US embassy cable - 05VIENNA2752

C O N F I D E N T I A L VIENNA 002752 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EUR, EUR/SE, EUR/ERA AND EUR/AGS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/17/2015 
 
TAGS: PREL, ECIN, TU, AU, EUN 
SUBJECT: EU-TURKEY: AUSTRIANS ON CONSISTENT LINE; WON'T 
 
QUESTION OCT 3 START 
 
REF: A) STATE 150087 B) VIENNA 2626 (AND PREVIOUS) 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires a. i. Carol van Voorst 
 
1.  (C) The Austrian position on Turkey's EU accession (as 
 
reported ref b) has been fairly consistent over the past 
 
several months and is not likely to change prior to October 
 
3.  Austria does not and will not want to reopen the December 
 
2004 decision to begin talks this autumn.  Austria will also 
 
not seek to impose additional conditions before accession 
 
negotiations can begin.  Austria recognizes that a Cyprus 
 
settlement will have to occur in a UN-sponsored process. 
 
Austria will therefore not demand that Turkey formally 
 
recognize the Republic of Cyprus as a prerequisite for 
 
discussions with the Commission on adopting the voluminous EU 
 
regulations. 
 
2.  (C) On the other hand, Austria was less than satisfied 
 
with the outcome of the December 2004 EU Summit, when it 
 
pushed hard for a reference to outcomes other than full 
 
membership.  Recent statements by ForMin Plassnik and 
 
Chancellor Schuessel (ref b) make it clear that Austria will 
 
seek to insert a mention of "open-endedness" or of a 
 
"privileged partnership" for Turkey in the negotiating 
 
mandate EU leaders give to the EU Commission.  Austria is 
 
particularly likely to pursue this goal if Chancellor 
 
Schuessel judges that the political consensus on Turkish 
 
membership in other important EU member states (e.g. Germany, 
 
France, the Netherlands) has moved in this direction. 
 
3.  (C) Chancellor Schuessel has personally determined 
 
Austria's position.  Arguments about Turkey's progress to 
 
date, and the role the incentive of EU membership has played 
 
in Turkey's reform process, are important to him.  Still, 
 
they do not address Austrian reservations about the impact of 
 
Turkish accession on the EU's cohesiveness and, especially, 
 
on EU finances.  Schuessel will already have taken into 
 
account our assessment that Turkey might react negatively to 
 
a negotiating mandate that includes language about 
 
alternatives to full membership.  However, recent, highly 
 
publicized polls show seventy to eighty percent of Austrians 
 
are either deeply skeptical or strongly opposed to Turkish 
 
entry.  All of Schuessel's political competitors - even the 
 
Greens - have read these tea leaves and have tilted away from 
 
support for Turkey in recent weeks.  Public misgivings about 
 
admitting Turkey could have a significant impact on 
 
Schuessel's chances for victory in the 2006 general election. 
 
He will need to be able to tell the Austrian public, 
 
credibly, that he understands their concerns and fought for 
 
them "in Brussels." 
 
4.  (C) Embassy Vienna will report septel Austrian MFA 
 
reaction to talking points contained in ref (a). 
 
van Voorst