue, it is 
unlikely we will make progress.  End Summary. 
 
THAKSIN CALLS 
 
2.  (C)  On August 22, I hosted Thaksin for lunch at the 
residence to discuss his upcoming visit to Washington.  He 
was relaxed and at ease, telling me that he had just given 
CNBC an interview in which he was asked what issues he wanted 
to discuss in Washington.  "I told them that I have no 
'issues,' only areas of cooperation.  We are two friends 
catching up," he said.  He did mention that he hoped to leave 
Washington by noon on September 19 in order to meet with PRC 
Vice Premier Wu Yi in Chiang Mai on September 21 and wondered 
whether his meeting with the President could take place in 
the morning.  I said that I had already forwarded that 
request through the NSC. 
 
DISCUSSING THE SOUTH 
 
3.  (C)  I said that Washington was very interested to know 
how Thai policy towards the troubles in the South might be 
changing.  I referred to concerns both inside and outside 
Thailand that Thaksin had seized "dictatorial powers" when he 
issued the recent emergency decree.  Thaksin said he fully 
expects the President to ask him about the South; "if he 
doesn't raise the issue, I will" he said.  He emphasized that 
Justice Minister Chidchai Vanasatidya remained in charge of 
the police and military response to southern violence while 
Education Minister Chaturon Chaisaeng was responsible for 
addressing social issues.  He described his visit last Friday 
to the region, where he went to encourage shop owners to defy 
pressure from separatists to close on Fridays, as a success. 
 
BURMA 
 
4.  (C)  I reminded Thaksin that he had told Secretary Rice 
that four years of "constructive engagement" with Burma left 
him frustrated and facing the likelihood of being more public 
in criticizing Rangoon.  I suggested that the President might 
wish to pursue this matter further. 
 
BEEF AND OPEN SKIES 
 
5.  (C)  Aside from these major issues, I noted that there 
are a handful of other important issues pending.  The 
resolution of these in advance of the visit, I said, could 
comprise a package of impressive achievements for the visit. 
The first issue is beef imports: Thailand still bans U.S. 
beef, in spite of earlier personal assurances from Thaksin 
that the import ban would be lifted.  Thaksin said that this 
could be quickly resolved.  I then mentioned the continuing 
delay in the launch of civil aviation Open Skies talks, in 
spite of assurances by the PM and the Transport Minister to 
Secretary Mineta in late April that the talks should be 
 
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completed within six months.  Thaksin replied, "Let's see if 
we can hold the first round of talks prior to my meeting with 
the President (i.e., prior to September 19)."  I welcomed 
this proposal and promised to convey it to the appropriate 
USG officials. 
 
PSI 
 
6.  (C)  I reminded Thaksin that FM Kantathi Suphamongkhon 
had indicated to the Secretary that Thailand might be willing 
to sign the PSI Statement of Principles soon.  Thaksin 
reiterated that intent, but backtracked slightly, saying that 
Thailand would sign as soon as another ASEAN member other 
than Singapore signed on.  "I need cover on this in the 
South," he said. 
 
F-16 
 
7.  (C)  On Thailand's efforts to procure new or updated 
fighter aircraft, Thaksin said that he was reviewing a plan 
to spend about 400 million USD to perform mid-life upgrades 
on two squadrons of F-16s already in the RTAF inventory. 
Nonetheless, he said that Russian President Putin was pushing 
SU-30 hard and indicated that it would be difficult not to 
buy Russian as well.  I explained that a Sukhoi purchase had 
the potential to jeopardize a future Thai purchase of the 
Joint Strike Fighter and suggested that he mollify the 
Russians by announcing that Thailand would procure no new 
aircraft and simply upgrading its existing fleet.  I asked 
whether this might not give Thaksin a face-saving way to 
avoid creating a problem with either side.  He was quiet for 
a long time and said he would think about this in detail.  He 
emphasized that no final decision had yet been made. 
 
FTA 
 
8.  (C)  I mentioned our growing concern with the slow 
progress of our FTA talks.  I emphasized that the two sides 
have been meeting for over a year, but these meetings have 
been mostly information exchanges.  By and large, the talks 
so far have been mostly conversation, with little in the way 
of negotiations.  Added to this slow pace is the fact that 
public opinion (as reflected in the Thai media) seems almost 
uniformly anti-FTA, with precious few RTG officials speaking 
publicly in favor of an FTA with the U.S.  I told the Prime 
Minister that I only half jokingly inform U.S. visitors that 
the PM seems to be the only person in Thailand who supports 
an FTA with the U.S. 
 
9.  (C)  Thaksin replied that the reluctance of the Thai FTA 
team to seriously engage with the U.S. is due to the fact 
that "we are afraid of you; you'll have to convince us to be 
less afraid."  Part of the cause of Thai anxiety, he said, is 
discussions with Singaporean officials.  These officials, he 
said, have complained to the Thais that Singapore got less 
than it thought it bargained for in its own FTA with the U.S. 
 Singaporean bad-mouthing aside, Thaksin went on to say that 
he does not envision any serious problems in eventually 
concluding an FTA with the U.S., and will tell the President 
that he still fully supports the FTA.  Thaksin noted that 
Thailand had just successfully concluded an FTA with Japan. 
As the talks went down to the wire, seemingly irreconcilable 
differences remained.  The PM recalled how the Thai chief 
negotiator and his Japanese counterpart met with him.  Both 
seemed very downcast.  Said Thaksin, "I told them, why are 
you so pessimistic?  PM Koizumi and I have a great 
relationship, we are always in a good mood and laugh a lot 
when we meet.  If we can do it, so can you.  I told them to 
go into a nearby room, fix the remaining problems, and then 
go to dinner.  And that's what they did." 
 
U.S.-THAI DIALOGUE 
 
10.  (C)  I told Thaksin that we took seriously his radio 
remarks after his meeting with Secretary Rice of the need to 
implement a bilateral "Action Plan" to strengthen our 
relationship.  I explained that we were now working on talks 
to take place in November, led on our side by the State 
Department and including representatives from NSC, OSD, JCS 
and PACOM.  He was very appreciative of this news and 
suggested it would be worth highlighting in Washington. 
 
DPRK 
 
11.  (C)  Thaksin mentioned that FM Kantathi still planned to 
go to the DPRK this month and hopes to talk to Secretary Rice 
before departing.  "If Kim Jong Il is lucid," Thaksin said 
"I'll probably go there myself later." 
 
THAKSIN SHOWS HIS AUTHORITARIAN SIDE 
 
12.  (C)  Thaksin complained vociferously about how he is 
targeted by the Bangkok elite and the media.  He said there 
were two major problems in Thai society, the press and the 
courts.  "In the old days, reporters and editors were paid 
off by crooked politicians and gamblers.  Previous PMs were 
more subservient to the press too, frequently doing them 
favors."  He explained that his unwillingness to do so was 
the reason he is attacked in the Thai media.  He told me that 
he will continue to weed out the out-of-date political hacks 
in senior positions of power suggesting that current Deputy 
Prime Minister Pinij Jarusombat might be next to go from the 
Cabinet. 
 
MALAYSIA 
 
13.  (C)  Thaksin told me he was bedeviled by his 
relationship with Malaysia.  Having worked with Malaysian PM 
Badawi when they were both Foreign Ministers, Thaksin said 
that he fully anticipated a better relationship with Kuala 
Lumpur.  Thaksin suggested that Badawi was now either 
unwilling to engage with Muslim separatists in Thailand for 
fear of aggravating his own problems or even hoped to restore 
Pattani as part of greater Malaysia.  In either case, Thaksin 
suggested, the Malaysians had not been as helpful on 
addressing complicated issues like dual nationals as he had 
hoped.  As a result, Thaksin sent DPM Surakiart Sathirathai 
to Malaysia with evidence of wrongdoing by dual nationals. 
That mission had been a partial success, Thaksin suggested, 
but relations were still not what they should be. 
 
SURAKIART AS UNSYG 
 
14.  (C)  As Surakiart's name had come up, I asked about his 
prospects to become UN Secretary General.  "If it is truly 
Asia's year to have the Secretary Generalship," Thaksin told 
me, "then it should be Surakiart."  He said that he had 
endorsements from China, India, France, Russia and ASEAN.  I 
confidentially suggested, however, that Surakiart might have 
 
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some problems based on his lack of experience and youth and 
noted that neither of us wanted to see Thailand put into an 
awkward situation.  Thaksin asked rhetorically whether other 
Thai candidates might be acceptable, but acknowledged that so 
much capital had been spent promoting Surakiart that it might 
be impossible to put forward another Thai. 
 
 
COMMENT 
 
15.  (C)  Although Thaksin is probably receiving more intense 
public criticism now than at any time since early in his 
first administration, he remains confident and very much in 
control.  All elements for a successful meeting with the 
President seem to be in place. The seemingly good prospect 
for resolving two issues -- beef and Open Skies -- in advance 
of the meeting with the President is good news.  On the FTA, 
the PM's story of how the FTA with Japan was resolved is 
consistent with our experience: Thaksin's personal engagement 
is essential in order to make anything important happen here. 
 But, the crucial issue of timing remains.  The importance of 
completing the FTA by early '06 would be a useful point for 
the President to emphasize in his meeting with the Prime 
Minister.  Thaksin's backpedaling on PSI is unfortunate, but 
should be resolvable if we succeed in obtaining the 
endorsement of another ASEAN country quickly.  F-16 is 
another matter.  Given the fact that many senior officials, 
including Secretaries Rice and Rumsfeld, have raised our 
concerns about F-16, it would be conspicuous to the Thai if 
the President did not.  The suggestion to Thaksin about 
mid-life upgrades, conducted by Lockheed Martin, in lieu of 
purchasing new fighters, might be worth pursuing. 
BOYCE