US embassy cable - 05BAGHDAD3391

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 003391 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/16/2025 
TAGS: IZ, PGOV, PHUM, Parliament 
SUBJECT: CONSTITUTION UPDATE AUGUST 16:  NEGOTIATORS PAUSE 
FOR A BREATH 
 
Classified By: POL Couns Robert Ford, reason 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
1.  (C)  National Assembly Constitution Committee Chairman 
Shaykh Humam Hamudi told PolCouns April 16 afternoon that he 
thought the time deadline to finish the constitution by 
August 22 will be achievable but tight.  There are many 
disagreements among the negotiators, including whose text was 
definitive.  The first order of priority was to settle on an 
operative text.  Hamudi and the committee's two vice-chairmen 
completed reconciliation of the texts, noting the 
disagreements on language throughout the final draft 
document.  This work was completed late evening August 16. 
 
2.  (C)  Hamudi said that the Shia Coalition had met the 
morning of August 16 to discuss its final positions.  He 
defined six points of difference with the Kurds.  The first 
three he called Shia redlines, but the latter three could be 
negotiated: 
 
--  Kurdish views on federalism that Hamudi said touch on 
Iraqi unity itself.  The Shia accept the Kurdish regional 
government but insist on Iraqi unity.  He asked for U.S. 
intervention to caution the Kurds not to push too far. 
PolCouns noted that we caution the Kurds that the U.S. does 
not support an independent Kurdish state.  (Comment:  The 
only thing close to Kurdish independence in the draft 
constitution we have seen is a Kurdish request -- not 
approved -- for a sentence that mentions the phrase 
"self-determination for the Iraqi people" in the preamble. 
Hamudi, nonetheless was convinced of the Kurds' intent to 
hold a referendum, spurred on, he claimed, by the Kurdish 
parliament. End Comment.) 
 
--  Ownership and distribution of natural resource revenues. 
Hamudi said the Shia Coalition does not want the central 
government left bereft of revenues. 
 
--  exact language concerning Islam and the state in the 
text. 
 
--  the Kurdish demand to have representation of some sort in 
Iraqi embassies they found puzzling. 
 
--  the Kurds are demanding the National Assembly approve in 
total the Kurdish regional parliament's laws passed since 
1991 (so they conform with national legislation). 
 
--  the structure and operations of the government, including 
the percentage of votes required in the future National 
Assembly to approve laws and government appointments. 
 
3.  (C)  Hamudi added that the Kurds want to finalize the 
understanding about the election law for the December 2005 
election as well.  The Shia are offering to divide seats up 
for election in the future national assembly such that ninety 
percent of the assembly seats would be chosen on the basis of 
election results at the provincial level; the other ten 
percent would be ("compensatory") seats allocated on the 
basis of left-over votes tallied nationwide.  The Kurds, with 
significant communities in central and southern Iraq, think 
the compensatory seat awards will benefit them want the split 
to be 80 percent / 20 percent.  Hamudi thought they could 
split the difference in offers at 85/15. 
 
4. (C)  Separately, the Committee's second Vice-chairman, 
Adnan al-Janabi, told PolCouns that former Prime Minister 
Allawi's Iraqiya bloc, the third largest in the National 
Assembly, shared many of the concerns about the Kurdish 
proposals.  Beyond those mentioned by Hamudi, he objected to 
the Kurdish proposal that the Iraqi army not deploy to any 
governorate or region without permission of the local 
authorities. 
 
5. (C)  Comment:  In the wake of the late night rush August 
15, the negotiators today took a pause to regroup.  We have 
heard of few meetings between the core blocs August 16.  At 
our urging, Hamudi agreed the Shia Coalition would reach out 
to Sunni Arab negotiators by inviting them the morning of 
August 17.  Our sense is that the negotiators still 
frequently do not understand the motivations of the other 
negotiators and still ascribe all sorts of motivations to 
them.  Adnan al-Janabi accused Hamudi of altering agreed text 
without anyone else's permission, for example.  (There may be 
some truth to this, but all sides have been doing this, 
making the necessity to clarify a single text imperative.) 
We will encourage more off-line encounters to build a bit 
more trust in the remaining time. 
Khalilzad