US embassy cable - 05AMMAN6686

S E C R E T AMMAN 006686 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/17/2015 
TAGS: PREL, MARR, KPKO, HA, JO, UNSC 
SUBJECT: DEMARCHE DELIVERED: PERFORMANCE OF JORDAN'S 
CONTINGENT IN HAITI 
 
REF: STATE 143382 
 
Classified By: CDA David Hale for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
1. This is an action request. Please see paragraph 7. 
 
2. (S) Summary. Defense Attache met August 16 with senior 
Jordan Armed Forces (JAF) officials to deliver reftel 
demarche regarding Jordan's battalion in Haiti. The 
Jordanians admitted leadership failures and identified key 
areas of improved training to address our concerns. End 
Summary. 
 
3. (S) DATT met on August 16 with Brigadier General (BG) 
Falah Audah, Director of Operations, and BG Mohammad Suleiman 
al-Raud, Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations and 
Training, to discuss the performance of the Jordanian 
military contingent in the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti. 
Audah and al-Raud readily acknowledged that leadership 
failures had contributed to the substandard performance of 
the Jordanian battalion in Haiti. They then identified 
several key areas of improved training that are being 
implemented to ensure that the new unit sent to Haiti, and 
all subsequent units, are better prepared to conduct 
operations. These include: 
 
- Emphasis on Peace Enforcement Operations vs. Peace Keeping 
Operations. This will allow JAF to elevate its operations 
capabilities to higher threat missions covered under UN 
Chapter 7. Most of JAF's previous experience has been in 
lower threat Chapter 6 missions. 
 
- Remedial training for all weapons crews. 
 
- Training in hostile checkpoint procedures. 
 
- Training in conduct of operations in urban areas (MOUT), 
conducted by Jordanian Special Operations Forces troops. 
 
- Search and Rescue. 
 
- Rules of Engagement. 
 
- Improvised Explosive Device identification. 
 
- Marksmanship. 
 
- Patrolling. 
 
4. (S) According to Audah and al-Raud, JAF had been asked to 
provide a colonel to join the UN staff in Haiti, to act as a 
sector commander. Instead, JAF is sending a brigadier 
general, Mahmud Adjaji, who will have the added 
responsibility of commanding the Jordanian units. JAF's 
General Headquarters (GHQ) is also establishing a Directorate 
level, BG-led organization within GHQ to oversee several 
facets of JAF's missions - peacekeeping, making preparations, 
training, and deployments. King Abdullah has approved this 
organizational change. 
 
5. (S) To enhance the capabilities of Jordan's Haiti 
battalion, GHQ plans to send three or four UH-1 Huey 
helicopters with the next rotation of troops. JAF officers 
believe this will help them to identify, anticipate, and 
interdict gang and criminal activities. The next Jordanian 
battalion is currently in training. Unlike its predecessors, 
this group of soldiers is training away from their 
home-stations, so as to minimize distractions from their 
families. 
 
6. (S) GHQ has also changed the method of forming 
peace-keeping operations (PKO) units. Previously, individuals 
were pulled from different units to form a composite PKO 
unit. Now GHQ has directed each division to form one company, 
train them in PKO responsibilities, and provide this unit for 
future PKO missions. The hope is that this change will 
instill more chain of command discipline in the units. 
 
7. (S) Action Request. DATT informed the Jordanian officers 
that their suggestions were important first steps, but ones 
which needed to be executed immediately and reflected in 
improved performance in the field. Post suggests that the UN 
provide another assessment of JAF's PKO performance in one 
month, to determine whether further intervention is necessary. 
HALE