US embassy cable - 05NEWDELHI6340

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NEW DELHI 006340 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/15/2015 
TAGS: PTER, PREL, MOPS, KCRM, PGOV, ECON, IN, CE, India-SriLanka 
SUBJECT: MEA: TURN UP THE HEAT ON THE LTTE 
 
REF: A. COLOMBO 1425 
     B. COLOMBO 1417 
 
Classified By: PolCouns Geoff Pyatt, for Reasons 1.4 (B, D) 
 
1.  (C) Summary: The GOI was saddened but not surprised by 
the August 12 assassination of Sri Lankan Foreign Minister 
Lakshman Kadirgamar -- apparently by the Liberation Tigers of 
Tamil Eelam (LTTE) -- because he, as a moderate Tamil, was 
considered the LTTE's second-most important target after 
President Chandrika Kumaratunga.  Sri Lanka's Tamil minority 
needs a "credible, moderate voice" to push their political 
agenda without resorting to the brutal terrorism that has 
been the hallmark of the LTTE, according to the MEA Deputy 
Secretary (Sri Lanka).  He prescribed a three-part response 
 
SIPDIS 
to this latest atrocity: unequivocal condemnation of the 
LTTE's "methods and objectives," cooperation on drying up 
LTTE fundraising among the Tamil diaspora in the West, and 
persuading the governments of countries that host the Tamil 
diaspora to take a tougher line against the LTTE.  End 
Summary. 
 
Assassination "Not Unexpected" 
------------------------------ 
 
2.  (C) MEA Deputy Secretary (Sri Lanka) Anupam Ray on August 
16 told Poloff that the assassination of Sri Lankan Foreign 
Minister Lakshman Kadirgamar was regrettable "but not 
unexpected ... he was the second target only after President 
Kumaratunga."  Ray explained that Kadirgamar, as an ethnic 
Tamil, was an effective spokesman against the LTTE and helped 
the GOSL paint the LTTE as a terrorist organization.  He 
lamented that the attack, which took place in Kadirgamar's 
home (Ref B), revealed "a terrible failure of routine 
security."  (NOTE: The MEA was busy supporting the Colombo 
travel of Foreign Minister Natwar Singh and preparing for the 
arrival later that day of Sri Lankan Opposition Leader Ranil 
Wickremesinghe.  End Note.) 
 
3.  (C) What puzzled Ray most was the timing of the attack. 
"Colombo was acceding to all the demands, even giving a 
better deal than the LTTE was asking for," Ray expounded. 
"Kumaratunga will probably lose her job after this, unless 
she is assassinated, too," he concluded, noting that 
Kadirgamar's death came after the GOSL made numerous 
concessions to the LTTE.  So far the MEA has declined to name 
the LTTE specifically in its public statements.  On August 
13, the MEA spokesman called the assassination "a heinous act 
and we condemn it unreservedly."  Spokesman Sarna added that 
India's support for the unity and territorial integrity of 
Sri Lanka remained "constant and undiluted." 
 
"A Blow to India" and the Peace Process 
--------------------------------------- 
 
4.  (C) Professor Ajay Behera of Delhi's Centre for Policy 
Research called the assassination "a blow to India" because 
Kadirgamar has long been considered an excellent friend of 
India.  Behera was also concerned the attack would force the 
GOSL to end the cease-fire and that Colombo would have a hard 
time carrying the peace process forward despite their stated 
desire to do so (Ref A). 
 
Tamils Need a "Credible, Moderate Voice" 
---------------------------------------- 
 
5.  (C) After referring to the ethnic conflict between Sri 
Lanka's Sinhalese majority and Tamil minority as "Balkan in 
its length and its brutality," Ray opined that the Tamil 
people need a "credible, moderate voice" to compete with the 
LTTE.  He admitted that the Tamils have legitimate 
grievances, but counseled that the country must remain 
undivided.  The worst outcome, Ray added, would be a 
unilateral declaration of independence (UDI), which he said 
he could not rule out: "A UDI would be a disaster," he 
predicted, since it would lead both sides to escalate 
violence. 
 
Next Steps: Condemnation, Cash Starvation, Persuasion 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
6.  (C) When asked what the international response to this 
terrorist attack should be, MEA's Ray had three 
recommendations: 
 
-- Public condemnation of all LTTE methods and objectives, 
including but not strictly limited to the assassination. 
"This is a Stalinist organization, the donor countries need 
to start treating it like one.  You need to decide if they 
are a terrorist group or freedom fighters." 
-- Examining and interdicting LTTE funding from the Tamil 
diaspora.  "They have a navy and an air force, purchased with 
funds from Tamils living in Canada, Norway, Germany, 
Switzerland, Australia, and the UK." 
 
-- Persuading these countries to ramp up the pressure on LTTE 
publications, recruitment, and other activities as well. 
"They need to hold the LTTE accountable," Ray averred, 
singling out Canada for "not doing anything." 
 
7.  (C) Ray shared his own theory -- which he admitted had no 
firm intelligence to confirm -- that the LTTE and Indian 
Naxalite terrorists might be cooperating on IED design and 
training.  (Consulate  Chennai Comment: Our sources have not 
confirmed this either although it is widely believed that the 
LTTE and the Naxalites have shared knowledge and training in 
the past.  End Comment.) 
 
Comment: No New Thinking Yet in Delhi 
------------------------------------- 
 
8.  (C) The MEA Sri Lanka desk appeared to be distracted by 
the assassination itself, FM Singh's travel to Colombo for 
the funeral, the Wickremesinghe visit, and recent personnel 
moves, and was not yet as focused on the need for a 
coordinated response as it was after the King's coup in Nepal 
last February.  However, the MEA, with its tight focus on 
curbing the Tamil diaspora living in the West, was at least 
prepared with an off-the-shelf message. 
BLAKE