US embassy cable - 02COLOMBO1835

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 COLOMBO 001835 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR SA, SA/INS, S/CT 
 
NSC FOR E. MILLARD 
 
LONDON FOR POL/RIEDEL 
 
E.O. 12958:  DECL:  10-02-12 
TAGS: PGOV, PTER, PINS, PINR, MOPS, PHUM, CE, LTTE - Peace Process 
SUBJECT:  LTTE pressure, cohabitation stresses, and 
friction with police act to demoralize military 
 
Refs:  (A) Colombo 1815 
 
-      (B) Colombo 1790, and previous 
 
(U) Classified by Ambassador E. Ashley Wills.  Reasons 
1.5 (b, d). 
 
1.  (S) Summary:  The Sri Lankan military is in a 
difficult period.  According to sources, a number of 
factors are acting to demoralize the military, including 
pressure from the Tamil Tigers, stresses in the 
relationship between the PM and the President, and 
frictions with the police.  The military as a whole 
appears to support the peace process, but there are some 
reports of dissension.  Caught in a transition period 
between war and possible peace, the military is clearly 
troubled and needs careful tending by the GSL.  End 
Summary. 
 
================================= 
Difficult Period for the Military 
================================= 
 
2.  (S) There are increasing reports indicating that the 
Sri Lankan military is in a difficult period.  Hardly a 
day goes by without the press reporting some sort of 
flare-up involving the armed forces.  Many of these 
reports pit the military against the Liberation Tigers 
of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in some small incident or paint 
members of the military engaged in infighting with one 
another.  Commenting on the rash of reports, Jehan 
Perera, the Director of the National Peace Council, a 
local think-tank, told polchief October 1 that he 
thought the military was in a "very confused state 
because it was caught in a transition period between war 
and possible peace."  He noted that the military used to 
be focused on all-out confrontation versus the LTTE. 
With the ceasefire in effect, however the military does 
not have a "central objective" at this time and is "a 
bit lost." 
 
===================== 
Pinpricks by the LTTE 
===================== 
 
3.  (S) An analysis of the latest reports indicates that 
several factors seem to be acting to demoralize the 
military, including pressure from the Tamil Tigers, 
stresses in the relationship between the PM and the 
President, and frictions with the police.  With respect 
to the first factor, the LTTE seems to be engaged in a 
strategy of engaging the military in small pinprick-type 
actions that fall well short of war, but are meant to 
harass and preoccupy. 
 
4.  (S) One of the more serious of these problematic 
incidents involves the ongoing detention of seven Sri 
Lankan soldiers held by the LTTE since September 25 (see 
Ref A).  The LTTE has demanded the release of two of its 
cadre in exchange for the release of the soldiers. 
Based on what we are hearing, the GSL -- not wanting the 
incident to become a crisis -- is squirming to find a 
way to release the LTTE cadre.  (Note:  Milinda 
Moragoda, an important minister, told DCM, October 2, 
that the GSL is "leaning" on the judicial system to 
speed up the processing of the two LTTE detainees so 
that they can be eligible for bail as soon as possible.) 
In the meantime, the military is helpless to do 
anything.  Brigadier Peiris, the Director of Legal 
Affairs at Army Headquarters, told us that the incident 
was shameful to the military, especially given the fact 
that families of the soldiers have been publicly 
demonstrating for their release, but to no avail. 
 
5.  (S) Another incident that has disturbed the military 
was the attempted overrunning of a military post located 
in the town of Point Pedro in Jaffna on September 2. 
During this incident, a large group of Tamil grade 
school students attacked the post, damaging a number of 
bunkers and other military positions before being driven 
back.  Several people were injured in the attack, which 
was apparently instigated by the LTTE.  In discussions 
with Mission, military officers report dozens of smaller 
but similar incidents involving troops who were 
physically or verbally harassed by LTTE cadre or pro- 
LTTE Tamils in various demeaning ways.  Again, due to 
the ceasefire, the military has not been able to do much 
to counter the LTTE and prevent such incidents. 
 
===================== 
Cohabitation Stresses 
===================== 
 
6.  (S) Stresses in the cohabitation relationship 
between the Prime Minister and President Kumaratunga 
also seem to be playing a role in the military's 
troubles.  Essentially, the deep tensions between the PM 
and the President are creating an unstable situation for 
the military in that it is not quite certain who it is 
that it reports to. 
 
7.  (S) The crux of the confusion comes from the fact 
that the PM is clearly politically the most powerful 
person in the country at this time, while Kumaratunga 
technically remains commander-in-chief of the armed 
forces under the terms of the Sri Lankan Constitution. 
Caught in this ambiguity, the military in effect is 
being forced to choose which side's strategic vision to 
support, i.e., the PM's peace initiative or the 
president's more skeptical approach.  (Note:  Milinda 
Moragoda told us that he was so worried about the 
"politicization" of peace issues that on October 1 he 
had urged former Foreign Minister Kadirgamar, a key 
presidential adviser, to ensure that the president and 
her supporters acted in a more bipartisan fashion.) 
 
8.  (S) Meanwhile, the stresses between the PM and the 
president are also being played out in the area of 
personnel.  The president, for example, recently 
extended the Army and Navy commanders' terms of office 
without consultation with the GSL.  We have heard that 
the president's actions, though legal, have been seen as 
interference by many in the military, who see her as 
rewarding officers she sees as her allies, while 
retarding the careers of others who are not. 
(Note:  This has helped spark some infighting in the 
military. The Naval commander, for example, has accused 
his own chief of staff of spying on him, claiming that 
the latter is angry over the extension.  Adding to this 
confusion is the fact that the Naval commander is known 
to be pro-president, while the chief of staff is thought 
to be close to the PM.  End Note.) 
 
======================== 
Friction with the Police 
======================== 
 
9.  (S) Another problematic area for the military 
involves its reported tensions with the police.  Milinda 
Moragoda told DCM that the relationship between the 
police and the military is a tricky one.  Moragoda 
explained that the genesis of the problem was the 
perception by some in the police that the military took 
advantage of the situation when the police were within 
the Ministry of Defense.  With responsibility for the 
police placed back in the Ministry of Interior upon the 
installation of the new government in December 2001, 
Moragoda related that the police have become more 
confident in challenging military authority. 
10.  (S) An example of police/military tensions coming 
to a head was a police raid on a military facility in 
January 2002.  In this incident, the police, acting on a 
tip (apparently from someone in the military itself), 
raided a safe house kept by military intelligence, 
arrested six soldiers, and seized arms and ammunition. 
The raid infuriated the military because the safe house 
was being used by members of a top secret anti-LTTE deep 
penetration unit that had its cover blown in the widely 
publicized raid.  Although the soldiers have since been 
released, it is still possible that a legal case against 
them may be pursued by the Attorney General's Office. 
Moragoda said the Director General of Military 
Intelligence (DGMI) also remained worried that he might 
be prosecuted in the matter, and, in fact, has had 
charges filed against him for allegedly plotting against 
the Prime Minister.  (Note:  These charges have not yet 
been publicly announced and we could not confirm them. 
Moragoda told us that the PM does not believe the charge 
and was chagrined when he found out that the police had 
filed these charges without checking with him, the 
Minister of Interior or the Minister of Defense.) 
 
============================================= = 
Most in Military said to support Peace Process 
============================================= = 
 
11.  (S) Despite its many problems, the military as a 
whole appears to support the peace process.  The Sri 
Lankan military has a long history of acquiescence to 
civilian authority and there is little indication of 
widespread objections to the government's peace moves 
within the force.  Jehan Perera, for example, told us 
that he saw few signs that the military was seriously 
angry with the government over its peace initiative, 
although it was not happy to have been effectively 
sidelined due to the initiative's success.  There were 
stresses, he noted, such as those over incidents with 
the LTTE (as described above), but he did not think the 
GSL and the military were headed toward any sort of 
break. 
 
12.  (S) That said, recent reports indicate that there 
may be some dissension.  Per Ref B, for example, Nimal 
Goonetilleke (please protect), the head of the Police 
Special Task Force (STF), told RSO that he had heard 
that five or six high-ranking military officers (NFI) 
were actively speaking out against the peace process 
within their respective commands.  He speculated that 
some of these officers might be angry because the peace 
process was beginning to undermine illicit activities 
they were engaged in.  He had no information that anyone 
in the military was planning to take any sort of action 
against the GSL, however.  In addition to Goonetilleke's 
report, a Sinhala-language weekly called "Lakjana" 
alleged in a September 29 article that a group of high- 
level brass in the Army was planning a coup in 
consultation with the president.  The article did not 
provide any additional details or proof of its 
assertions, but it was the first press report of its 
kind that Mission has seen. 
 
======= 
Comment 
======= 
 
13.  (S) The military is clearly in a difficult 
position.  It feels increasingly marginalized by the 
peace process, especially against the backdrop of the 
central role it used to play in national affairs during 
the wartime conflict.  The pressure it is facing from 
the LTTE and from working within a confusing 
cohabitation system is clearly demoralizing, if not 
potentially debilitating. 
 
14.  (S) Given this situation, the military needs 
careful tending by the GSL.  While it seems in no mood 
to challenge the direction of the peace process, the 
government needs to work with the military carefully to 
ensure that it remains fully on board.  Although 
obscured by the war, many of the military's problems 
also have deep roots, which will take a serious 
commitment to reform to fix.  One way the GSL is trying 
to assuage the military -- and nudge it toward reform -- 
is to underscore that the international community stands 
ready to assist it with advice, training, and material 
support.  If the government fails in the delicate task 
of making the military more comfortable with its 
newfound situation, there is a possibility that it could 
become a wildcard element that potentially could be 
taken advantage of by hard-line political elements. 
 
15.  (S) Just back from R+R, the Ambassador has requested 
appointments with each of the service chiefs to gauge 
the military leadership's frame of mind.  End Comment. 
 
16.  (U) Minimize considered. 
 
WILLS