US embassy cable - 05THEHAGUE2271

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NETHERLANDS: MFA OFFICIAL ON IRAN/IAEA, AFRICA, MARITIME SECURITY

Identifier: 05THEHAGUE2271
Wikileaks: View 05THEHAGUE2271 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy The Hague
Created: 2005-08-17 14:38:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: NL AF PARM PREL IR NATO
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 THE HAGUE 002271 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/17/2015 
TAGS: NL, AF, PARM, PREL, IR, NATO 
SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS: MFA OFFICIAL ON IRAN/IAEA, AFRICA, 
MARITIME SECURITY 
 
Classified By: DCM Chat Blakeman, reasons 1.4 (b, d) 
 
1. (U) This is a action request; please see para 9. 
 
2. (C) Summary: DCM and Polmiloff met August 15 with Director 
Robert de Groot and Section Head Hans Sandee of the Security 
and Defense Policy Division at the Dutch MFA.  On Iran, de 
Groot suggested there are no alternatives at present than 
continued negotiations through the EU3.  He noted that the 
August 9 IAEA Board of Governors meeting revealed for the 
first time that some EU members are growing hesitant to refer 
Iran's actions to the UNSC.  De Groot suggested convening a 
Board of Governors meeting immediately following the release 
of IAEA Director General ElBaradei's anticipated report on 
September 3.  On India, de Groot requested consultations 
regarding the U.S.-India agreement on nuclear cooperation. 
He briefly discussed ISAF Stage III and Dutch involvement in 
Africa.  De Groot concluded with a discussion on maritime 
security, and requested information regarding standard 
operating procedures for the protection of commercial ships 
in waterways with high incidents of piracy, including 
specifically Somalia and the Straits of Malacca.  End Summary. 
 
--------- 
Iran-IAEA 
--------- 
 
3. (C) De Groot noted a lack of consensus in the IAEA Board 
of Governors; as such, there did not appear to be any 
alternatives other than continuing negotiations through the 
EU3. He added that the Dutch government was considering 
calling in the Iranian ambassador in The Hague to discuss 
recent developments regarding the IAEA and the execution of 
two teenagers in Northeastern Iran in July.  De Groot 
suggested that the Board of Governors meeting on August 9 
revealed for the first time hesitancy on the part of some EU 
members to refer Iran's actions to the UNSC. Among the EU3, 
he stated that the UK is ready to refer the case to the UNSC, 
but Germany and France are now hesitant. De Groot speculated 
that EU members were not entirely certain what Iran had done, 
and suggested that perhaps the United States had more 
information on the steps Iran had taken to resume uranium 
conversion.  De Groot added that new Iranian President 
Ahmadinejad has not been constructive.  De Groot pointed to 
IAEA Director General ElBaradei,s report on September 3 as 
the next step, and suggested that the Board of Governors 
convene earlier following the release of ElBaradei,s report 
instead of its next planned meeting on September 19.  In de 
Groot's opinion, this was too serious a matter to allow so 
much time to pass prior to the next Board of Governors 
meeting. 
 
---------------------------- 
U.S.-India Nuclear Agreement 
---------------------------- 
 
4. (C) De Groot raised the recent U.S.-India agreement on 
nuclear energy cooperation, explaining that the Dutch Embassy 
in Washington had requested more information and/or an 
experts, meeting regarding agreement details.  De Groot 
noted that the Dutch have yet to be contacted about this 
request, and are "quite worried" regarding ramifications the 
agreement may have for the NPT.  He requested any information 
that Washington might be able to provide -- hopefully in the 
form of consultations from experts, and closed by remarking 
"Delhi appears very happy, which makes us quite concerned". 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
ISAF Stage III -- Partnership with Australia? 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
5. (C) De Groot briefly reviewed Dutch proposed plans to 
participate in ISAF Stage III.  He expressed satisfaction 
with the current formulation of ISAF,s U.N. mandate 
(septel), stressing that the mandate is key for Dutch 
participation in Stage III.  He noted that the Netherlands 
and Australia have begun preliminary discussions regarding a 
possible partnership in the Dutch proposed PRT in Uruzgan 
province; hopefully, more progress will be made during the 
Stage III follow-up conference in The Hague on August 17-18. 
 
------ 
Africa 
------ 
 
6. (C) When asked about Dutch military operations in Africa, 
de Groot replied that the Netherlands is committed -- as 
indicated by the 2003 White Paper on Africa -- but explained 
that it has proven logistically difficult to send the right 
personnel to function in such places as Rwanda, Burundi, or 
DROC.  In one instance, for example, a non-French speaking 
Dutch general officer was sent to the region, which proved 
problematic.  De Groot noted that the Dutch are interested in 
partnering with greater powers in this region; they cannot 
act on their own. 
 
7. (C) De Groot pointed to Minister for Development 
Cooperation Agnes van Ardenne,s interest in Sudan as the 
primary focus of Dutch action in Africa at present.  He 
commented that the U.N. has been slow to develop an operation 
plan.  Following the death of Vice-President John Garang, the 
need for information from southern Sudan has become vital. 
De Groot stated that the Dutch plan to send defense experts 
to southern Sudan in early September as part of an observer 
mission including German parliamentarians.  He cited some 
security concerns; the unarmed observer mission will not be 
located near any protective force.  However, the mission is 
important, as it will help the Dutch determine how to best 
use the approximately 200 million Euros budgeted by the Dutch 
Parliament for reconstruction in Sudan. 
 
----------------- 
Maritime Security 
----------------- 
 
8. (C)  De Groot concluded by raising maritime security.  He 
explained that the Dutch government is under considerable 
pressure from Dutch shipping companies to enhance security in 
waterways from Europe to Asia due to increased cases of 
piracy.  Dutch firms are required to pay higher insurance 
premiums as a result -- this is bad for business.  He cited a 
recent example of a Dutch firm that had been hired to tow an 
American oil rig from Singapore to Egypt -- the Dutch firm 
had requested an armed escort or military personnel on board 
while passing along the coast of Somalia.  De Groot wondered 
whether Coalition forces in Djibouti might be available to 
assist in some capacity, either through maintaining radio 
contact or providing escort.  De Groot noted that these 
requests from Dutch shipping firms are coming to the 
attention of the Dutch parliament; in response, the Dutch 
government has begun an internal review of what may be 
possible.  He asked whether there were any standard operating 
procedures to assist commercial vessels through waterways 
with high rates of piracy, including specifically Somalia and 
the Straits of Malacca.  DCM offered to inquire in Washington 
and get back to de Groot. 
 
-------------- 
Action Request 
-------------- 
 
9. (C) Post seeks guidance regarding de Groot's requests for 
a) more information on specific steps Iran has taken to 
resume uranium conversion; b) experts' consultations on the 
U.S.-India agreement on nuclear cooperation; and c) 
information on standard operating procedures or arrangements 
for the protection of commercial vessels transiting waters 
with high rates of piracy. 
SOBEL 

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