US embassy cable - 05AMMAN6689

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 AMMAN 006689 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/17/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PTER, IZ, JO 
SUBJECT: UPDATE ON CURRENT JORDAN-IRAQ RELATIONS 
 
REF: A. AMMAN 3231 
 
     B. AMMAN 6160 
     C. AMMAN 5806 
     D. AMMAN 5456 
     E. AMMAN 5510 
     F. AMMAN 3963 
     G. AMMAN 6568 
     H. AMMAN 6240 
     I. AMMAN 6118 
     J. AMMAN 6538 
 
Classified By: CDA David Hale for reasons 1.4 (b), (d) 
 
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SUMMARY 
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1. (C) Official Jordanian-Iraqi relations remain strong 
despite GOJ fears that insurgent violence may cross the 
border, and tensions related to Ahmad Chalabi.  The GOJ has 
worked hard to smooth over the King,s December public 
warnings of a "Shi,a Crescent", as well as the diplomatic 
row sparked by reports that a Jordanian was the March 1 
Hillah suicide bomber.  The GOJ provides important support 
for the U.S. effort in Iraq.  Jordan plans to send its 
designated Ambassador to Baghdad as soon as security 
arrangements permit.  Senior Iraqi clerics and politicians 
attended July's international Islamic conference in Amman. 
The GOJ continues to engage Ayatollah Sistani and Sunni 
tribal leaders.  END SUMMARY. 
 
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ENGAGING A NEW NEIGHBOR 
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2. (C) The relationship with Iraq has always been one of 
Jordan,s most important.  The GOJ views it as a priority to 
establish strong relations with the emerging new Iraq.  GOJ 
support for operation Iraqi Freedom was outstanding, and 
Amman had a close relationship with Iyad Allawi.  However, 
tensions spiked in December 2004 after King Abdullah, 
reflecting widespread Sunni apprehensions over the impending 
Iraqi elections, warned of an emerging "Shi,a crescent" 
during a Western television interview.  Hard feelings in Iraq 
toward Jordan were again enflamed by press reports in March 
2005 that a Jordanian family had celebrated the "martyrdom" 
of their son, Ra,ed al-Banna, who allegedly carried out a 
suicide bombing in Hillah.  Crowds attempted to sack the 
Jordanian mission in Baghdad, and both governments recalled 
their ranking diplomats. A sudden spotlight on Jordanian 
media articles supportive of the so-called "noble Iraqi 
resistance" compounded the row.  King Abdullah, who was on an 
official visit to the U.S. at the time, ordered the Jordanian 
Charge back to Baghdad.  The King,s unhappiness with the 
mishandling of this incident contributed to the dismissal of 
PM Faysal al Fayez and FM Hani Al Mulki shortly thereafter. 
The GOJ launched a media campaign highlighting Jordan,s 
efforts to train Iraqi security forces and secure the 
Jordan-Iraq border.  At the same time the King called on 
Jordanian media to end its use of positive terms in 
describing insurgent attacks and to report responsibly on 
Iraqi issues.  His meeting with a delegation of visiting 
Iraqi journalists in April produced some positive coverage in 
Iraq (ref A). 
 
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A CONSISTENT MESSAGE 
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3. (C) The King and senior GOJ officials now stress support 
for the Iraqi Transitional Government (ITG) and the ongoing 
political process there.  The GOJ continues to host senior 
ITG figures for meetings in Amman, as well as the Jordan 
International Police Training Center, instruction for Iraqi 
soldiers and pilots at Jordanian military facilities, and 
training provided to many Iraqi civilian government 
employees.  The GOJ has designated an Ambassador for its 
mission in Iraq (retired General Ahmad Salameh al-Lozi) and 
on August 15, the cabinet agreed to send him to Baghdad as 
soon as arrangements for his security are completed. (NOTE: 
FM Kasrawi told Charge that he would like to send one or two 
other Jordanian diplomats to Baghdad, but needed assurances 
on their safety as well.  END NOTE.) The GOJ would prefer for 
al-Lozi to be in Baghdad prior to the start of the UN General 
Assembly in September, but he may have to present his 
credentials and return to Amman if sufficient security 
measures are not in place by then (ref B-C). 
 
4. (C) In another potential boost to Jordan-Iraq relations, 
the GOJ is still hoping to make good on Prime Minister 
Badran's stated intention to travel to Baghdad (ref E).  The 
daily newspaper Al Ghad reported on August 16 that "Badran 
plans to visit Baghdad soon to hold bilateral discussions 
with Iraqi officials" (ref B). 
 
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ENDING SECTARIAN VIOLENCE 
------------------------- 
 
5. (C) On July 4-5, in an effort to unite senior Islamic 
religious leaders, including Shi,as and Sunnis from Iraq, 
against terrorism and religious extremism, the King sponsored 
(through the al-Bayt Foundation) an international Islamic 
conference in Amman.  Conference participants issued a final 
statement that forbids Muslims from declaring as apostates 
followers of any of the eight schools of Islamic 
jurisprudence.  Additionally, the agreed statement limited 
the issuance of religious edicts (or fatwas) to qualified 
Mulim scholars of the eight schools (ref D).  Through this 
conference, King Abdullah hoped to contain Sunni/Shi,a 
violence in Iraq by depriving terrorists of religious cover 
through the issuance of their own fatwas.  Furthermore, it 
was another chance for the GOJ to extend an olive branch to 
the Iraqi Shi,as.  The King intends to capitalize on the 
momentum of the Islamic conference -- including a fatwa by 
Ayatollah Sistani supportive of the final statement -- by 
inviting Islamic leaders one tier down to follow-up meetings 
that would, among other things, declare as forbidden the use 
of violence against other Muslims.  This plan complements GOJ 
engagement with Iraqi Sunni tribal leaders, as well as 
communications with Sistani, on a possible conference in 
Jordan of Iraqi leaders, secular and religious, with the 
objective of combating sectarian violence (ref E). 
 
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GROWING ECONOMIC TIES 
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6. (C) The Jordanian and Iraqi economic relationship, which 
was vital to Jordan under Saddam, is reviving.  To facilitate 
expanding bilateral trade, King Abdullah is pushing for a 
joint border facility at the Karama-Trebil crossing.  This 
proposal (which the King highlighted during a May visit to 
the border) includes technical assistance and capacity 
building for Iraqis, a shared software system allowing for 
more rapid information exchange, and improved infrastructure 
and equipment upgrades.  Once this project receives funding 
and if it proves successful, it could serve as a model for 
other border crossings. 
 
7. (U) An estimated 400,000 Iraqis are now living in Jordan. 
The rich among them have driven the real estate market in 
fashionable West Amman through the roof.  Iraqi capital is an 
important component of the recent strong performance of the 
Amman bourse and of the Jordanian economy as a whole (ref F). 
 
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OUTSTANDING ISSUES: Security, Chalabi, the Insurgency 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
8. (C) Fears that violence will spread into Jordan are on 
everyone,s mind here.  Many fret that continuing attacks on 
Shi,a civilians will lead to Shi,a militias being unleashed 
against Iraq,s Sunnis in a Balkan-style ethnic war, 
prompting large refugee flows into Jordan.  (Ironically, it 
is this fear that leads the more thoughtful critics of U.S. 
policy here to condemn the U.S. intervention in Iraq while at 
the same time warning against a premature exit.) The 
Jordanian security services are also concerned that the 
GOJ,s support for the U.S. effort in Iraq will prompt 
insurgents to strike here (ref G). 
 
9. (S/NF) There are periodically rumors in Iraq that members 
of Saddam's family living in Jordan, as well as alleged 
former regime officials in exile here, are actively aiding 
insurgent forces in Iraq through financial contributions 
and/or operational planning.  However, the Jordanian General 
Intelligence Directorate (GID) keeps Saddam,s relatives here 
under close watch, and shares details on this coverage 
through intel channels.  The GOJ remains ready to expel or 
take any other requested action against Iraqis accused of 
wrongdoing (ref H). 
 
10. (C) The struggle between Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister 
Ahmad Chalabi and the GOJ over his conviction in absentia on 
bank fraud continues, with Chalabi upping the ante by filing 
a related lawsuit in the U.S. against the GOJ (ref I-J). 
Chalabi is insisting on reversal of the Jordanian verdict and 
a statement of his innocence; some in the GOJ claim Chalabi 
is seeking to undermine Jordanian-Iraqi relations to ratchet 
up the pressure. (A few GOJ contacts claimed Chalabi paid to 
bus in the demonstrators who attacked the Jordanian mission 
in Baghdad in April, though they never produced any proof for 
this accusation.)  A committee at the Royal Court is working 
to resolve Chalabi's dispute with Jordan, but their work has 
been complicated by Chalabi's legal action in the U.S. 
 
11. (C) Conclusion:  The GOJ cast its lot with the U.S. 
effort in Iraq, and recognizes that Jordan could not afford a 
coalition. failure there.  Iraq will remain one of Jordan,s 
most important relationships in the region.  The GOJ, and 
increasingly other levels of Jordanian society, have realized 
that Jordan cannot afford to be on poor terms with whatever 
new order emerges to the east. 
HALE