US embassy cable - 05COLOMBO1440

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 COLOMBO 001440 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/16/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PTER, NO, CE, LTTE - Peace Process 
SUBJECT: SRI LANKA:  HELGESEN BRIEFS CO-CHAIRS ON NORWEGIAN 
INTENTIONS IN THE WAKE OF KADIRGAMAR ASSASSINATION 
 
REF: (A) COLOMBO 1425 (B) COLOMBO 1399 
 
Classified By: Charge' d'Affaires, a.i. James F. Entwistle for reason 1 
.4 (d). 
 
 1. (C)  Summary.  The Norwegian facilitators have 
shared with the co-chairs a constructive plan for 
putting the burden on the Liberation Tigers of 
Tamil Eelam (LTTE) for the next steps in the peace 
process while also heading off rash actions by the 
government (GSL).  The Norwegians will give LTTE 
theoretician Anton Balasingham in London August 17 
five "areas of opportunity" for the LTTE to show 
that it is a serious interlocutor.  The Norwegians 
and the GSL would welcome higher-level Balasingham 
contacts from other governments as well.  The 
Norwegians would also welcome public statements 
from capitals that make clear the LTTE is 
responsible for next steps in the peace process 
and express hope that the P-TOMS will be revived 
soon.  In her upcoming telephone conversation with 
Norwegian FM Petersen, the Secretary may wish to 
express support for the Norwegian plan.  End 
Summary 
 
2. (C)  Norwegian Deputy Foreign Minister Vidar 
Helgesen, who accompanied Foreign Minister 
Petersen to Colombo for assassinated Sri Lankan 
Foreign Minister Kadirgamar's funeral, met with 
Colombo co-chair representatives (Charge', UK High 
Commissioner Evans, Japanese Ambassador Suda, EC 
Charge' Wilton) August 16 to brief them on 
Norwegian observations and intentions in the wake 
of Kadirgamar's murder.  Norwegian Ambassador 
Brattskar sat in with Helgesen. 
 
CBK "Positive and Strategic" 
---------------------------- 
 
3. (C)  Helgesen first briefed on Foreign Minister 
Petersen's meeting with Sri Lankan President 
Chandrika Bandanaraike Kumaratunga (CBK) the night 
before, characterizing it as a "good meeting" in 
which "we found her more strategic than ever.") 
Helgesen said CBK walked Petersen through the 
status of the investigation; she put at "70 per 
cent" the likelihood that the LTTE was behind the 
assassination.  Clearly, Helgesen said, the GSL is 
under pressure to "do something" and has "limited 
room for maneuver."  Norway is relieved so far to 
see GSL leaders making public statements about 
continued commitment to the cease-fire agreement 
(CFA), etc. which CBK reiterated in her meeting 
with the Norwegians.  Helgesen said it is clear 
from the CBK meeting that the primary GSL strategy 
right now is to mobilize the international 
community to increase condemnation of and pressure 
on the LTTE to see if that will bring modified 
behavior from the Tigers.  The Norwegians had 
found CBK (as well as Peace Secretariat Secgen 
Jayantha Dhanapala and Foreign Secretary 
Palihakkara who sat in with her) supportive of the 
Norwegian strategy (see below) for the weeks 
ahead.  Helgesen concluded that CBK was "stepping 
up to it" and "showing considerable wisdom in a 
difficult period." 
 
Norwegian Strategy:  More London Contact 
---------------------------------------- 
 
4. (C)   Turning to Norwegian next steps, Helgesen 
noted that he had seen LTTE theoretician Anton 
Balasingham en route from Oslo for the funeral and 
that he and FM Petersen would call on him again in 
London on the way back August 17.  This reflects 
the Norwegian view that it is time for them to 
spend more time working through Balasingham since 
they have greater confidence that their messages 
will get to LTTE leader Prabhakaran than through 
the usual channel via political wing leader 
Thamilchelvan (as reported earlier, the Norwegians 
will also insist on more face time with 
Prabhakaran when they do go to Kilinochchi). 
 
5. (C)  Petersen will tell Balasingham that it is 
a "moment of truth" for the LTTE.  Whether or not 
the LTTE killed Kadirgamar, the ball is clearly in 
the LTTE's court to show good faith and take the 
next step in the peace process.  "Politically, the 
burden of proof is on the LTTE.  We will tell 
Balasingham that they will be measured by the 
degree to which they take positive steps in the 
immediate future."  Petersen and Helgesen will 
tell Balasingham that they see five possible 
"areas of opportunity" for the LTTE to display 
good faith (and might leave a memorandum on the 
subject for Prabhakaran with Balasingham; they 
haven't decided yet).   Those five items are: 
 
--  The LTTE should agree to meet with the GSL 
and the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) to 
discuss CFA implementation.  Helgesen said this 
is the most important of the five items and 
stressed that this would not be a reopening of 
the CFA terms but a meeting on how to make it 
work better.  Helgesen commented that if the 
LTTE had not killed Kadirgamar, then they should 
have even more incentive to come to such a 
meeting so that they could make their case in 
this regard. 
 
-- The LTTE should accept the SLMM proposal on 
arrangements for the transportation of LTTE 
cadres across GSL territory.  Helgesen said the 
LTTE has been dragging its feet on this for 
several weeks; meanwhile, he said, the 
government has agreed to go back to its previous 
practices which Helgesen described as "very 
generous."  (Brattskar interjected that SLMM 
chief Haukland will be in Kilinochchi August 18 
for a meeting that was scheduled to discuss the 
transportation issue but now would "obviously 
include many other issues.") 
 
-- The LTTE should stop political killings and 
the recruiting of child soldiers. 
 
-- The LTTE should demonstrate willingness to 
expand collaboration with the GSL on tsunami 
reconstruction.  The GSL, Helgesen said, is 
willing to expand relief to LTTE areas and the 
Tigers should take them up on this. 
 
--The LTTE should immediately re-establish contact 
with the Sri Lanka army in the East.  The LTTE has 
stopped its routine contact with the Army across 
the board (such contacts continue only in Jaffna, 
according to Helgesen), and this lack of daily 
contact leads to misunderstandings and could lead 
to much more.  This is especially key, Helgesen 
said, if in fact Sri Lanka is headed for elections 
before the end of the year. 
 
Support from the International Community 
---------------------------------------- 
 
6. (C)  Turning to the role of the "international 
community," Helgesen noted that finding the 
balance between "censoring and engaging" the LTTE 
is a "continuing dilemma" for each country, 
especially in the wake of the assassination.  He 
noted that the idea of another LTTE trip to Europe 
had been dead for some time.  Helgesen said that 
in his visit here several weeks ago (Ref B), he 
had urged more diplomatic trips to Kilinochchi. 
He is backing off that position now after the 
Kadirgamar murder since it would be "too 
detrimental to your standing in the South." 
 
7. (C)  The best thing concerned countries can do, 
Helgesen opined, is to put out public statements 
which make clear that it is up to the LTTE to take 
the next political steps.  Helgesen said it was 
none of his business what individual countries 
chose to say publicly about LTTE culpability for 
the Kadirgamar assassination.  "What would really 
help us is a fairly unified public line about LTTE 
responsibility for the next steps in the peace 
process." 
 
8. (C)  Helgesen said Norway would also encourage 
higher level contacts with Balasingham from all 
countries ("I understand the United States has its 
own position on LTTE contacts," he quickly added). 
He encouraged in particular the British to engage 
Balasingham at a "higher level than usual" and 
suggested that Japanese envoy Akashi also include 
a call on Balasingham in his next trip to Europe. 
Helgesen stressed that the GSL was fully on board 
with the Norwegians and others having more contact 
with Balasingham. 
 
Petersen/Rice Phone Call Imminent 
--------------------------------- 
 
9. (C)  Helgesen noted that FM Petersen has a 
telephone call scheduled with Secretary Rice "very 
soon."  The main topic, Helgesen said, is 
"something else," but Petersen undoubtedly would 
turn briefly to Sri Lanka during the call. 
 
Importance of P-TOMS 
-------------------- 
 
10. (C)  Helgesen and Petersen had called on Prime 
Minister Mahinda Rajapakse and on Opposition 
Leader Ranil Wickremesinghe earlier on August 16. 
Helgesen said they had found Rajapakse's position 
"somewhere in between CBK and his funeral oration 
yesterday" (the PM delivered a podium-thumping 
condemnation of the LTTE at Kadirgamar's funeral). 
Ranil was quite predictable, Helgesen said, but 
said it was absolutely crucial that a way be found 
to get the Post Tsunami Operational Management 
Structure (P-TOMS), recently partially derailed by 
the Supreme Court, back in action as a confidence 
building measure with the LTTE.  Ranil told 
Helgesen he hoped the international community 
would make statements to "pressure the Supreme 
Court on P-TOMS." 
 
11. (C)  Helgesen said that Ranil was absolutely 
right about the P-TOMS.  It was important, the 
Norwegian told the co-chair reps, to understand 
the importance of this issue for the LTTE.  Tiger 
political chief Thamilchelvan in particular had 
put his "internal credibility" on the line to 
negotiate the P-TOMS only to see "the South," in 
the LTTE view, scuttle it.  "The LTTE is 
incredibly angry about this," Helgesen said. 
Given the fate of the P-TOMS, how can the Tigers 
have any confidence that whatever political 
structures or arrangements that might be created 
to enable a lasting peace settlement would not be 
scuttled just as quickly?  Helgesen expressed hope 
that public statements from capitals could support 
the P-TOMS as well. 
 
Co-chair meeting in New York? 
----------------------------- 
 
12. (C)  Helgesen said his government strongly 
endorsed a September co-chairs meeting in New York 
on the margins of UNGA.  He hoped that co-chair 
capitals could get back to the Norwegians on their 
receptivity to this quickly so that it could be 
set up soon.  A September meeting would fit with 
the Norwegian strategy.  The LTTE will receive the 
Norwegian list of five areas of opportunity, 
buttressed by statements from concerned capitals 
putting pressure on the Tigers.  If there was no 
discernible response over the following month, 
then a September meeting would be perfectly timed 
to consider further ways to ratchet up the 
pressure.  (Helgesen noted that the GSL is 
comfortable with this strategy as well, which he 
said "is much better than the government 
undertaking hasty actions.") 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
13. (C)  The assassination of FM Kadirgamar raises 
very obvious and grave doubts about the LTTE's 
commitment to the peace process.  That said, the 
President has made clear her intention to try to 
rescue the peace process, and the co-chairs have 
to find ways to advance that aim.  The Norwegians 
clearly are putting even more energy into their 
facilitative duties here in the wake of the 
Kadirgamar assassination.  Their approach, as 
presented by Helgesen, makes sense.  Among other 
things, it will lessen the possibility of rash GSL 
action.  We will forward a draft U.S. public 
statement septel in the next few days.  In the 
meantime, Secretary Rice may wish to tell the 
Norwegian FM in their telephone conversation that 
we find the Norwegian plan, as outlined to the co- 
chairs in Colombo, to be imaginative and 
constructive and that it has full U.S. support. 
End Comment 
ENTWISTLE