US embassy cable - 05PARIS5610

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 005610 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/31/2014 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, FR, TU, CY 
SUBJECT: TURKISH READOUT OF ARPAKAN-FRENCH CONSULTATIONS ON 
EU ACCESSION NEGOTIATIONS 
 
REF: PARIS 5528 AND PREVIOUS 
 
Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt for reaso 
ns 1.4 (B & D). 
 
1.  (C) Summary:  Turkish Deputy Under Secretary Apakan's 
August 17 and 18 discussions with officials in FM 
Douste-Blazy's and PM de Villepin's cabinets provided no new 
clarity on French motives and intentions.  The French 
rehearsed familiar arguments about the need to take French 
public opinion into account following the failed May 29 
referendum, while insisting that they did not intend to be an 
obstacle to the beginning of accession negotiations with 
Turkey on October 3.  Most telling was a "personal" request, 
rebuffed by Apakan, that Turkey issue a clarification that 
the French could use as a fig leaf presumably to allow it to 
draw back from the brink.  So far the French have indicated 
no clear intention to do so.  But even if they are looking 
for a way out, a question remains as to what France would 
need -- on Cyprus or other issues -- in order to back away 
from their current position.  The French continued to 
indicate that French policy has not yet been fixed, pending 
exchanges with other EU partners at the August 31 Coreper and 
September 1-2 informal ministerial.  End Summary. 
 
2.  (SBU) Pol deputy met August 19 with Turkish Counselor 
Bashkan Oz (or Oez) to obtain a readout of Turkish MFA Deputy 
Under Secretary for Cyprus Ertugrul Apakan's August 17 and 18 
consultations with FM Douste-Blazy's chef de cabinet Pierre 
Vimont and PM de Villepin's diplomatic advisor Christophe 
Farnaud.  (Farnaud declined to respond to an inquiry from POL 
M/C.) 
 
3.  (C) Oz said that Apakan's formal mission was to provide 
an explanation of Turkish thinking behind its July 29 
statement on the enlargement protocol, but he dismissed 
French claims that the statement had created a "new" element 
that needed to be taken into consideration.  The Turkish MFA 
had consulted closely with international lawyers in 
elaborating the statement to ensure it would not invalidate 
the protocol.  Moreover, negotiations in the run-up to the 
December 2004 summit had made clear that "both sides would 
clarify their positions" on the Cyprus question; this, in 
fact, had formed the legal basis for the Turkish declaration. 
 French objections to Turkish references to "partnership" on 
Cyprus were unfounded, as similar language was to be found in 
the Annan plan.  Similarly, the French lamely cited 
unspecified translation problems with the Turkish statement 
from English into French, which was not credible given PM de 
Villepin's diplomatic experience. 
 
4.  (C) Oz claimed that Vimont and Farnaud had made it clear 
that the French position was motivated largely by the need to 
take into account the results of the failed May 29 referendum 
on the EU constitutional treaty.  It was necessary to proceed 
slowly on all EU-related issues, including enlargement. 
While France had no desire to create obstacles for the 
beginning of accession negotiations, it needed to satisfy 
public opinion.  Oz was explicit that neither Vimont nor 
Farnaud suggested that French statements to date should be 
equated with new preconditions.  The Turks were told that 
France had not yet defined its position, and that this would 
be done only after consultation with other EU partners.  The 
French had inquired about Turkish soundings in other European 
capitals. 
 
5.  (C) Asked whether the French had had any ideas for 
overcoming the current impasse, Oz said they had asked "on a 
personal basis only" whether Turkey would be prepared to make 
a new statement clarifying its June 29 declaration.  Oz said 
this would not be possible, given domestic political 
sensitivities in Turkey.  Oz said Arpakan had referred the 
French to Turkey's June 1 letter to the UN SYG Annan on 
Cyprus.  Pol deputy asked whether Turkey would be prepared to 
state simply that its June 29 unilateral statement on the 
customs union protocol should be interpreted in light of the 
earlier letter to the UN explaining its willingness to allow 
free movement of goods and services and open sea and air 
ports.  This would not be possible, he said, given that 
ratification of the customs union extension, scheduled for 
October 4, was already facing considerable opposition in 
parliament. 
 
6.  (C)  Pol deputy noted that the U.S. hoped the 
negotiations would begin as planned on October 3 and was 
considering ways to approach EU members.  Oz stressed the 
importance of beginning accession negotiations, stressing 
their importance in promoting reform.  Whether they 
eventually ended in EU membership was not a question that 
either side needed to resolve at the moment.  Turkey 
understood that it would need to recognize Cyprus before any 
eventual accession.  But if pushed if to choose between the 
EU and Cyprus too soon, it would have to choose the latter. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
7.  (C) As we have noted before, it appears that the French 
will not define their position until after the August 31 
Coreper and September 1-2 Gymnich meetings.  Even assuming 
that the French hope to climb down from their demands, 
however, it remains unclear how this can be accomplished in a 
face-saving way, given the apparent weakness of their 
position.  The way out could lie in the last para of the 
French non-paper, which demands that Turkey clearly express 
its intention to recognize each one of the EU member states. 
Perhaps the Turks could be persuaded to work with this idea, 
although the French informal suggestion that the Turks make 
an additional statement was reportedly dismissed as a 
non-starter for the Turks.  Another option could be to seek a 
strengthening of the EU anti-statement or additional 
conditionality in the negotiating framework.  Our British 
colleague speculated August 18 that France may want to wait 
until CDU leader Angela Merkel takes over as Chancellor in 
Germany (assuming that occurs) before softening in order to 
ensure continuity of follow-up.  Christian Heldt, the German 
advisor on Franco-German relations in the FM's cabinet, told 
Pol M/C today, however, that the French may have 
misinterpreted Merkel's calls for a privileged partnership 
with Turkey as willingness to delay the opening of 
negotiations.  Our British colleague speculated that France 
might be looking for a quid pro quo in other areas, for 
example UK agreement to abandon its proposed mid-term review 
of EU financing. 
Hofmann