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| Identifier: | 05ABUDHABI3580 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 05ABUDHABI3580 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | Embassy Abu Dhabi |
| Created: | 2005-08-17 12:26:00 |
| Classification: | CONFIDENTIAL |
| Tags: | EPET ENRG ECON TC |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
null
Diana T Fritz 08/28/2006 04:05:10 PM From DB/Inbox: Search Results
Cable
Text:
C O N F I D E N T I A L ABU DHABI 03580
SIPDIS
CXABU:
ACTION: ECON
INFO: FCS P/M AMB DCM POL
DISSEMINATION: ECON
CHARGE: PROG
APPROVED: AMB:MSISSON
DRAFTED: ECON:OJOHN
CLEARED: NONE
VZCZCADI459
RR RUEHC RUEHHH RUEHDE RHEBAAA RHEHNSC RHEHAAA
DE RUEHAD #3580/01 2291226
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 171226Z AUG 05
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1203
INFO RUEHHH/OPEC COLLECTIVE
RUEHDE/AMCONSUL DUBAI 5331
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RHEHAAA/THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABU DHABI 003580 SIPDIS STATE FOR NEA/ARPI, EB/ESC/IEC/EPC WHITEHOUSE FOR OVP- KEVIN O'DONOVAN ENERGY FOR MOLLY WILLIAMSON E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/20/2015 TAGS: EPET, ENRG, ECON, TC SUBJECT: ABU DHABI'S OFFSHORE PRODUCTION Classified By: CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR MICHELE J. SISON FOR REASONS 1.4 (B & D). THIS CONTAINS BUSINESS PROPRIETARY INFORMATION. 1. (C) Summary: Abu Dhabi Marine Operating Company (ADMA/OPCO) GM Bud Fackrell (protect) told Econchief August 16 that ADMA/OPCO had taken several steps to increase oil production over the last year and had a project to bring sustainable oil production capacity to 600,000 barrels per day bp/d by 2008. ADMA/OPCO is also developing a plan to increase production by a further 200,000 bp/d, using undeveloped fields. Fackrell noted that developing new offshore fields was expensive. The international oil companies that own 40% of ADMA/OPCO would want to renegotiate the terms of their agreements with Abu Dhabi's state owned oil company ADNOC, he added. Fackrell briefly discussed the possibility that planned gas production and imports from Qatar would be insufficient to meet the UAE's rapidly growing energy demand. He also said that the Abu Dhabi leadership's attention to securing the offshore oil facilities -- which had increased during the invasion of Iraq then diminished -- appeared to be on the upswing. Exxon Al-Khalij's president Frank Kemnetz (protect) told us August 13 that negotiations over the 28% stake in the Upper Zakum field were moving along "slowly." End Summary. 2. (C) Econchief met with ADMA/OPCO (one of two companies responsible for Abu Dhabi's offshore oil production) General Manager Bud Fackrell (protect) on August 16 to discuss current production and his plans to increase production over the medium term. (Note: Fackrell is an AMCIT employee of BP, seconded to ADMA/OPCO.) On August 13, DCM and Econchief briefly discussed the status of the Upper Zakum negotiations with Exxon Al-Khalij President Frank Kemnetz (AMCIT president of Exxon/Mobil's local operation). Current Production ------------------ 3. (C) Fackrell said that he, and ADNOC in general, was under pressure to produce as much oil as possible. Fackrell added that ADMA/OPCO needed to balance increasing current production with its longer term goal of increasing production capacity. According to Fackrell, ADMA/OPCO has undertaken a number of projects over the last year to remove bottlenecks and improve coordination with the Abu Dhabi Gas Liquefaction Company (ADGAS), which produces LNG and LPG from the gas produced offshore. (Note: ADNOC has a strict no-flare policy, which means that some of the production constraints are driven by limits in how much gas Abu Dhabi's gas plants can absorb.) 4. (C) Fackrell explained that years of spare capacity had conditioned the Emiratis to operating with more redundancy in their operation than the international oil companies (IOCs). With no spare capacity, ADNOC needed to make a "mind shift" in ensuring that the operations "run at over 90% efficiency" the way oil companies elsewhere need to operate. Fortunately, the Emiratis were learning this new lesson, he noted. Planned Increases ----------------- 5. (C) Fackrell explained that he had a program to raise sustainable production capacity by 150,000 bp/d to 600,000 bp/d by 2008. He said "I can produce at 600,000 bp/d now, but I can't sustain it" for the long term. (Note: We understand that ADMA/OPCO is currently producing between 500,000 and 600,000 barrels per day, which would be close to the top of its rated capacity.) Abu Dhabi will build a pipeline from ADMA/OPCO's offshore facilities on Das Island to Abu Dhabi's onshore gas processing facilities. Currently, there is no way to pipe excess gas onshore to meet the UAE's power generation needs. With the pipeline and some upgrades, Fackrell said, he would have no problem producing at 600,000 bp/d for the next 25 years. 6. (C) ADMA/OPCO is developing a plan for Abu Dhabi's Supreme Petroleum Council's (SPC) approval to increase production by a further 200,000 barrels per day. Fackrell explained that the production increase would come from ADMA/OPCO's undeveloped fields. He admitted that the undeveloped fields were not the size of the Zakum or Umm Shaif reservoirs, but noted that the undeveloped fields were as large as the fields that BP is aggressively developing in "deep water Gulf of Mexico." Fackrell also noted that both Zakum and Umm Shaif would continue producing for years to come. 7. (C) Fackrell explained that developing new offshore fields is costly. The IOCs that own 40% of ADMA/OPCO operate under fixed cost contracts that have not allowed them to benefit from the "windfall" high oil prices, which go to ADNOC. He said that he suspected the IOCs would want to renegotiate the terms of any new development contract before investing large sums of money. Although he noted that Abu Dhabi's SPC and ADNOC were tough bargainers, he was confident that Abu Dhabi would come to an agreement that would give the IOCs "enough" to keep them interested in developing new projects. He added that Exxon/Mobil was discovering just how tough the SPC was as a bargaining partner. (Note: Exxon/Mobil beat BP and Shell to final negotiations with ADNOC to develop a 28% stake in the Upper Zakum Field. Kemnetz told DCM and Econchief that the negotiations were moving forward, but slowly. He added that "obviously Abu Dhabi was interested in more than just price (i.e., technology) otherwise we wouldn't be where we are today," but noted that ADNOC and the SPC were still pushing for the best price possible. End Note.) Gas and the UAE's Energy Demands -------------------------------- 8. (C) Fackrell explained that while the UAE's offshore gas reserves are large, most of the gas is "associated" and needed for reservoir management. He said that the major Khuff gas reservoir is a deep non-associated gas reservoir that lies below the Umm Shaif oil field. It is expensive to produce this gas, as ADMA/OPCO needs to segregate the gas from the oil (which is at a lower pressure) in the field above. 9. (C) Fackrell said that ADNOC had recently asked him to provide his gas supply and demand projections for the next few years, adding that he thought ADNOC was looking at gas available to meet the UAE's rapidly growing demand for power. He told Econchief that he did not know the exact reason for the request, since his immediate boss (ADNOC Deputy CEO Abdullah Nasser Al-Suwaidi) was out of the country, but he suspected that ADNOC was worried about potential supply shortages. He added that he had heard that there were (unspecified) problems with the Dolphin project to bring natural gas from Qatar to the UAE. Fackrell explained that he had told his planners to develop a range of estimates, noting that he would need to reinject more gas into the reservoirs as he increased oil production. He added that the plans to sharply increase production at the Upper Zakum field would also need gas from ADMA/OPCO's fields. Security of the Facilities -------------------------- 10. (C) In response to econchief's question, Fackrell admitted that security of the offshore oil facilities could be improved. He said that the UAEG paid a "flurry" of attention to the issue after the invasion of Iraq, but then the level of attention dropped. He added, however, that security appeared to be gaining attention again. ADNOC security had approached him about raising his personal security awareness (while staying "low profile") and noted that he is already varying his times and routes of travel. He added that security was an issue of discussion between ADNOC's CEO and Minister of Interior Sheikh Saif bin Zayed AL-Nahyan. ADMA/OPCO had hired a security consultant to help identify the specific priorities that the UAEG needs to address with regard to improving security. SISON
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