US embassy cable - 05TELAVIV5082

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TEL AVIV 005082 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/15/2015 
TAGS: KPAL, KWBG, PGOV, PREL, EG, IS, GAZA DISENGAGEMENT, ECONOMY AND FINANCE 
SUBJECT: NSA EILAND SAYS DISENGAGEMENT GOING WELL, BUT 
DISAGREEMENT PERSISTS OVER CUSTOMS ENVELOPE 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Daniel C. Kurtzer for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D) 
 
 1.  (C) Summary:  In an August 15 meeting with NEA A/S Welch 
and the Ambassador, Israeli NSC Director Giora Eiland and 
Deputy Director Eran Etzion assessed that it seems 
disengagement "is going to be easier than expected."  The 
majority of the discussion centered on what would happen 
after disengagement, particularly on the customs envelope. 
Israel's preferred option is to move the customs point to 
Kerem Shalom; if Palestinians do not agree, the GOI will move 
the customs envelope to the border between Gaza and Israel. 
A/S Welch countered that this option could leave Gaza worse 
off, and suggested that other options were viable.  A/S Welch 
cautioned that the Israeli proposals could make Gaza "a 
prison," and urged that Israel make Gaza "more open, more 
prosperous, more free, more secure."  Eiland objected that 
the world expects Israel to continue to be responsible for 
Gaza and its economy, while the point of disengagement is to 
abdicate that responsibility.  End summary. 
 
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Disengagement "Easier Than Expected" 
------------------------------------ 
 
2.  (C) NSC Director Giora Eiland seemed optimistic about the 
disengagement process, saying it "seems it is going to be 
easier than expected."  He estimated that half of the 
settlements in Gaza are almost empty, and that "most people 
understand that it is more or less over."  The only real 
problem Eiland identified is the approximately 4,000 people 
who infiltrated Gaza and are potentially violent. 
 
3.  (C)  The behavior of the Palestinians has also been 
"better than expected," according to Eiland.  He was quick to 
point out, however, that this behavior did not result from PA 
determination and effectiveness, but from the clear decision 
by Hamas to not "undermine the evacuation."  Eiland said the 
ongoing restraint in Palestinian violence during 
disengagement depends on Hamas maintaining this policy. 
 
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Difficulties After Disengagement 
-------------------------------- 
 
4.  (C) Eiland highlighted four main difficulties after 
disengagement.  Israel's domestic problem, in particular the 
deep division within Israeli society over disengagement, is 
serious.  A second difficulty stems from Hamas.  Eiland said 
that Hamas has announced that it will return to violence 
after the withdrawal is complete.  Hamas wants to 
differentiate itself from the PA, particularly before the 
Palestinian Legislative Council elections.  Hamas leaders do 
not want Palestinians to perceive the PA as successful after 
disengagement, and, therefore, Eiland claimed, have no 
incentive to refrain from attacking Israel after the 
withdrawal. 
 
5.  (C) A third difficulty comes in the area of the 
Philadelphi strip.  Eiland said that there has been a 
"semi-formal decision" to evacuate Philadelphi, and that an 
arrangement was finalized with the GOE August 14 that 
Egyptian border guards would be deployed along the border. 
Eiland clarified that while all GOI ministers support the 
decision to evacuate Philadelphi, many are uncomfortable with 
the idea of the deployment of Egyptian border guards.  Eiland 
and Etzion disagreed about how important the upcoming Knesset 
vote on this issue will be.  Eiland maintained that, while 
Israel will withdraw from Philadelphi, there will be no real 
evacuation until the Egyptians are deployed.  Etzion 
predicted that Israel will be out of Philadelphi before the 
end of 2005. 
 
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Customs Envelope 
---------------- 
 
6.  (C) Eiland identified the customs envelope as the fourth 
difficulty.  He argued that the more open the border between 
Gaza and Egypt, the more strict the customs and security 
measures between Gaza and Israel and Gaza and the West Bank 
will have to be.  He acknowledged that the Palestinians want 
more openness along both borders, but said "we cannot allow 
both simultaneously."  He maintained that dangerous people 
and goods could freely move into Gaza from Egypt, and then 
into Israel from Gaza.  Eiland outlined four possible options: 
 
     A.  Israel's proposal: move the customs border to the 
Gaza/Israel border at Erez and Karni. 
 
     B.  The PA proposal:  maintain the customs point at 
Rafah (on the border with Egypt), with third country 
nationals monitoring customs. 
 
     C. Israeli compromise proposal: move the Egypt/Gaza 
crossing southeast to Kerem Shalom on the Gaza/Egypt/Israel 
border.  There, the amount of Israeli involvement could be 
negotiable, with gradual transfer of responsibility to 
Palestinians. 
 
     D.  Other compromise proposal:  that Rafah be controlled 
by Palestinians, but only used for people.  Goods could cross 
through Nitzana and then into Gaza with full Israeli 
inspection.  The Israelis do not like this option, according 
to Eiland, because people carry baggage, and, therefore, 
dangerous or suspect goods would end up passing through Rafah. 
 
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Customs Options 
--------------- 
 
7.  (C) Eiland asserted that Prime Minister Sharon wants to 
pursue option A, believing that it most completely rids 
Israel of responsibility for what happens in Gaza.  A/S Welch 
responded that option A would effectively turn Gaza into a 
"big prison," cutting it off economically from Israel and the 
West Bank, and making it even less economically viable and 
less open than it currently is.  The Ambassador suggested 
that the GOI focus on a performance-based arrangement, easing 
their own customs check when and if the Palestinians prove 
they are controlling their border with Egypt.  A/S Welch 
suggested that the customs point be at Rafah with the help of 
third country nationals, and that Israel only become more 
strict if the GOI discovers that the PA is not doing its part 
on the Egyptian border. 
 
8.  (C) Eiland and Etzion objected to both of these 
suggestions.  Eiland said that once Israel is out of Gaza, it 
can exercise the right of any government - that of 
controlling access to its country.  He also objected to the 
idea of other nations helping to monitor customs.  "We cannot 
trust any third party" to certify that goods meet Israeli 
standards.  Eiland complained, "Everyone treats us as the 
only ones to be responsible for the economy of the 
Palestinians.  Everything can flow out through Egypt.  Why 
should we be responsible for anything else?" 
 
9. (C) In response to A/S Welch's question about what would 
happen if the two sides do not reach agreement, Eiland said 
the GOI would go back to option A.  A/S Welch cautioned that 
this option would "set up the worst possible situation for 
yourselves in terms of the image of what you created," by, in 
effect, cutting off Gaza from Israel and the West Bank, and 
weakening the PA.  Etzion requested clarification on the USG 
position on the customs options.  A/S Welch replied that 
there is an emerging American position, that Gaza should be 
"more open, more prosperous, more free and more secure" the 
day after.  Eiland appeared eager to find agreement with A/S 
Welch and the Ambassador on this point, and, when none was 
reached, expressed disappointment that the meeting had not 
been "more pleasant." 
 
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The New Status of Territories 
----------------------------- 
 
10.  (C) After disengagement from the northern West Bank, the 
GOI plans to transfer control of civil responsibilities to 
the PA, but maintain security responsibilities.  Eiland 
claims that the GOI intends to eventually transfer those as 
well; "sooner or later we will have to transfer security to 
Palestinians, but we would like to negotiate that -- not just 
give it away." 
 
11.  (C) Etzion raised the issue of the status of Gaza after 
Israeli withdrawal.  Eiland commented that the GOI would 
rather not have a UN resolution, but that they would 
appreciate a USG announcement defining the status of Gaza, 
suggesting something along the lines of, "Once Israel does a, 
b and c, Gaza is no longer occupied."  Eiland asked for USG 
views. 
 
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