US embassy cable - 05BAGHDAD3427

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 003427 
 
SIPDIS 
 
ANKRA PLEASE PASS TO ADANA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/31/2015 
TAGS: EFIN, ENRG, EPET, IZ, MASS, MOPS, PGOV, PREL, Energy Sector, Security 
SUBJECT: IRAQ NATIONAL ENERGY COUNCIL REVIEWS ENERGY 
INFRASTRUCTURE AND SECURITY 
 
REF: BAGHDAD 3324 AND PREVIOUS 
 
Classified By: ACTING ECONOMIC COUNSELOR HARRY O'HARA FOR REASONS 1.4 B 
 AND D. 
 
1. SUMMARY:  (SBU) On August 16, the National Energy Council 
met to update DPM Chalabi on energy production and 
infrastructure security actions in Iraq.  Ministry of 
Electricity reported an average electric power production 
rate of 4300 MW/hr with a high total of 4760 MW/hr, and a 
daily total of 103,000 MWH.  The MOE goal remained at 130,000 
MWH.  The DPM instructed an improvement of the hydroelectric 
production from Hadithah Dam.  The ministers discussed and 
requested a plan from the MOE to meet an electricity demand 
of 10,500 MW for the summer of 2006.  BG Kamal reported 
improvements in the security of pipelines and electrical 
lines across Iraq, however the DPM was not satisfied with the 
progress on infrastructure security.  DPM prioritized the 
security goals to include the provision of essential services 
to the people of Baghdad. END SUMMARY. 
 
2.  (SBU) DPM Ahmed Chalabi convened the meeting of the ITG 
National Energy Council (NEC) on August 15, 2005.  The 
purpose of the meeting was to review the status of energy 
infrastructure security actions across Iraq. Those attending 
included the Ministers of Water Resources (MOWR), Finance 
(MOF), Interior (MOI), Trade (MOT), Deputy Minister of 
Electricity (ME), Deputy Minister of Industry and Minerals 
(MIM), Deputy Minister of Transportation (MOTRANS), Deputy 
National Security Advisor (NSC), BG Kamal of the Iraqi Armed 
Forces, Governor of the Central Bank of Iraq (CBI), 
Infrastructure Coordination Center Chief (ICC), POLMILCOUNS, 
IRMO Deputy Director, and ECONOFF. 
 
------------------------------------- 
REPORT OF THE MINISTRY OF ELECTRICITY 
------------------------------------- 
 
3.  (SBU) The Deputy Minister of Electricity (MOE) began the 
meeting with a review of the electricity generation capacity 
in Iraq.  The MOE stated Iraq was producing 103,000 MWH per 
day, with an average of 4300 MW/hr, and a high generation 
rate of 4760 MW/hr.  The MOE said the daily goal for 
electricity remained at 130,000 MWH.  He explained the 
Musayyib power plant had three units working and generating 
250 MW, however there was a need for Russian technicians to 
arrive in country and fix the turbines at the other unit at 
Musayyib.  The MOE had arranged for their visit, and they 
were waiting for the visa approvals--the DPM told them to go 
to the airport and meet them and not worry about visas.  The 
MOE reported that the electrical generation in the North was 
at 85 per cent of capacity, with the reductions coming from 
the 50 MW plants at Bayji, where there were problems with the 
gas generators.  The DPM requested a report at the next NEC 
meeting on the gas generators.  Specifically, the DPM wanted 
to know why the plants were not generating electricity since 
they had good security, available gas, and no reason for not 
producing electricity. The MOE reported one of the LM 6000 at 
Qudas was not producing power because of equipment problems. 
MOE explained that the Musayyib power plant was not running 
at capacity due to breakdowns of equipment.  The DPM demanded 
a report at the next meeting to "tell me how and what we need 
to do to get the additional 800 MW of power generation 
capacity that is currently not working on-line and producing 
electricity. Provide that report at the next meeting." 
 
4.  (SBU) The MOE and Minister of Water Resources (MOWR) then 
complained to the DPM that the Hadithah Dam was not 
generating sufficient hydroelectricity due to equipment 
problems at the dam.  The MOWR said the technicians could not 
get to the power plant in the dam because the US forces 
guarded it.  The MNF-I representative, COL Parker, explained 
that the repair crews could go to the dam power station, but 
they required continuous escort by the U.S. forces guarding 
the dam.  Parker explained the USMC elements present would 
provide escorts for the repair crews, and that in the past, 
the technicians had demanded to go without escorts.  The DPM 
requested that MNF-I coordinate the escorts, and make sure 
that no one came in and destroyed the dam and power 
generators. DPM concluded saying, "We would prefer to have 
escorts because of all the inside sabotage which has occurred 
across Iraq." 
 
----------------- 
ENERGY WAR ROOM? 
----------------- 
 
5.  (SBU) The DPM then requested to know what other problems 
were of concern to the group.  The Ministry of Industry and 
Minerals (MIM) said the industries of MIM were short of fuel. 
 The DPM noted the gas line had just been cut between the 
plants and Bayji.  The DPM then said, "We need an Energy War 
Room!"  The DPM directed the MIM draft a plan for an Energy 
Coordination Center. 
 
------------------------------- 
Future Electricity Requirements 
------------------------------- 
 
6.  (SBU) The DPM discussed the requirements for the next 9 
months in Iraq to meet the summer electricity demand for 
2006.  He said the current demand for electricity was 8500 
MW, but would probably be 10,500 MW by mid-summer 2006.  He 
instructed the MOE to tell him how the MOE would meet these 
requirements by 2006. 
 
----------------- 
PIPELINE SECURITY 
----------------- 
 
7.  (SBU) BG Kamal reported a pipeline in the 9th Brigade 
area had been interdicted on August 15, and the units, which 
noticed the interdiction, had no communications to report the 
incident.  Kamal said these units needed radios, vehicles, 
and better command and control to handle interdictions and 
reporting.  Kamal told the DPM that the trees along the 
pipeline needed to be cut, and requested permission to do so. 
 The DPM told Kamal he could not cut the trees, because they 
were in the process of trying to plant trees in Iraq, not 
destroy them.  Kamal reported IEDS in the 2nd and 3rd Brigade 
areas, and a firefight with 10-12 fighters.  The 3rd Brigade 
had won the firefight and saved an attack on the pipeline. 
The DPM told Kamal to reward the Army personnel who were 
involved. Kamal reported the 2nd and 3rd Brigades had also 
found 2 IEDs, one under a pipeline, and the other by an 
electrical tower.  Kamal reported an attack on infrastructure 
at Al Nasiriyah.  The DPM told the ministers to expect more 
attacks in the south, now that the northern security was 
improving, suggesting that the sabatours will change their 
tactics and locations of future attacks. 
 
8.  (SBU) The DPM informed the ministers that oil production 
in the north was now at 600 mbpd and exports would be 350 
mbpd (NOTE:  MOO is reporting 400 mbpd from Kirkuk oil 
fields.  END NOTE).  He requested an update from MNF-I on the 
security operations in the north.  COL Parker from MNF-I 
informed the DPM that the 42nd ID had invested in hardening 
the pipeline and key nodes in the north, particularly in the 
vicinity of Al Fathah.  Parker informed the DPM there had 
been no incidents at Al Fathah for over two months, since 
early June.  The DPM requested that the MNF-I "inform MG 
Taluto that he was very pleased with the support from the 
42nd ID and to personally thank him for the work of his 
soldiers in securing the northern pipeline and Al Fathah." 
 
-------------------- 
INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT 
-------------------- 
 
9.  (C) BG Kamal informed the ministers that the intelligence 
coordination system is working.  For example, Kamal said, 
"The contractors who built the electrical towers near 
Samarra, came back 24 hours later and blew them down.  We 
know the man who did it, Mohammad Dakhl, and that is an 
example of how intelligence is working well."  Kamal 
explained that intelligence from MOO was also working well, 
and they had found information leading to the discovery of 
IEDs on the Naft Khaneh pipeline.  Kamal said, "We need a 
bigger space for the intelligence cell, where do you want to 
put the cell?  At Camp Victory or at the MOD?" (NOTE:  No 
decision was provided on where to host the intelligence cell. 
 END NOTE) The DPM said, "Make sure each ministry is to have 
a representative at the intelligence coordination cell", and 
the MNF-I representative told the DPM that each ministry had 
representation there.  The DPM told BG Kamal "we need a 
better strategic plan for geo-spatial mapping, so we know 
where our key facilities are located, and so we can respond 
to attacks on them." 
 
--------------------- 
PROTECTION PRIORITIES 
--------------------- 
10.  (C) The DPM said, "We need to sort out the priority for 
security for the electrical infrastructure and fuel supplies. 
 The goal of the insurgents is to cause maximum discomfort 
for the people of Baghdad, thus we need to protect the supply 
of essential services to Baghdad."  The ministers discussed 
the available forces and the training readiness levels of the 
Iraqi forces and determined, in Kamal's assessment, that the 
Iraqi forces cannot protect even 50 per cent of the key 
linear infrastructure.  This was unsatisfactory to the DPM, 
and he demanded that the MOD develop plans and forces to 
protect the key infrastructure in Iraq.  The DPM asked if he 
should direct the Iraqi Army to secure the pipelines. 
 
------------------- 
NEXT MEETING AGENDA 
------------------- 
 
11.  (SBU) The DPM set the agenda for the next meeting as 
follows:  1) The MOO is to present the status of exports of 
oil, and 2) The MOE is to provide a full report on the 
repairs at Hadithah Dam, Qudas, and Musayyib power plants. 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
12.  (SBU) COMMENT:  The NEC, particularly DPM Chalabi, 
continues to be dissatisfied by the progress of 
infrastructure protection for the provision of essential 
services across Iraq, particularly in the support of Baghdad. 
 The emphasis on completing the security force deployments in 
the North continues, and there appears to be the start of an 
increased emphasis for infrastructure security in the South. 
END COMMENT. 
Khalilzad