US embassy cable - 05ROME2720

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ITALY MAINTAINS STRONG SUPPORT FOR TURKEY'S EU ACCESSION TALKS

Identifier: 05ROME2720
Wikileaks: View 05ROME2720 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Rome
Created: 2005-08-17 12:11:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PREL PGOV TU IT ITALIAN POLITICS
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

171211Z Aug 05
C O N F I D E N T I A L  ROME 002720 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/24/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, TU, IT, ITALIAN POLITICS 
SUBJECT: ITALY MAINTAINS STRONG SUPPORT FOR TURKEY'S EU 
ACCESSION TALKS 
 
REF: A. ROME 01979 
 
     B. ROME 02372 
     C. ROME 02422 
     D. ROME 02178 
 
Classified By: Acting Political Counselor Candace Putnam, for 
reasons 1.4 (b)(d) 
 
1. (SBU) Summary.  Prime Minister Berlusconi's government 
continues to steadfastly support Turkey in the run-up to the 
expected start of EU negotiations October 3, although Italian 
officials acknowledge that the talks will be lengthy and 
difficult.  Italian officials concede that EU membership for 
Turkey has become a tougher sell as the EU works to overcome 
internal difficulties, but they maintain that it is important 
to solidify democracy there and protect Europe's flank from 
the spread of Islamic extremism.  Italy's center-left 
opposition, however, is unlikely to champion Turkey's cause 
if elected in next year's election. End Summary. 
 
2.  (C) Over the past several months, Italian officials have 
told Poloffs and visiting USG officials that the double "no" 
from France and the Netherlands on the EU constitution has 
made it harder to stir up enthusiasm for EU expansion.  They 
acknowledge that the EU is under pressure to bounce back from 
the constitutional setback and redefine the Union's future, 
but they maintain that relaunching the process of EU 
integration and expansion could shake the Union out of its 
doldrums.  Senior MFA officials suggested months ago that 
France would use its "no" vote to slow or block negotiations 
with Ankara but that Italy would work to prevent a few big 
states from "calling the shots" on the future of the Union 
(ref A). 
 
3. (C) MFA Secretary General Vatani told visiting A/S Fried 
in June that Italy will firmly support Turkey's bid in the 
run-up to the start of EU negotiations in October (ref A). 
Italian officials argue that an EU "no" to Turkey could have 
negative implications on accession talks for Bulgaria and 
Romania, which the Italians want to avoid.  (Note: EU 
membership for the Balkans is a key Italian foreign policy 
goal. End note.)  In July 2005, MFA EU Office Director Luigi 
Mattiolo told Laborcouns that in-depth EU discussions on the 
way forward with Turkey are not likely until the September 
Gymnich or perhaps delayed until November (after the German 
elections) when the EU could hold an "extraordinary" European 
Council meeting (ref B). 
 
4.  (SBU) FM Fini's visit to Ankara in July was designed to 
publicly reiterate Italy's support for Turkey ahead of the 
expected start of formal negotiations.  During his visit, 
Fini noted that Turkey remains a strategic partner for the EU 
and that membership for Turkey serves the Union's interests. 
Fini said that Turkey, as a member of NATO, already is 
integrated with Europe and the United States militarily and 
politically.  (During an earlier meeting in Rome with German 
FM Fischer, Fini said that embracing Turkey also helps fight 
terrorism and the spread of Islamic extremism.)  At the same 
time, he signaled that EU negotiations will likely be long an 
complex--lasting at least 10 years, he speculated--and will 
include "timely verifications" and "moments for pause" to 
ensure that Ankara complies with EU values before formal 
integration. Berlusconi in June agreed that negotiations 
could be lengthy, in part, he says, because it will take time 
to convince French and Germany publics on the benefits of 
having a democratic Muslim country in the EU. 
 
5.  (SBU) In contrast to the government's enthusiasm, 
center-left leader (and former EC President) Romano Prodi has 
suggested that the EU should delay enlargement discussions to 
take stock of the Union's future (ref D).  In a June 
interview with a regional newspaper, Prodi implied that 
intra-EU problems fueling grumblings about the Euro and the 
rejection of the draft EU constitution, are linked to worries 
over further expansion.  Prodi explicitly stated that the 
"real" concern was not the Euro, but Turkey.  He suggested 
the EU "rethink" Turkey's future membership because, in his 
view, the "conditions" for Turkey's accession in the near and 
medium terms no longer exist.  (Comment: Prodi has been 
consistently lukewarm about Turkey's potential EU membership 
but shares the government's goal of pursuing EU membership 
for Balkan countries.  End comment.) 
 
6.  (SBU) Comment: Berlusconi's government remains 
consistently "on message" regarding Turkish EU accession and 
may already be working behind-the-scenes to build support for 
launching accession negotiations in October.  However, if 
Prodi's coalition wins next year's parliamentary election, 
Ankara is unlikely to find an enthusiastic champion in Rome. 
 
SPOGLI 
 
 
NNNN 
 2005ROME02720 - Classification: CONFIDENTIAL 


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