US embassy cable - 05SANAA2414

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SANAA 002414 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
PINR: C-NE5-00281 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/17/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PTER, KISL, KDEM, KMPI, KMCA, YM 
SUBJECT: WHERE DOES ISLAH'S HEART LIE? 
 
REF: A. SANAA 1723 
     B. SANAA 542 
     C. SANNA 1782 
 
Classified By: DCM Nabeel Khoury for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
1. (C) Summary:  With the 2006 Presidential and Local Council 
elections fast approaching, the Yemeni Congregation for 
Reform, or "Islah" is taking center stage in Yemeni politics. 
 Islah is a coalition of northern tribal interests and the 
Yemeni Muslim Brotherhood (YMB).  The party boasts the 
highest membership of any other political party in Yemen, 
including the ruling General Peoples Conference (GPC).  As 
both tribal and Islamist, it is difficult to pinpoint where 
Islah lies on the ideological spectrum.  Insiders point out 
that Islah's moderate characteristics come from the 
traditionally peaceful Yemeni Muslim Brotherhood (YMB).  The 
YMB's more radical elements also affect party behavior from 
time to time.  Many observers maintain that Islah is 
motivated more by tribal and political interests than 
religion.  End Summary. 
 
2. (SBU) Islah holds 45 out of 301 seats in Parliament. 
Although difficult to confirm, the party's leadership claims 
to have between 800,000 to one million members.  The party's 
support is steadily growing among the young, religious 
conservatives, moderate, reform-driven intellectuals, women 
and (quietly) even from GPC party members.  Geographically, 
the party's support is strongest in the industrial city of 
Taiz, the central region surrounding the towns of Ibb and 
Jibla, and in powerful tribal pockets of the north. 
Recently, the party has gained members from the Yemen 
Socialist Party (YSP) in Aden, most likely a result of 
Islah's social programs and the southward migration of 
Islahis.  Islah lacks strong support from Yemen's Zaydi 
population, concentrated in the north and west of the country 
(ref. A). 
 
--------------------------------------------- - 
The Yemeni Muslim Brotherhood: Mostly Moderate 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
3. (SBU) Islah was formed in 1990 as a coalition of northern 
tribal leaders led by the Hashid tribal confederation and its 
paramount chief, Speaker of Parliament Sheikh Abdullah 
al-Ahmar and the Yemeni Muslim Brotherhood (YMB).  Sheikhs 
Yassin Abdullah and Abdul Majid Zindani founded the Yemeni 
Muslim Brotherhood (YMB) twenty years earlier in Taiz.  In 
its early years, the YMB was funded by Saudi Arabia and 
spread it ideas through the Yemeni educational system, 
heavily reliant on Egyptian teachers, many of whom were 
affiliated with the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood.  The YMB has 
always officially rejected violence, advocated democratic 
change and believed that any political system chosen by a 
Muslim community is religiously acceptable.  Nevertheless, 
there are Islahis associated with the YMB who espouse a more 
radical and militant brand of Islam. 
 
4. (C) Within Islah today, the emerging, though not 
controlling, faction consits of the moderate reformers. 
Their influence can be seen in Islah's platform that mandates 
"democracy bound by Islamic teachings," as well as in the 
opposition coalition Joint Meetings Party (JMP) whose Islah 
representative is Political Director Mohammed Qahtan. 
Discussions with influential Islahis always center on the 
need for a "peaceful struggle" to achieve a democratic and 
non-corrupt state (ref. B).  In addition to Qahtan, leading 
Islahi moderates include the current SYG Mohammed Abdullah 
Yadoumi, Assistant SYG Abdul Wahab al-Anisi, Economic Chief 
Mohammed al-Affendi, Planning Chief Mohammed al-Saidid and 
journalist Nabil as-Sufi. They are not, however, party Chief 
al-Ahmar's inner circle responsible for Islah's relationship 
with President Saleh and the ROYG. 
 
5. (C) Islah's moderate reformers are usually well-educated 
technocrats who espouse a more moderate ideology than Islah's 
core leadership.  Although not social liberals, their 
positions are left of al-Ahmar and his inner circle on 
economic reform, political freedoms, human rights and women's 
issues.  They also repeatedly express outright rejection of a 
strict application of Sharia Law.  Most recently, the 
moderate reformers were responsible for Islah's block vote in 
Parliament favoring a bill limiting al-Ahmar's tenure as 
Speaker (Ref C).  Leading moderate Islahi MPs include French 
educated Dr. Abdul Rahman Ba Fadhl, Abdul Razak al-Hajri, Ali 
Ashal and Ali Annsi. 
 
---------------------- 
Is Secularism a Front? 
---------------------- 
 
6. (C) Radical fundamentalism permeates Islah through a small 
but vocal faction.  During the 1994 Civil war, Islahi Shura 
Council member Imam Abd al-Wahab al-Dailimi issued a Fatwa to 
northern troops sanctioning the pillage of "secular, 
anti-Islamic" southern cities.  Deputy Chairman of the 
Supreme Committee, Yassin Abdul Majid al Qubati, the 
reclusive spiritual head of Islah, is also a religious 
fundamentalist.  In the countryside, particularly around Ibb 
and Jibla, residents regularly complain about religious 
Islahis pressing the authorities to enforce a stricter 
interpretation of Sharia.  They also recall how, when the 
Islahis controlled the educational system, fundamentalist 
teachings were mandated in schools. 
 
7. (C) Some believe that the YMB's fundamentalist side 
extends to more than just a small faction of the party.  Dr. 
Saif Asali, a former Deputy Minster of Finance who left Islah 
in 2003, claims that the YMB (and by extension Islah's 
leadership) ultimately aims to establish an Islamic 
government in Yemen.  He asserts Islah's leadership practices 
a carefully orchestrated "dualism," speaking of moderation to 
the West while preaching radical doctrine in the mosques. 
NDI Democratic Development Director Dr. Saad Talib disagrees 
with Asali.  Talib contends that that while there may be a 
radical element within Islah, it is not the controlling 
faction. 
 
----------------------- 
Zindani and the Salafis 
----------------------- 
 
8. (C) Another Islahi fundamentalist faction is led by Sheikh 
Abdul Majid al-Zindani, a charismatic anti-American Salafi 
Imam designated as a terrorist financier by the US Department 
of Treasury and UN Security Council.  Zindani is the Chairman 
of the Islah Shura Council, the body responsible for forming 
Islah's platform and confirming its leadership.  Many claim 
that this position gives him veto power over party policy. 
Talib disagrees.  He claims that the emerging moderates have 
clearly eroded Zindani's power in the Shura Council and 
points to Islah permitting women's participation in the Shura 
Council over Zindani's objections as an example.  Moderate 
Islahis confide in private that Zindani is a "burden" on the 
party. 
 
9. (C) Conservative Salafi Islam rejects Islamic 
interpretations formulated three generations after prophet 
Mohammed's death.  Salafis also vehemently oppose Shi'a 
Islam.  The number of Salafis in Islah is unknown, although 
Asali estimates that they compose less than one percent of 
the party's membership.  Sufi concurs, holding that the 
Zindani faction's influence on Islah is negligible. 
 
------------------------ 
Islah's Secular Politics 
------------------------ 
 
10. (C) Although it is Yemen's primary Islamic party, its 
day-to-day dealings appear driven by practical politics and a 
secularly based democratic and economic reform agenda.  "The 
biggest secret about Islah," says UN Advisor to the Ministry 
of Human Rights El-Obaid el-Obaid, "is that just like the GPC 
it is driven by political and tribal interests and, also like 
the GPC, on most issues has no ideology at all."  Sufi agrees 
noting, "If you look at our platforms and papers, you will 
see that religion really has nothing to do with the 
decision-making process.  We are purely a political machine." 
 Indeed, Islah's positions on economic and legal reform never 
mention religion or Sharia.  In Parliament, Islahi MPs rarely 
turn to Sharia as a basis for their arguments. 
 
11. (C) Islah's interest-based pragmatic politics can 
ultimately be attributed to Party Chief al-Ahmar and Yemen's 
tribal traditions.  Al-Ahmar heads the party's fifteen-member 
Supreme Committee and has the final say on much of the 
party's agenda.  Many also say that al-Ahmar, who clearly 
does not belong to any of Islah's Islamist camps, balances 
the party.  Talib calls al-Ahmar the "hypocritical" side of 
Islah.  "The Brotherhood needs al-Ahmar's protection from a 
possible crackdown, so you will never hear Islah condemning 
the well-known corruption of the tribes or al-Ahmar's sons 
who run his lucrative businesses despite Islah's 
anti-corruption platform."  Insiders overwhelmingly agree 
that al-Ahmar is not popular among the party's rank and file, 
who see him as President Saleh's tribal Sheikh and ultimately 
part of the regime. 
 
------------------------------------- 
Moderate Reformers: Islah's Best Hope 
------------------------------------- 
 
12. (C) Although a more cohesive party than the GPC, Islah is 
still more a marriage of convenience between the YMB and 
tribal (including regime) interests.  For now, Islah's 
different factions are united in their focus -- to strengthen 
their position in order to become a more effective opposition 
in upcoming elections.  The moderate reformers, who in a 
short time have managed to effectively lobby for their agenda 
within the party, have been the most successful element in 
this effort of late.  These moderates oppose al-Ahmar, whom 
they accuse of allowing Saleh to control the party.  However, 
they need al-Ahmar for the moment to provide both 
constituents and protection against an outright political 
attack by the ROYG. 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
13. (C) Islah's moderate reformers are currently the only 
group with the potential to create an effective, 
democratically run political party with any hope of being 
elected to power.  That this group is seen as Islah's best 
hope is reflected in the quiet support they receive from 
moderates within the GPC.  Reform-minded, western educated 
technocrats within the ROYG (and therefore members of the 
GPC), show their subtle support by pressing their western 
interlocutors to get to know these Islahi progressives. 
Deputy Foreign Minister Mustafa Noman, a strong supporter of 
reform and a key embassy contact, has repeatedly pressed us 
to seek the participation of Islahi moderates in USG-funded 
regional training and conferences on democratic reform.  That 
Noman would make such suggestions, despite President Saleh's 
continued protestations to Ambassador on emboffs frequent 
meetings with opposition elements, demonstrates the strength 
of his belief that moderates within Islah can play an 
important role in implementing the democratic and economic 
reforms necessary for Yemenis to have a better future.  End 
Comment. 
Krajeski