US embassy cable - 05PARIS5528

S E C R E T PARIS 005528 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/16/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, FR, TU, EUN 
SUBJECT: EMBASSY PARIS RESPONSE TO ACTION REQUEST ON 
TURKEY'S EU ACCESSION 
 
REF: A. STATE 150087 
 
     B. PARIS 5471 
     C. PARIS 5350 
     D. PARIS 5307 
     E. ANKARA 4619 
 
Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt for reaso 
ns 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
 1. (C) Post refers Washington to refs B, C and D for its 
current analysis of French views and intentions with respect 
to the beginning of EU accession negotiations with Turkey on 
October 3.  We continue to believe that PM de Villepin's 
statement on recognition of Cyprus was motivated primarily by 
domestic political considerations.  At the same time, we 
believe the French threat to block the beginning of accession 
negotiations must be taken seriously.  The studied ambiguity 
of Villepin's and others' statements suggests that much will 
depend on the eventual line-up of views within the EU.  Given 
current tensions between France and the UK in the wake of the 
May 29 French referendum on the EU constitutional treaty, and 
the UK's delicate role as EU Presidency, we judge that 
London's influence is extremely limited.  The role of the 
EU's two most interested partners -- Greece and Cyprus -- 
could be crucial. 
 
2.  (S) For what it is worth, we share the UK Deputy Head of 
Mission's analysis (ref E) that the French may intend to use 
Villepin's statements as a bargaining chip to seek broader 
language on the open-endedness of Turkey's accession process. 
 For domestic purposes, an indefinite delay in the opening of 
accession negotiations through new preconditions would be the 
ideal outcome.  In practice, the GOF may be willing to settle 
for broadening the negotiation mandate over an outright 
delay.  This could include a demand that the Turks state 
early-on their intention to recognize Cyprus, as stated in 
the French non-paper circulated in the Greek press. France 
may also hope tactically that a broadening of the negotiation 
mandate will force the Turks themselves to react in a manner 
that could delay the opening of talks (see also ref D).  This 
would allow France to argue that it is respecting its 
previous engagements while shifting the onus to Turkey. 
 
3.  (C) We repeat that, based on our soundings to date, the 
French position has not yet been fully determined.  Our sense 
is that our contacts are working on the basis of defending PM 
de Villepin's and President Chirac's statements rather than 
an articulated policy.  That policy will likely be defined by 
Villepin personally in coordination with Chirac, which 
suggests that France will initially take a very hard line at 
the August 24 COREPER meeting and at the September 1-2 
Gymnich meeting, and then draw final conclusions. 
 
4.  (C) Our British Embassy contacts plan to hold their own 
round of consultations with French officials over the next 
couple of days.  We have set up a meeting for August 18 to 
discuss their assessment of the situation. 
Hofmann