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| Identifier: | 05TELAVIV5105 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 05TELAVIV5105 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | Embassy Tel Aviv |
| Created: | 2005-08-18 07:59:00 |
| Classification: | CONFIDENTIAL |
| Tags: | PREL KWBG KPAL ETRD EG IS KBTS GAZA DISENGAGEMENT |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TEL AVIV 005105 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/17/2015 TAGS: PREL, KWBG, KPAL, ETRD, EG, IS, KBTS, GAZA DISENGAGEMENT SUBJECT: EIVAL GILADY ON GAZA DISENGAGEMENT REF: TEL AVIV 4417 Classified By: Ambassador Daniel C. Kurtzer. for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d ). 1. (C) Summary: Brigadier General (res) Eival Gilady, a special advisor to PM Sharon on disengagement, met August 16 with Assistant Secretary (A/S) Welch and Ambassador Kurtzer to discuss progress in Gaza disengagement. Gilady said that the Prime Minister's disengagement plan was proceeding more or less according to plan. He anticipated that the evacuation of all settlements in Gaza would be complete in less than ten days. More than 50 percent of the settler families in Gaza had already departed. A/S Welch and Ambassador Kurtzer pressed Gilady on the need for Israel to make disengagement a success, including finding ways to assist President Abbas and the Palestinian Authority. They encouraged Gilady to pursue creative solutions for overcoming differences on crossings and to consider a possible third-party role at Rafah crossing. End Summary. ------------------------- Settler Evacuation Status ------------------------- 2. (C) Gilady described the GOI strategy as a combination of sensitivity in dealing with settlers in the run-up to August 17 and decisiveness thereafter. Much will depend on how events unfold on August 16, but the GOI plan has been to tell the IDF soldiers to respect the law and to treat the settlers respectfully. West Bank infiltrators will be evacuated "decisively" on August 17, Gilady predicted. Gilady said that more than 50 percent of the Israeli settlers in Gaza had already departed. He believed that 700-800 settler families would have departed Gaza by midnight August 16, but cautioned that figures cited are not always accurate. Gilady anticipated that another 700-800 settler families would wait until the last moment, and would only depart once it became illegal for them to remain in Gaza on August 17. The possibility of losing financial compensation would also influence their decision-making. Gilady said the GOI had made arrangements with a number of settler groups and different leaders within these groups to facilitate the departure of remaining settlers. "They will not pack, but they will leave," Gilady clarified, adding that this group might engage in some passive resistance. Gilady estimated that 220 families constituted the hard-core of those settlers who might actively resist evacuation. Another 200 families would monitor this group closely. --------------------------- Coordination and Governance --------------------------- 3. (C) Gilady commented that the level of coordination between the GOI and PA has improved, but action on the ground remains weak. Gilady said a strategic decision on the part of the PA leadership needs to be taken to enforce PA policies. For example, President Abbas must make it clear that there are to be no more mortar attacks. In response, A/S Welch recalled that President Abbas had made two statements outlining the importance of a single authority and a demand that there be no deviations. The PA, at U.S. urging, had responded with force to Hamas in July. Even so, Gilady responded, the challenge of helping the Palestinians do what they (the PA) say should be done remains difficult. Gilady said he is convinced that PA security forces refrained from doing more for fear of not being backed up by the PA's political leadership. The passage of time would make it increasingly difficult for President Abbas to make headway on security matters. 4. (C) After recognizing Israel's support for the provision of non-lethal equipment to the PA, A/S Welch asked Gilady what else Israel would do on key issues, such as crossings, to help President Abbas strengthen his credibility with the Palestinian people. Gilady concurred that Israel has an interest in a disengagement process that leads to greater freedom of movement, trade and improvement in the quality of life of Palestinians. He agreed that the GOI should do whatever would help the PA govern more effectively. The PA has an interest, independent of U.S. or Israeli concerns, in demonstrating good governance, and Gilady added that if the provision of ammunition would serve that end he would support it. However, Gilady came back to his preoccupation with good governance. He cited the absence of PA control to minimize bottlenecks at Erez crossing as just one example of how the PA has failed to focus on easy steps it could take to improve the lot of its people. --------------------------------------------- ------------ Post-Disengagement Planning, Symbolic Importance of Rafah --------------------------------------------- ------------ 5. (C) A/S Welch focused on the importance of helping the PA present Gaza as "more open, more free, more prosperous and more secure" on the day after disengagement. For instance, Israel could assist on crossings, particularly Rafah. Gilady replied that Israel's agreement with Egypt on the deployment of Egyptian forces along the Gaza border would be concluded within 24 to 48 hours. "It will be done," Gilady emphasized. On the question of crossings, Gilady said he believes the Palestinians will ultimately come to accept that goods will need to pass through the Kerem Shalom crossing. Speaking personally, he said that people could continue to cross at Rafah, but stressed that the GOI security establishment would not trust anyone but Israelis on security matters. Probed on this point, he accepted A/S Welch's idea that there might be a role for a third party in control and inspections at that crossing -- provided there was an agreement between the parties on what a third party was to monitor. Gilady acknowledged that the Rafah question needs more study, but ventured that "we could make it happen" with a combination of trust, technology (he mentioned UAVs), Egyptian border control, PA agreement and the involvement of a third party. 6. (C) A/S Welch noted that the Europeans are prepared to play a third party role in Rafah, and stressed that for disengagement to be perceived as a success, Gaza has to be more open. Ambassador Kurtzer added that if Israel wants to demonstrate that the day after disengagement is different, it needs to act now on issues such as Rafah rather than in six months. A/S Welch encouraged the GOI to build an image of successful disengagement by mid-September so as to prevent others from seizing control of the agenda or second-guessing the wisdom of disengagement or the roadmap. Gilady predicted that Israel would withdraw from the Philadelphi corridor within this timeframe, but A/S Welch again stressed the importance of resolving the issue of Rafah crossing. 7. (C) Ambassador Kurtzer asked why Gilady assumed that the Palestinians will accept a goods crossing at Kerem Shalom. Gilady said the customs union provided some leverage in Israel's dealings with the PA, as maintaining the union is in the Palestinians' economic interest, particularly in the short term. "They have a lot to lose," Gilady concluded, acknowledging that this fact does not mean that the PA will be open to compromise on matters that concern issues of national pride. A/S Welch agreed that Israeli leverage was potentially useful, provided it leads to the right outcome. Ambassador Kurtzer noted that the GOI is demanding a third-party (EU) role in rubble removal from Gaza, but has opposed, to date, an EU role in Rafah. A/S Welch and Ambassador Kurtzer urged Gilady to explore new approaches -- including a third-party role -- to resolving the Rafah issue, given the shared Israeli-Palestinian interests in opening Gaza and maintaining security. Gilady reiterated his insistence that there could be no third party on security matters, but acknowledged the importance of creating an atmosphere to do more. 8. (C) On Gaza crossings into Israel, Gilady said he believes that the situation at Karni and Erez will improve post-disengagement. The goal is to facilitate trade, while maintaining security. On the seaport, Gilady stressed the importance of agreeing on the protocol of how it will operate before it is built. Israel and the PA must come to a basic understanding. A/S Welch agreed. ********************************************* ******************** Visit Embassy Tel Aviv's Classified Website: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/telaviv You can also access this site through the State Department's Classified SIPRNET website. ********************************************* ******************** KURTZER
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