US embassy cable - 05TRIPOLI209

S E C R E T  TRIPOLI 000209 
 
 
COMMERCE FOR DAVID ROTH, USTR FOR DOUG BELL 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  8/10/2015 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PTER, LY, SA 
SUBJECT: LIBYANS PLEASED WITH SAUDI DECISION 
 
REF: RIYADH 5509 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: GREGORY L. BERRY, CHIEF OF MISSION, U.S. LIAISON 
OFFICE TRIPOLI, DOS. 
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 
 
1.  (C)  August 10 COM spoke at some length with Ambassador to 
the UK Mohammad al-Zway and his colleagues about the Saudi 
decision to pardon and expel three Libyans accused of an 
assassination plot again then-Crown Prince Abdullah (reftel). 
Zway had just returned from Sirte; he flew there August 8 to 
talk with Qadhafi immediately after learning of the Saudi 
decision.  At our urging and that of the British, the Libyans' 
official reaction on August 9 had been restrained (they refused 
official comment to the press, though someone on background 
pointed out that a pardon implied a conviction,  which had not 
taken place -- probably on balance the best we could hope for). 
 
 
2.  (C)  In the August 10 meeting, which included External 
Security Organizations Chief Musa Kusa, Internal Security 
Organizations Chief Abdullah Sanussi, MFA America's Director 
Ibrahim Dridi and Qadhafi's personal interpreter Fuad Zlitni, 
Zway described the Saudi announcment as a positve and good step. 
 Giving a uniquely Libyan spin to the statement, Zway said that 
it was positive news, even though there had never been a real 
problem between the two countries; "at most it was a personal 
misunderstanding."  According to Zway, the personal matter only 
escalated because the Saudis withdrew their Ambassador from 
Tripoli.   In the Libyan version of events, they did not respond 
to this petty action, and didn't withdraw their Ambassador from 
Riyadh until they were forced to do so under Saudi pressure. 
 
3.  (C)   "Qadhafi never supported the Libyan opposition," said 
Zway.  He believed that the Saudis have now acknowleged that 
truth and responded appropriately to the Libyan overtures, so 
that the situation will now move forward.   Referring to U.S. 
requests for guarantees, Zway said that the Libyans are the ones 
who were justified in asking for guarantees.  From the Libyan 
point of view, the Saudis are a wealthier nation with more 
resources at their disposal, and therefore the Saudis are 
obliged to take the initiative in improving relations from now 
on.   Zway pointed out that in his analysis, the Saudi 
opposition is self-generated as a result of Wahabi fanaticism. 
Since Libya stands firmly against Wahabi extremism, it can't 
align with the Saudis.  He also said that the Libyan opposition 
derives from radical Islam, implying that the Saudis were to 
blame for inciting trouble in Libya.    Zway asked for the U.S. 
to intervene with the Saudis and ask them to rein in the 
Islamists and cut out "the root of terrorism." 
 
4.  (S/NF)  Abdullah Sanussi urged that we specify a timeline 
for moving foward now that "the Saudi issue is out of the way" 
(in his view).  He also took the opportunity to point out that 
the U.S. is the party responsible for the pause in progress in 
the bilateral relationship, since Musa Kusa is waiting for a 
coordinated list of intelligence questions from the Washington 
interagency community.  (In passing, he suggested that any 
meeting with A/S Welch take place in Tripoli rather than Europe, 
since that, "would allow for higher-level participation.") 
 
5.  (C)  Musa Kusa expressed appreciation for the efforts of the 
U.S. and UK, but emphasized that Libya had put forth the most 
effort in making the Saudi decision possible and deserved 
recognition for its initiative.  He highlighted the three day 
mourning period and telegram of condolences as "extraordinary" 
steps (see para. 8 for text of condolences).  Kusa repeated 
again that Libya had never had a problem with the Saudis -- any 
misunderstandings were created when the Saudis withdrew their 
Ambassador from Tripoli.  Looking forward, Kusa warned that the 
Saudis must pay close attention to their relations with Libyans 
abroad at the risk of creating new difficulties that, "would 
involve more than three or four countries." 
 
6.  (C)  All of the Libyans emphasized that, "the file should be 
closed forever; we anticipate a new chapter."   In answer to 
this repeated point, COM agreed that the Saudi announcement 
should make it easier for us to find appropriate language for 
the assurances that the U.S. will need from Libya.  That should 
be a topic for discussion in preparation for the next meeting 
between the Libyans and A/S Welch.  Zway closed the meeting by 
reiterating Libya's common interest in working with the U.S. on 
counter terrorism efforts, saying, "we are working toward a 
common goal." 
 
7.  (C) COMMENT:  Qadhafi's condolence message on the death of 
King Fahd and his dispatch of his son Saif al-Islam to represent 
Libya at the funeral were clearly intended as positive gestures. 
 It is interesting, however, that the Libyan press has said 
nothing about Saif's role.  There is a limit to how conciliatory 
Qadhafi is prepared to appear. 
 
8.  (U)   NOTE.  After King Fahd's death, the secretaries of the 
General People's Committee declared a three day mourning period 
and Qadhafi issued the following condolence message: 
 
To the family of the late Fahd Bin-Abd-al-Aziz, 
 
We have learned with great sadness of the death of our brother 
King Fahd, and we would like to extend our sincere condolences 
and our sympathy to your fraternal family. We also pray God to 
forgive him and receive him with His abundant mercy.  To God we 
belong and to Him we return. 
 
Your brother Mu'ammar al-Qadhafi. 
 
 
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