US embassy cable - 02ABUJA2787

C O N F I D E N T I A L ABUJA 002787 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/03/02 
TAGS: PBTS, MOPS, PGOV, PREL, PREF, EPET, NI, CM 
SUBJECT: NIGERIA MIGHT IGNORE UNFAVORABLE RULING ON 
BAKASSI 
 
 
REF: USDAO ABUJA 2023 
 
 
Classified by Ambassador Howard F. Jeter; reasons 1.5 
(B) and (D) 
 
 
1. (C) Summary: Nigerian Minister of State for Defense 
(Army) Batagarawa told us on September 27 said that 
Nigeria would disregard an unfavorable ICJ ruling on 
Bakassi.  International pressure could be withstood. 
That evening, DCM heard a second report of Minister of 
Defense Danjuma's warning to the French to stay 
neutral should hostilities break out.  End Summary. 
 
 
2. (C) DCM and POLMILOFF met September 27 with 
Minister of State for Defense (Army) Malam Lawal 
Batagarawa to discuss the ROE for Nigerian forces 
deployed to Abidjan (septel).  Batagarawa commented 
that Nigeria did not want "ECOMOG 3" because of 
concerns "about the situation on our eastern border" 
and potential requirements to maintain domestic order 
during the imminent election season. 
 
 
3. (C) Batagarawa mused that Cameroon had much to lose 
by not working towards a negotiated settlement.  If 
the ICJ ruled against Nigeria, the GON would disregard 
the ruling, he declared.  Batagarawa thought the loss 
of goodwill in the international community would be 
short-lived and that within five years everyone would 
have moved beyond Nigeria's continuing presence in 
Bakassi. 
 
 
4. (C) As an alternative to possible confrontation 
with Cameroon, Batagarawa suggested that the two 
countries could reach an arrangement similar to the 
one Nigeria has with Sao Tome and Principe.  The 
Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) would 
develop Bakassi's hydrocarbon resources (onshore and 
offshore) while sharing the revenue with Cameroon. 
This, he argued, would allow Cameroon to benefit from 
the petroleum reserves in the Bakassi while allowing 
Nigeria to safeguard the interests of its 
predominantly Nigerian population. 
 
 
5. (C) COMMENT: It was not clear if Batagarawa 
understood that most of Cameroon's existing oil 
production comes from waters off Bakassi or had given 
thought to how that might be factored into his joint 
exploitation concept.  We chose not to explore this 
with him.  Batagarawa thought the USG was being 
helpful to Nigeria with respect to the Bakassi dispute 
while the GOF was being duplicitous.  He peremptorily 
dismissed France's provision of the venue for the 
September 5 meeting with a wave of his hand and, "We 
could have paid for a room ourselves."  END COMMENT. 
 
 
6. (C) At the September 27 Chinese National Day 
reception, German Ambassador Dietmar Kreusel told DCM 
the same story reported reftel: That Minister of 
Defense T.Y. Danjuma had informed French Ambassador 
Jean-Marc Simon that Nigeria would view "France also 
as its enemy" if France were to intervene in support 
of Cameroon should hostilities break out between 
Nigeria and Cameroon. 
 
 
7. (C) COMMENT: The German Ambassador seemed taken 
somewhat aback by Danjuma's statement; he should not 
have been. The Franco-Nigerian relationship in West 
Africa has always been edged with tension arising from 
overlapping, sometimes competing, senses of hegemony. 
Further reporting on Danjuma's discussions with the 
French follows septel.  END COMMENT. 
 
 
8. (C) At a September 25 reception Embassy held for 
members of the National Assembly and State liaison 
officers, several Senators and Representatives 
discussed Bakassi with Emboffs.  Views of how Nigeria 
would respond ranged from positions similar to 
Batagarawa's to the superficially more cooperative, 
"We will faithfully implement the ICJ decision, but we 
know it will favor us." 
 
 
9. (C) COMMENT: Whether it is Batagarawa's cynical 
viewpoint or the Assembly Members' insistence that 
Nigeria will win at the Hague, Nigerian leaders still 
have not come to grips with the distinct and imminent 
probability that the ICJ will rule against them. END 
COMMENT. 
 
 
JETER