US embassy cable - 05ANKARA4777

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 004777 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/12/2029 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PINS, TU, EUN, EU Accession 
SUBJECT: TURKEY-EU: FURTHER CONCERNS OF EU DIPLOMATS IN 
ANKARA REGARDING OCT. 3 START DATE AND TURKISH APPROACH 
 
REF: A. ANKARA 4716 
     B. PARIS 5471 
     C. ANKARA 4619 
 
(U) Classified by Polcounselor John Kunstadter; reasons: E.O. 
12958 1.4 (b,d). 
 
1, (C) Summary: A range of EU diplomats in Ankara has 
expressed concern to us not only about Turkey's road to the 
Oct. 3 harmonization start date but also about the 
willingness of Turks to adapt to EU standards of religious 
freedom and tolerance and rule of law.  End summary. 
 
2. (C) Further to reftels (A-B), we have followed up with UK 
and Danish DCMs and Dutch Polcounselor to gauge EU 
assessments of how solid the Oct. 3 date is for the start of 
Turkey's harmonization process. 
 
3. (S) UK Deputy Head of Mission (strictly protect -- he 
asked not to be quoted), normally relentlessly upbeat about 
Turkey's candidacy and UK support, expressed deep concern to 
us Aug. 12 about whether the Oct. 3 start date will hold.  He 
sees the French using the early August de Villepin and Chirac 
statements as a bargaining chip to seek broader language on 
the open-endedness of Turkey's accession process at the 
late-Aug./early Sept. COREPER and Gymnich meetings to discuss 
the framework negotiation document.  He is concerned that the 
French are also signaling these intentions to the Greeks and 
Greek Cypriots to encourage the former to push for stiffer 
language in the Aegean paragraph and the latter for stiffer 
language in the Cyprus paragraph.  He also sees the Danes as 
wavering. 
 
4. (S) Compounding the challenge is the absence of people to 
consult with at FCO and throughout Europe in mid-August and 
the consequent difficulty of tracking French maneuvers and 
developing a counter-strategy, he noted.  Any change to the 
current language on open-endedness will bring a sharp 
reaction by the Turks.  However, even if the UK in its 
presidency could in the end persuade the GOT to swallow such 
language, any change to the Aegean and Cyprus paragraphs will 
overload the circuits and the Turks will refuse to show up in 
Luxembourg on Oct. 3, he opined.  The UK in its presidency 
will find it difficult to deflect a concerted approach to 
load up the framework document since the argument that the 
Turks would balk will only encourage the French and others to 
persist. 
 
5. (S) Looking at the issue from another angle, UK DHM 
affirmed that his Embassy and London prefer to see PM Erdogan 
and especially FonMin Gul as committed to the EU.  At the 
same time he acknowledged that Gul, Erdogan advisor Cuneyd 
Zapsu, and other favorite British interlocutors could be 
consummate barbarian handlers and that it would be prudent to 
pay more attention to the radical Islamist strands in Gul's 
background. 
 
6. (S) Moreover, Turkish ministries are unprepared to begin 
screening and harmonization, he noted.  He also admitted that 
Erdogan's failure to visit any EU capital from Dec. 17 until 
his July 21-22 visit to London, his five month delay in 
appointing a chief negotiator (and then his appointment of a 
minister who, "while considered cuddly in EU capitals," has 
no clout in the Turkish Cabinet), his refusal to let Gul play 
an active lobbying role since Dec. 17, and the resignation of 
EU Secretariat SecGen Murat Sungar (ref C) raise questions 
whether the AKP government is using the EU process to pursue 
a hidden agenda.  He agreed that religious intolerance in 
Turkey is a problem that will only become bigger in the 
accession negotiation context. 
 
7. (C) Danish DCM and Dutch Polcounselor both expressed 
concern to us Aug. 11 and 12 that the AKP government's 
approach to the EU is alienating some EU member states. 
Dutch Polcounselor added that the GOT's behavior has killed 
the willingness of Commission bureaucrats to tip off the 
Turks about how to overcome legal or procedural roadblocks in 
Commission deliberations.  They both noted that Erdogan's 
behavior at Brussels on Dec. 17 and the Turks' refusal to 
share the text of their declaration of non-recognition of the 
Republic of Cyprus even with the UK presidency have also 
created a negative impression, although Danish DCM opined 
that in the end the Turkish government's language on 
non-recognition should have been mild enough to have calmed 
most EU nerves.  Danish DCM confirmed, however, that the 
French have circulated a non-paper to EU member states (ref 
B) questioning whether accession negotiations can start if 
Turkey is unwilling to recognize all 25 member states. 
8. (C) Contrary to the view of Dutch Polcounselor (and UK 
PolChief) that the European Court of Justice has ruled that 
both goods and services are covered under Customs Union 
agreements, and thus that Turkey will have to allow Republic 
of Cyprus flagged vessels access to ports and airports, 
Danish DCM, a legal expert on EU goods and services 
regulations, averred that the Turks can tie up the issue for 
years by working Customs Union dispute-settlement procedures. 
 
9. (C) Aug. 11 Turkey,s chief EU negotiator Babacan 
announced a series of high-level Turkish visits to EU 
capitals to explain Turkey,s approach to (1) the extension 
protocol, including its Cyprus non-recognition declaration, 
and (2) the negotiation process.  UK PolChief previously told 
us the Turks will target, inter alia, Paris, the Hague and 
Vienna (ref A).  Dutch PolCounselor told us MFA U/S Tuygan 
will arrive in the Hague Aug. 18.  However, Dutch 
PolCounselor is concerned that the Turkish initiative may be 
too late to influence the Aug,. 25 COREPER, given his view 
that most EU capitals will have already decided on their 
COREPER strategies. 
 
10. (C) Both our Danish and Dutch interlocutors emphasized 
that Turkey's lack of religious tolerance or religious 
freedom will be a serious, perhaps the most serious, barrier 
to EU entry.  Neither thinks the Turks are going to be 
willing to change for a long time.  Danish DCM confirmed our 
impression that the German DCM and press counselor, two of 
the more active EU diplomats here, share this assessment that 
Turkey is seriously retrograde in religious tolerance.  Dutch 
PolCounselor added that the Turkish attitude toward rule of 
law, even among MFA bureaucrats who should know better, is 
equally disturbing.  His MFA interlocutors treat rule of law 
as a criterion to be checked off rather than as an essential 
pre-condition. 
 
11. (C) Comment: With the exception of the Dutch Ambassador, 
departing after six years here, EU Ambassadors remain 
publicly upbeat about Turkey's progress.  Since Dec. 17, 
however, the most active EU DCMs and Counselors have become 
much more pessimistic about the willingness of Turkish 
authorities to understand and adapt to EU realities.  End 
comment. 
MCELDOWNEY