US embassy cable - 05TELAVIV5155

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FM SHALOM TELLS A/S WELCH THAT ISRAELIS MUST SEE BENEFITS FROM DISENGAGEMENT

Identifier: 05TELAVIV5155
Wikileaks: View 05TELAVIV5155 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Tel Aviv
Created: 2005-08-21 17:16:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PREL PGOV KWBG KPAL IS UNGA GAZA DISENGAGEMENT GOI INTERNAL
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TEL AVIV 005155 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/18/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, KWBG, KPAL, IS, UNGA, GAZA DISENGAGEMENT, GOI INTERNAL 
SUBJECT: FM SHALOM TELLS A/S WELCH THAT ISRAELIS MUST SEE 
BENEFITS FROM DISENGAGEMENT 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Daniel C. Kurtzer for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D) 
. 
 
1. (C) SUMMARY: In an August 17 meeting, FM Silvan Shalom 
told Assistant Secretary Welch and the Ambassador that 
disengagement is proceeding better than expected, but still 
carries a heavy price for Likud politicians.  Shalom 
expressed concern that Palestinian extremists could launch 
attacks against Israel, necessitating severe Israeli 
responses.  He advocated a return to the roadmap, with the 
caveat that Israel would first need to see "full 
implementation" from the Palestinians.  Shalom repeatedly 
stressed the need for Israelis to see concrete benefits from 
disengagement, and suggested the need for positive statements 
by the USG, the Quartet, and the UN, as well as improvement 
in Arab-Israeli relations.  Turning to Iran, Shalom urged the 
United States and EU-3 to address Tehran's nuclear program in 
the UNSC during September.  He also noted the importance that 
Israel places on resuming a strategic dialogue with the USG. 
END SUMMARY. 
 
--------------------------------------- 
Disengagement, Security and the Roadmap 
--------------------------------------- 
 
2. (C) Although he admitted that disengagement "looks much 
better than I predicted," Shalom said that Likud ministers 
and politicians who support disengagement are paying a heavy 
price.  He predicted that early general elections would 
probably take place in March 2006, preceded by party 
primaries.  He cautioned that public disillusionment could 
mean "another ten years" before someone with Sharon's ability 
would emerge and move the peace process forward.  A/S Welch 
noted that the USG has strongly supported the disengagement 
process and has worked to ensure that the GOI and President 
Abbas get full credit for the positive developments. 
 
3. (C) A/S Welch said the USG believes that a successful 
disengagement policy can leave Gaza more open, more 
prosperous, more free and more secure.  He said that he and 
General Ward stressed the importance of security -- 
describing it as "the beginning, the middle, and the end" -- 
during their August 16 meeting in Gaza with Interior Minister 
Nasir Yusif and PA security chiefs.  Shalom expressed concern 
that President Mahmoud Abbas has failed to rein in militants 
and that weapons could flow easily into Gaza from Egypt and 
the future Gaza port.  He said that Hamas, which he claimed 
should be prohibited by the Oslo Accords from taking part in 
PA elections, could win 35-40 percent of the vote in January. 
 If the extremists put their threats of violence into action, 
for example, by launching rockets at Ashqelon, Shalom 
predicted a quick swing in Israeli public opinion leading to 
sweeping political changes in Israel.  Such a "catastrophe" 
would also result in "Defensive Shield III," i.e., the return 
of Israeli troops to Gaza. 
 
4. (C) Shalom reported to the Israeli Cabinet that the GOI 
will face international pressure to move quickly on the peace 
process once disengagement is complete.  He told A/S Welch 
that Israel's willingness to do so is dependent upon how 
disengagement proceeds (i.e., if there are casualties) and on 
what the Palestinians do on the day after.  Pointing to large 
gaps in the PA and GOI positions on refugees and Israel, he 
cautioned against any attempt to address final status issues. 
 Instead, he advocated a return to the roadmap, with the 
caveat that Israel would first need to see "full 
implementation" from the Palestinians.  He accused the 
Palestinians of "doing nothing" to fulfill their obligation 
to act against extremists.  A/S Welch noted the importance of 
the GOI's commitment to the roadmap, saying it protects 
Israel's own interests.  Shalom replied that many Likud 
members do not believe this to be the case. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
Israeli Public Must See Benefits from Disengagement 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
5. (C) Throughout the meeting Shalom emphasized the 
importance of showing Israelis that there are benefits to 
disengagement.  He reiterated his request for USG assistance 
in urging Arab countries to "embrace Israel."  Shalom 
suggested that there was "never a better time" for Arab 
countries to establish diplomatic relations with Israel, or 
-- in the case of Morocco, Tunisia, Qatar and Oman -- to 
publicly reestablish their ties.  He noted that several Arab 
leaders have stated that they plan to visit Gaza.  A/S Welch 
responded that the USG actively encourages closer 
Arab-Israeli ties. 
 
6. (C) Shalom said the GOI is looking for international 
support, adding "we deserve it ... we need it."  He suggested 
that the President's speech at the UNGA might be an 
appropriate venue to make a positive statement and express 
understanding of how difficult disengagement has been for 
Israel.  Chief of Staff Jacob Dayan asked if the Quartet 
could issue positive language.  Director General Ron Prosor 
explained that the GOI believes it will be easier for others 
to praise disengagement if they can refer to a Quartet 
statement. 
 
------------------------------------------- 
Shalom: Bring Iran to the UNSC in September 
------------------------------------------- 
 
7. (C) Shalom stressed that September is the time to speak 
with the Europeans and bring Iran's nuclear program to the 
UNSC.  He claimed that Israeli and American officials agree 
that Iran could achieve independent research and development 
for uranium enrichment within four to six months, even though 
there is disagreement on how quickly Iran could use this 
knowledge to construct nuclear weapons.  A/S Welch noted the 
importance of maintaining unity among the Europeans and on 
including the IAEA in the process. 
 
-------------------------------- 
Request for a Strategic Dialogue 
-------------------------------- 
 
8. (C) Using Iran as an example, Shalom noted the importance 
that Israel places on resuming a strategic dialogue with the 
USG.  A/S Welch acknowledged that Amb. Ayalon had raised the 
issue in Washington and assured Shalom that the request was 
being seriously considered by senior officials. 
 
9. (U) NEA A/S Welch has cleared this message. 
 
********************************************* ******************** 
Visit Embassy Tel Aviv's Classified Website: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/telaviv 
 
You can also access this site through the State Department's 
Classified SIPRNET website. 
********************************************* ******************** 
KURTZER 

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