US embassy cable - 05PANAMA1711

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 PANAMA 001711 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR WHA/CEN, WHA/AND, AND PRM 
SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 8/16/2015 
TAGS: PGOV, PREF, PREL, PHUM, PM, Labor/Human Rights/Pol Mil 
SUBJECT: UNHCR UNHAPPY WITH PANAMANIAN REFUGEE POLICY 
 
 
Classified By: CDA LUIS ARREAGA FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D). 
 
Summary 
------- 
1.  (C) UNHCR Representative Gonzalo Vargas Llosa believes 
the Torrijos government is starting down the same path as the 
previous Moscoso administration in failing to meet its 
international obligations under the 1951 UN Refugee 
Convention.  One never-ending issue is that the Government of 
Panama (GOP) believes its own immigration law trumps whatever 
the Convention requires.  In recent meetings with PolOffs 
Vargas Llosa accused the GOP of endless foot-dragging in 
resolving refugee issues and noted a slowing of efforts since 
the start of 2005.  He believes Panama trumpets its fear of 
large refugee inflows as an excuse to avoid meeting minimum 
international standards, while trying to leverage its 
relatively tiny refugee population to demand international 
aid.  Vargas said Foreign Ministry (MFA) officials are the 
chief "culprits" in Panamanian procrastination and questioned 
why the GOP sees refugees as a foreign policy issue at all. 
He also argued that the USG, as the largest donor to UNHCR's 
budget, could help convince Panama to resolve its refugee 
issues.  Vargas also is frustrated by the unresolved status 
of 800 Central American refugees present in Panama for over 
20 years and by the GOP's refusal to properly process several 
Cuban refugees in late 2004 and to grant them refugee status. 
 The GOP believes special legislation will resolve the 
problem by year's end but Embassy doubts that will provide a 
long-term fix.  Panama's vacillations on refugees largely 
stem from fear and resentment of Colombia, its giant, violent 
neighbor.  End summary. 
 
Loss of Momentum on Refugee Issues 
----------------------------------- 
2.  (C) In recent meetings with PolOffs, Panama UNHCR chief 
Gonzalo Vargas Llosa, who departs his position on September 
15, said the GOP improved its handling of refugees during the 
last 2-3 years.  (Note: UNHCR plans to replace Vargas Llosa 
with Bolivian national Jose Euseda.  End note.)  Acceding to 
combined USG, NGO, and UNHCR pressure, the GOP gave UNHCR 
guaranteed access to refugees, opened a dialog with the UN 
and NGOs, and reactivated the Oficina Nacional para Attencion 
del Refugiado (ONPAR).  The new GOP, which took office on 
September 1, 2004, showed even more interest in resolving 
refugee issues.  But Vargas believes progress halted at the 
beginning of 2005, as processing of asylum applications 
slowed down.  ONPAR, which is supposed to meet quarterly, has 
met only once in 2005.  Vargas says GOP officials have 
convinced themselves that Panama will be swamped by refugees 
if they liberalize refugee policies.  He faults the GOP's 
"lack of political will" to achieve a solution. 
 
Modern History of Panama's Refugee Problem 
------------------------------------------ 
3.  (SBU) During 1997-1998, due to pressure from Colombian 
FARC guerrillas, 500-600 Colombian villagers fled to Panama's 
remote, Darien frontier province.  Occasional refugees still 
arrive in the region but UNHCR doesn't have exact figures 
available and plans to visit the area in September to do a 
census.  Unwilling to consider the Colombians as legitimate 
refugees, Panama granted them three-month renewable temporary 
protection status as "temporarily displaced persons" by 
executive decree.  ONPAR gave the Colombians ID cards but 
does not permit them to work or to leave their villages, much 
less the region.  Since 1998, the refugees have depended on 
UNHCR (working out of Venezuela) for health care, rent, food, 
and clothing. 
 
A Second Forced Repatriation Narrowly Averted 
--------------------------------------------- 
4.  (SBU) In April 2003, apparently in breach of 
internationally accepted procedures, Panama returned 109 
refugees to Colombia in what UNHCR and many NGOs derided as a 
"forced" repatriation.  In November 2003, Panama planned a 
repatriation of a further 70 families to Colombia without 
coordinating with UNHCR.  At Embassy's insistence, Panama at 
the last minute agreed to bring UNHCR into the repatriation 
process and the families were repatriated to Colombia in 
December 2003.  After protracted negotiations, UNHCR opened a 
Panama City office in April 2004.  In December 2004, GOP 
denied refugee status to three Cubans who entered Panama in 
the Darien.  Vargas Llosa claimed that at least one Cuban was 
deported without being interviewed, which he called a clear 
breach of Panama's international obligations.  Partly out of 
frustration with the GOP's reluctance to regularize the 
Colombians' status, in July 2005 UNHCR ended food 
distribution to concentrate on sustainable development, such 
as small business grants (for seamstresses, bakeries, and 
cooks), agricultural loans and is building houses to replace 
wooden shacks. 
 
MFA Delaying Tactics 
-------------------- 
5.  (C) Vargas believes the MFA is manufacturing delays to 
hinder resolving refugee issues, just as it did under the 
previous Moscoso administration.  Vargas claimed that MFA 
Legal Affairs Director Iana Iana Quadri and MFA officials 
Vladimir Franco, and Ivette Quiel are responsible for the 
delays and accused them of hijacking and weakening ONPAR. 
After four-and-a-half years of discussion, in January 2005 
ONPAR approved regularization of the Central Americans by 
executive decree.  But Vargas's satisfaction quickly turned 
to annoyance when Quadri then decided that that a new law was 
needed instead of an executive decree.  MFA also wants 
special legislation for the displaced Colombians in Darien. 
Vargas sees that as delaying tactics.  Although ONPAR reports 
to the Ministry of Government and Justice (MOGJ), MFA uses 
its status as refugee commission member to influence ONPAR's 
decisions.  He speculates that Quadri, a naturalized Chilean 
refugee, wants to appear tough on refugees.  (Comment: There 
is little love lost between Quadri, a Chilean, and Vargas 
Llosa, an English-educated Peruvian with a famous last name. 
End comment.) 
 
Central American Refugee Issues 
------------------------------- 
6. (SBU) Vargas Llosa also complained that Panama has not 
granted permanent residence status to 800 refugees from 
Nicaragua and El Salvador present in Panama for over 20 
years, allegedly in breach of Panama's international 
obligations.  Vargas described a case he had presented to the 
GOP involving a man who had lived in Panama for 30 years, 
still in refugee status, unable to open bank accounts or 
obtain credit.  As a non-permanent resident he has no 
permanent legal status in Panama and cannot obtain a driver's 
license or credit or sign his name to legal documents.  There 
are hundreds of others like him. 
 
What Does Panama Gain by Delay? 
------------------------------- 
7.  (SBU) Vargas implied that Panama wants to delay 
regularizing the Colombians, hoping to leverage the situation 
to receive international assistance.  At a bilateral 
Colombia-Panama meeting Vargas attended in late May, 
Panamanian MFA Foreign Relations Director Dario Chiru 
insisted that regularizing the 500 displaced Colombians 
should be tied to a frontier development plan and that the 
international community -- Colombia included -- should pay. 
According to Vargas, none of those conversations appeared in 
the official record of the meeting.  (Note: At a May 2005 
conference in Bogota, the Governments of Panama and Colombia, 
UNHCR, and the International Migration Organization (OIM) 
pledged $300,000 to Panama for resettlement assistance.  End 
note.) 
 
MFA's Point of View 
-------------------- 
8.  (SBU) In June, PolOffs met with Iana Quadri to discuss 
refugee issues.  Quadri explained the need for new laws to 
regularize both Colombians and Central American refugees. 
(Comment: The new laws may be introduced as a rider to a 
larger Immigration bill.  Many of UNHCR's criticisms could be 
met by a new law, although it only would offer a one-time 
fix.  Any future refugees entering Panama would be subject to 
the same problems and delays.  End Comment.)  Quadri argued 
that many of the Colombians no longer would qualify as 
refugees due to improving conditions in Colombia and that 
they should be subject to Panamanian immigration law if they 
choose not to return to Colombia. 
 
 
ONPAR Confirms UNHCR Need For Legislation 
----------------------------------------- 
9.  (SBU) In late July PolOff and Pol Specialist met with 
ONPAR Director Pablo Perez on refugee issues.  Under 
Panamanian law, Perez confirmed, refugees cannot become 
permanent residents or citizens of Panama.  Perez said Panama 
did not grant refugee status to the Colombians in 1998 
because the Darien was a "no-man's land" that neither Panama 
or Colombia could control.  Granting refugee status in his 
opinion would have encouraged a massive inflow from Colombia. 
 According to Perez, the Colombian Army's presence near the 
border now prevents an inflow of refugees. 
 
10.  (SBU) Perez downplayed Vargas's concerns about the 
Central Americans and provided a more sanguine view.  He 
pointed out that ONPAR works with Immigration authorities to 
issue identification cards which allows them to live and work 
legally in Panama.  According to Perez, refugees can open 
bank accounts and obtain credit if they meet a bank's normal 
criteria, i.e. hold a steady job and pay taxes.  Immigration 
assists many refugees by providing them with letters for 
banks certifying their refugee status.  Refugees annually 
must renew their status through ONPAR and Immigration to 
obtain new ID cards. 
 
With A Little Help From My Friends... 
------------------------------------- 
11.  (SBU) In a July meeting, Vargas told POL Counselor that 
UNHCR needs a little "help from its friends, like the United 
States."  He believes that as the U.S. supplies 25% of 
UNHCR's budget for Panama ($150,000 in 2005), it should try 
to shape policy in the organization.  POL Counselor offered 
to invite Bogota PRM representative to travel to Darien with 
Vargas to see the situation first hand.  (Note: PolOff is 
planning a visit to the Darien with Vargas Llosa in 
early-September.  End note.) 
 
"Poor Communication" To Blame? 
------------------------------ 
12.  (SBU) In an August 4 meeting, MFA Officials Chiru, 
Franco, Quiel and Migration Sub-Director Carmelo Gonzalez 
told PolOff and Pol Specialist that poor communication with 
UNHCR was mostly to blame for creating misunderstandings 
about refugees.  Franco pointed out that the Colombian 
refugees live in conditions no worse than many Panamanians in 
the Darien.  The officials also contended that UNHCR does not 
understand Panamanian law or their personal liability if they 
do not obey it.  Gonzalez cited the inability of many Darien 
refugees to prove their identity and citizenship as an 
important delaying factor, despite help from a Colombian 
consular officer based in the Caribbean border town of Puerto 
Obaldia.  Franco also spoke of Panama's ongoing concern about 
a large inflow of refugees to the Darien from Colombia and 
the potential overwhelming impact on public services such as 
schools in the region. 
 
13.  (SBU) Franco explained that the GOP first saw the need 
for special legislation to resolve the Colombian and Central 
American refugee issue in 2003.  The 2004 Presidential 
election campaign then intruded.  When the ruling Arnulfista 
party lost the election, the issue was left for the new 
Torrijos government to resolve.  The GOP officials agreed the 
legislative assembly will approve a bill granting regular 
status to the Colombian and Central American refugees before 
the end of 2005.  In the case of the Central Americans, 
Quadri said the Refugee Commission never reached a decision 
on whether a new law was needed and that the Procuraduria 
(Attorney General) had not yet given advisory opinion. 
 
Comment 
------- 
14.  (C) There are several reasons for Panamanian 
foot-dragging on refugees.  With the exception of blowback 
following the April 2003 "forced" repatriation of Colombians, 
Panama has paid little or no price for violating its 
international agreements.  The all-but-inaccessible Darien 
province is under-populated and remote and the problems of 
Colombian refugees can be easily ignored.  Also, time has 
softened some issues.  Many Colombians -- who are culturally 
and physically indistinguishable from the locals -- are now 
married to Panamanians. 
 
15.  (C) At root, Panamanians resent spending money to help 
Colombians, who they see as coming from a much richer, more 
powerful country.  They feel threatened by and resent the 
100,000-200,000 Colombians who live illegally in Panama City, 
who they suspect are taking jobs from Panamanians.  They fear 
being swamped by Colombians arriving at Tocumen airport 
claiming refugee status.  That may explain why, according to 
UNHCR, GOP officials routinely return such persons to 
Colombia without interviews.  Meanwhile, Panama detains 
scores of other Colombians for months at a time in squalid 
conditions at Panama's crowded Immigration Jail until they 
finally ask to be deported.  Calls by Panamanian officials 
for better communication with UNHCR may not be fully 
ingenuous. 
 
16.  (C) When GOP officials are asked why Panama does not 
follow the 1951 UN Convention on Refugees, which Panama 
ratified in 1977, they cite contradictions between it and 
Panamanian law and the GOP's position that Panamanian law has 
precedence over international agreements.  UNHCR argues, on 
the contrary, that Panamanian law legally obligates the GOP 
to follow the UN Convention and that Panama currently is out 
of compliance with its own laws on the granting of asylum. 
 
17.  (C) Attitudes about Colombia do not explain Panama's 
slowness to resolve the status of its Central American 
refugees, who, along with the Colombians, also require full 
integration into society.  GOP attitudes toward Cubans may 
reflect sensitivities of a government with more pro-Cuba 
voices than the last one, one which also is eager to 
reestablish relations with Cuba following the rupture of 
August 2004.  Embassy will monitor the proposed legislation. 
Whether or not it resolves the existing problems, the new law 
will be tailor-made to fix an existing problem.  It will not 
resolve issues related to future inflows of refugees to 
Panama. 
 
ARREAGA