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| Identifier: | 05BAGHDAD3410 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 05BAGHDAD3410 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | Embassy Baghdad |
| Created: | 2005-08-18 19:19:00 |
| Classification: | CONFIDENTIAL |
| Tags: | PGOV PHUM IZ Parliament Shia Islamists Kurdish Alliance |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 003410 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/18/2025 TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, IZ, Parliament, Shia Islamists, Kurdish Alliance SUBJECT: CONSTITUTION UPDATE: SHIA AND KURDS TRYING TO CLOSE DEAL AS EMBASSY WORKS TO KEEP SUNNI ARABS IN GAME Classified By: AMBASSADOR KHALILZAD, REASON 1.5 (B) AND (D). 1. (C) Summary: The Embassy is trying to bridge the gaps on an agreed constitution text between the Shia Coalition and Kurdish Alliance that control the National Assembly. The major issues still separating Shia Coalition and the Kurdish Alliance are guarantees about sustained national unity, provincial or national control of oil revenues and future hydrocarbon sector development, the division of national and provincial authorities and the future of Kirkuk. Spurred by the Embassy, the Kurds put forward proposals on August 18 that leaned in favor of the provinces, and the initial response from the Shia was that these leaned too far away from the proper role for the central government. The Shia did agree to drop the idea of a constitutional council. As of August 18 late afternoon we await Shia responses to the Kurdish proposals tabled midday. Meanwhile, the Embassy was also reviewing constitutional issues with the Sunni Arab negotiators whose positions, especially on federalism, were frequently at variance with Kurdish and Shia thinking, but becoming more focused. End Summary. 2. (C) On August 18 the Ambassador was trying to help close agreement on a text between the Kurdish Alliance and the Shia. In response to a request from the Shia Coalition (that Shia Coalition leader Abdel Aziz al-Hakim said originated with Ayatollah Sistani), the Embassy convinced Kurdish leader Masud Barzani to put forward proposals on the following five areas: -- that "Iraq is a free union of people, land and sovereignty and as long as this constitution is upheld its unity will be preserved." -- that "authorities of the central government will be limited to those laid out in the Transitional Administration Law, and the other authorities will be shared between the central government and the governments of the provinces an governorates. Where there is a conflict, the priority goes to the law of the provinces." -- that "Ownership of the oil and gas exploited from current fields goes to the Iraqi people. The federal government will undertake the management of resources in partnership with the governments of the provinces or governorates that produce them and distribute them in a fair manner that corresponds to the population distribution in all areas of the country, with the provision of a set allotment for a set period for damaged areas deprived under the former regime in a way that ensures balanced development in the different parts of the country, and this will be regulated by law." -- that "As for the future, the provincial or governorate government will present in agreement with the central government a new strategic policy for oil, and this will be regulated by law." -- that the process launched by Article 58 to resolve the Kirkuk dispute "would end in a referendum in Kirkuk and the disputed territories to determine the inhabitants' desires." -- that the draft constitution's reference to establishing a constitutional council be dropped entirely. 3. (C) The Shia agreed to drop the constitutional council from the text. Prime Minister Jafari, Coalition leader Abdel Aziz al-Hakim and Constitution Committee chair Hamudi rejected the Kurdish language about a "free union," but they liked the reference to maintaining Iraq's unity. They likely will make a counterproposal. They were not enthusiastic in private about the resource language and non-committal about the language on central government and provincial government laws. They also had no comment on the Kirkuk language. 4. (C) The Kurds and Shia prefer the Ambassador shuttle between them before coming back to another large meeting of Kurds and Shia like the one August 18 morning. We still have to contend with Kurdish objections to wording on Islam and personal status in the constitution. 5. (C) DCM and British Ambassador August 18 met meanwhile with a group of Sunni Arab leaders to review issues related to the text. These discussions moved forward slowly, especially on the issue of federalism. At the end, the Sunnis appeared to grasp that their best strategy would be to focus with us on a few key issues, rather than obsess over every detail of every sentence in the constitution. In particular, we got grudging awareness that there had to be acknowledgement of federalism for a Kurdish region now, with the choice of governorates joining into provinces ) and the legal mechanisms for that to happen ) made after the elections and the seating of the next national assembly. Despite the slow progress, the Sunnis were at pains to reassure us that they were sticking with the political process. It is likely that the Sunni Arabs and former Prime Minister Allawi's Iraqiya bloc, the third largest in the National Assembly, will be brought into talks with the Kurds and Shia on the morning of August 19. Khalilzad
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