US embassy cable - 05ANKARA4842

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 004842 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/15/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM, TU 
SUBJECT: TURKISH PM'S KURDISH INITIATIVE: SEARCHING FOR 
REALITY BEHIND THE RHETORIC 
 
 
(U) Classified by CDA Nancy McEldowney; reasons: E.O. 12958 
1.4 (b,d). 
 
1. (C) Summary:  PM Erdogan is portraying his public 
extension of a hand to Turkey's Kurds as the democratic 
alternative to resolving what he calls "the Kurdish problem". 
 However, the ad hoc, undefined nature of his approach and 
rhetoric have left him vulnerable to charges that he has no 
real plan and that his principal objective was to blunt prior 
criticism by the military.  Only if Erdogan backs up his 
rhetoric quickly with programs that improve people's lives in 
the Southeast will he be able to turn what is so far an empty 
show into a political victory.  End summary. 
 
2. (U) PM Erdogan wants the world to see his Aug. 10 meeting 
with a dozen "intellectuals", at which he spoke of a "Kurdish 
problem", and his Aug. 12 visit to the symbolic Kurdish 
capital Diyarbakir as a long-overdue breakthrough in 
resolving the place and identity of Kurds in the Republic of 
Turkey. 
 
3. (U) Indeed, there are unprecedented elements to his 
initiative.  Although previous Turkish leaders have 
acknowledged that democracy and prosperity depend on 
overcoming Turkish Kurds' sense of alienation, no Turkish PM 
or President used the phrase "Kurdish problem" before 
Erdogan.  Moreover, in Diyarbakir Erdogan spoke in general 
terms of (unspecified) mistakes that Turkish authorities have 
committed in the past, and reiterated that the "Kurdish 
problem" is solvable only through "democratic means". 
 
4. (C) On the surface Erdogan's comments seem sensible: the 
Turkish State has failed since the founding of the Republic 
in 1923 to help the mainly Kurdish Southeast overcome its 
feudalism, chronic underdevelopment, and sense of grievance 
leading to dozens of Kurdish uprisings, whether for religious 
or -- as with the continuing Marxist-Leninist PKK insurgency 
-- social/ideological reasons. 
 
5. (C) However, Erdogan's approach and his loose rhetoric 
raise serious questions about both his intentions and 
capacity to follow through. 
 
6. (C) The first question mark hangs over Erdogan's choice of 
"intellectual" interlocutors.  With one or two exceptions all 
represented left-wing or leftist-Islamist, Istanbul-centric 
points of view which at best are abstract or irrelevant to 
the vast majority of Turks or Kurds struggling to find jobs 
or food for the table.  Furthermore, the group contained only 
one ethnic Kurd, Yilmaz Ensarioglu, who was chosen for his 
Islamist views, not his ethnic background.  Even more 
problematic for Erdogan is the impression deliberately left 
by the "intellectuals"'s spokesman Gencay Gursoy that Erdogan 
should open a dialogue with the PKK.  Thus Erdogan created no 
channel to Kurdish politicians or spokesmen who are anti-PKK. 
 Moreover, given the favorable comments about the meeting 
issued by PKK operational chief Murat Karayilan and 
PKK-linked politicians like Leyla Zana, Erdogan left himself 
vulnerable to the charge that he is being manipulated by the 
PKK and its terrorist leader, the jailed Abdullah Ocalan. 
 
7. (C) In declaring in Diyarbakir that he intends to solve 
"the Kurdish problem" by "democratic means" and economic 
policies and stating that the Turkish State made errors in 
the past, Erdogan raised another question mark.  He appeared 
to be using this rhetoric to try to constrict what he sees as 
the Turkish military's push for stronger powers to prosecute 
the anti-terrorist campaign against the PKK.  It is the 
military which has cogently criticized Erdogan and AKP for a 
singular lack of coherent economic and social policies to 
complement the military campaign.  It is the military which 
has pressed for increased powers to deal with the renewed PKK 
violence and which has criticized the AKP government for a 
lack of an overall anti-terrorism policy and regional 
development strategy. 
 
8. (C) Erdogan was thus gambling that he can gain time and 
general favor, while maintaining the loyalty of 70 Kurdish 
AKP MPs (one fifth of his parliamentary group).  However, 
Erdogan's attempt to appeal to the emotions of anti-State 
(anti-military) Kurds and left-wingers has not stopped PKK 
violence: a day after Erdogan's Diyarbakir speech the PKK 
missed blowing up the governor of Elazig by a hairsbreadth; 
the Elazig governor was the third governor in the past two 
weeks narrowly to have missed assassination.  Contacts tell 
us that, as the PKK violence continues and more soldiers are 
killed, the military will have ample opportunity to work on 
public opinion.  They expect the military will emphasize that 
the solution to the issues at hand is first and foremost to 
oppose the ideology of terrorism, not to indulge Kurds' 
beliefs that their problem is separate from or superior to 
"Turkey's problem".  The military's view will be all the more 
convincing since in his Diyarbakir speech Erdogan used a 
phrase -- "democratic Republic" -- which was coined by the 
PKK. 
 
9. (C) The planning for both the meeting and the Diyarbakir 
visit and Erdogan's rhetoric have stimulated telling 
criticism from within AKP.  An AKP MP with more nationalist 
roots and conservative iconoclast AKP MP Ersonmez Yarbay have 
expressed concern to us that Erdogan's willingness to draw 
attention to Kurdishness will encourage Kurdish nationalist 
and separatist tendencies. 
 
10. (C) Several papers noted that only 700-800 people turned 
out for Erdogan's Diyarbakir speech.  Ahmet Tasgetiren, the 
columnist for "Yeni Safak" with probably the most influence 
among AKP's Islamist core, sharply criticized both the 
"half-baked" preparations for Erdogan's meeting and visit and 
his sloppy use of rhetoric whose meaning will be defined by 
those who created the rhetoric in the first place, i.e., the 
PKK.  Others, including leading anti-PKK Kurdish politician 
Hasim Hasimi, who is convinced that AKP is the last best hope 
for a solution, have pointed out to us that Erdogan's 
backpedaling in Diyarbakir -- he undercut the appeal of 
"Kurdish problem" by declaring that all citizens of Turkey 
are one nation under one flag -- made his appeal to Kurds 
appear cynical. 
 
11. (C) Comment: Kurdish identity in the Republic of Turkey 
has been problematic for the Kurds, for the Turkish State, 
and for every Turkish government since the Republic was 
founded in 1923.  Erdogan appears to have sought a short-cut 
not only to resolve this issue but also to put the core 
institutions of the secular State into a box.  However, his 
reliance for advice on Kurdish AKP MPs who are symbols of the 
oppressive feudal system, ad hoc gestures, and vague rhetoric 
-- no substitute for coherent, comprehensive policies -- may 
compound the problem.  Erdogan is thus at risk of falling 
into his own trap unless he follows through with concrete 
programs that positively impact people's lives in the 
Southeast while maintaining the unitary nature of the State. 
End comment. 
MCELDOWNEY