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| Identifier: | 02ABUJA2786 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 02ABUJA2786 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | Embassy Abuja |
| Created: | 2002-10-03 15:38:00 |
| Classification: | CONFIDENTIAL |
| Tags: | KCRM EFIN SNAR NI |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 002786 SIPDIS DEPT FOR AF AND INL . TREASURY FOR OFFICE OF ENFORCEMENT--DANIEL GLASER AND SHAUN LONERGAN E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/03/2017 TAGS: KCRM, EFIN, SNAR, NI SUBJECT: NIGERIA: EMBASSY VIEWS ON LOOMING FATF SANCTIONS DECISION REF: 03OCT02 LONERGAN/TAYLOR TELCON Classified by Ambassador Howard F. Jeter. Reasons: 1.5 (b) and (d). 1.(U) This is an action message. 2.(C) The Embassy understands that an October 1 Washington interagency meeting concluded that the USG should recommend counter-measures against Nigeria during next week's Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Plenary session in Paris. According to the USG representative to the FATF, Treasury's Shaun Lonergan, the GON did not report adequate progress when a GON delegation met with the FATF's Africa and Middle East Review Group (AMERG) on September 25. 3.(C) We agree that the GON did not energetically address the issue during most of the year; yet, after months of unsuccessful dialogue, the GON is now motivated to take needed steps towards money laundering reform. President Obasanjo has charged his Principal Secretary, Stephen Oronsaye and Attorney General Kanu Agabi with leading the dialogue with the FATF and with coordinating GON legislative and policy reforms. This seriousness was envinced after the FATF and the Embassy warned the President that "counter-measures" would be taken if the GON did not show genuine progress on this issue. 4.(SBU) Steps taken during the last four weeks include significant amendments to the GON's existing Banks and Other Financial Institutions (BOFI) Act of 1991 and its Money Laundering Act of 1995. Also, the President submitted a revised draft Financial Crimes Commission Bill. These amendments make a number of major improvements, including: expanding the scope of money laundering to include the proceeds of all crimes; adding "other financial institutions" to those required to submit currency transaction reports over a threshold of the equivalent of $5,000; and giving the Central Bank greater authority to freeze suspicious accounts. A stumbling block to finalize the legal reform is the lethargy of the National Assembly in passing these and many other proposed laws. 5.(C) We feel a credible threat of imminent counter-measures is far stronger and will afford much better leverage than the actual imposition of those sanctions at this stage. This will encourage the Executive Branch to redouble its efforts and will place a great deal of political pressure on members of the National Assembly not to let their legislative inaction result in the imposition of sanctions on their country. Assuming this blame would be something the Assembly would like to avoid during an election year, we think the legislature would be compelled to act uickly on the proposed legislation now before it. Conversely, implementation of sanctions might be counter-productive. The Executive and Legislature are locked in an intense political battle. Imposition of sanctions right now would be blamed on the President and the Assembly would have no incentive to help him resolve the issue even though doing so would be clearly in tne country's interest. Again, maintaining the threat of sanctions will put an equal onus on both the Executive and Legislature. 6.(C) Additionally, the imposition of sanctions could produce a defensive backlash, in which advancing money laundering reforms will prove more rather than less difficult. If the USG sanctions will be those contained in the Patriot Act, the strain to the bilateral relationship could be significant. Because of the anti-terrorism motivation behind the Patriot Act, the Nigerians will perceive that we are viewing their inaction as some type of implicit support for terrorism. This would be unfortunate because Nigeria has been one of our strongest anti-terrorism allies in Africa. Nigerians will resent being sanctioned under the same legal weapon used against terrorists and rogue states. 7.(C) The argument for imposition of counter-measures is sound and these measures would hurt Nigeria. However, we are not sure that this is what we want to do. Diminishing Nigeria's economcy and economic prospects, at this stage, would not appear to be in the U.S. interest. If our goal is to advance money laundering reforms, we should adopt a more measured approach. We propose the USG representative to the FATF advocate imposing a tight 60-day deadline for the GON to pass (not introduce or consider) required anti-money laundering legislation in the National Assembly. This would give the Executive and Legislature time to act on the new-found momentum in passing the requisite anti-money laundering legislation. The Embassy would also press key leaders in the legislature to move expeditiously on the issue. Failure to pass this legislation would automatically trigger the appropriate sanctions under the Patriot Act or similar mechanism. 8.(U) Please advise. JETER
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