US embassy cable - 05COLOMBO1425

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 COLOMBO 001425 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/15/2015 
TAGS: PGOV, PTER, PREL, EAID, CE, LTTE - Peace Process 
SUBJECT: SRI LANKA:  GOVERNMENT WANTS BOTH CRACKDOWN ON 
LTTE AND CONTINUED PEACE PROCESS IN WAKE OF KADIRGAMAR 
ASSASSINATION 
 
REF: (A) COLOMBO 1419 AND PREVIOUS (B) 04 COLOMBO 2002 
 
Classified By: Charge' d'Affaires, a.i. James F. Entwistle for reasons 
1.4 (d) and (e). 
 
1.  (C) Summary.  The Sri Lankan government (GSL) 
wants the international community to crack down 
further on the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam 
(LTTE) in the wake of the assassination of Foreign 
Minister Lakshman Kadirgamar but also insists 
somewhat contradictorily that it remains committed 
to the peace process with the LTTE.  The highest 
priority for the Norwegian facilitators is to get 
both sides to meet for a discussion of cease-fire 
agreement (CFA) implementation.  A co-chair 
statement a few days after Kadirgamar's funeral 
might be useful but it is not clear that there is 
anything new to say.  In the context of tangible 
steps the international community can take to 
support the GSL, it is past time for a serious 
look at Tamil fundraising in the United States. 
End Summary 
 
2.  (C)  Charge' attended an August 14 GSL 
diplomatic corps briefing on the situation in the 
wake of the August 12 assassination of Sri Lankan 
Foreign Minister Lakshman Kadirgamar.  The 
government briefing panel consisted of Foreign 
Secretary HMGS Palihakkara, national police chief 
 
SIPDIS 
Chandra Fernando, GSL Peace Secretariat secretary 
general Jayantha Dhanapala and Finance Ministry 
Secretary P.B. Jayasundera (who said nothing 
 
SIPDIS 
throughout). 
 
Strong Statements Appreciated 
----------------------------- 
 
3.  (C)  Speaking first, Palihakkara thanked the 
diplomatic corps for the many strong statements 
issued by capitals condemning Kadirgamar's 
assassination.  He said the GSL "will not give in" 
and needs the strongest support of the 
international community right now.  Greater 
international law enforcement cooperation against 
the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) is 
needed.  He noted also that Kadirgamar's 
assassination underscored the need for the United 
Nations to finish its efforts to come up with an 
accepted international definition of terrorism as 
well as its efforts to move forward on proposals 
to take steps against "non-state actors." 
 
4.  (C)  Palihakkara said the ongoing 
investigation would be painstaking and fair but 
that, "as of now," all indications and evidence 
(the type and sophisticated handling of the 
weapon, the meticulous planning) point clearly to 
the LTTE.  "It has all the quintessential 
hallmarks of the LTTE," Palihakkara asserted. 
Moreover, the murder came in the wake of several 
months of information from domestic and foreign 
intelligence agencies that Kadirgamar had been 
under even greater threat that usual.  Palihakarra 
scoffed at the LTTE denial of responsibility, 
noting that they had denied many of their attacks 
over the years (the assassinations of President 
Premadasa and Rajiv Gandhi and the attempted 
killing of President Kumaratunga, for example). 
 
5.  (C)  Turning to the state of emergency, 
Palihakkara stressed that the GSL had only 
invoked a few of the powers at its disposal (given 
the weekend, the full text of the state of 
emergency declaration has not yet been 
"gazetted.").  The primary purpose was to give the 
military arrest and detention powers in order to 
assist the police in their investigation.  The 
Foreign Secretary said the emergency declaration 
would be submitted to Parliament for approval and 
reviewed from time to time with an eye towards 
keeping it in effect no longer than necessary. 
 
6.  (C)  Palihakkara concluded his remarks by 
noting that "the killers' clear intent was to 
jeopardize the peace process and to restart the 
conflict."  The assassination of Kadirgamar is a 
"serious setback to the peace process," 
Palihakkara conceded but he then stated that he 
wished to "categorically reaffirm the status quo" 
regarding the GSL's commitment to the peace 
process and its willingness to sit down with the 
LTTE at any time to discuss ways to strengthen the 
cease-fire agreement (CFA).  The government 
remains committed to a "peaceful and democratic 
solution.  Minister Kadirgamar would want this, 
indeed this is what he sacrificed his life for." 
 
Status of the Investigation 
--------------------------- 
 
7.  (C)  Police chief Chandra Fernando next gave a 
brief overview of the investigation, starting with 
a discussion of the clear indications that serious 
surveillance was taking place against Kadirgamar's 
private residence.  He confirmed that two men 
remain in custody for videotaping the house 
several weeks ago.  Their "brand new" state of the 
art digital video camera contained dozens of 
pictures of the house and the surrounding area. 
Fernando said he had taken the photos from the 
camera and shown them to Kadirgamar in an effort 
to get the Foreign Minister to be even more 
cautious about security ("I even suggested he swim 
at the police pool instead of at home"). 
Kadirgamar had instructed him to brief the Swedish 
Embassy down the street (apparently there were a 
few photos of their chancery on the video camera) 
but had told Fernando he did not want to increase 
his security any further. 
 
8. (C)  Turning to the aftermath of the killing, 
Fernando said that a massive investigation is 
under way under his direction.  He speculated that 
the arrest of the videotapers may have accelerated 
the timeline of the actual assassination. 
Fernando described the sophisticated nature of the 
assassination preparations and declared "ordinary 
criminals could not have done it."  He cited the 
rifle type (according to him the same as was used 
in the LTTE assault on Katunayake airport in 2001) 
and the presence of cyanide in the upstairs room 
of a neighboring house that the sniper used as 
clear indications of LTTE responsibility.  "The 
question is which individuals did this, not which 
group."  Fernando also circulated photos of the 
crime scene including several of the tripod used 
by the sniper which included a bicycle seat welded 
to one of the legs to allow the shooter to sit 
near the top of the structure.  Fernando promised 
to share more information about the investigation 
as it proceeds. 
 
International Community Needs to Do More 
---------------------------------------- 
 
9.  (C)  A visibly angry GSL Peace Secretariat 
Secretary General Jayantha Dhanapala concluded the 
 
SIPDIS 
briefing with a call for the international 
community, especially the four co-chair countries, 
to "take action" against the LTTE.  Dhanapala 
claimed that donors have, over the years, pushed 
the GSL to engage in "appeasement and constructive 
engagement" and cited LTTE trips to Europe and 
trips by diplomatic personnel to Kilinochchi as 
examples of soft behavior towards the LTTE.  "It 
is time for sanctions, travel bans and to cut off 
money flows from the Tamil diaspora.  We must 
suffocate and isolate the LTTE and cut off their 
oxygen."  (In the question and answer session 
after the presentation, Charge' asked if the GSL, 
given that it saw Tamil diaspora money flows as 
part of the problem, was reconsidering the legal 
status of the LTTE-linked Tamil Rehabilitation 
(TRO) in Sri Lanka.  "All options are being 
reviewed," Dhanapala replied.) 
 
10.  (C) Dhanapala then said it is imperative that 
the LTTE respond to the Sri Lanka Monitoring 
Mission (SLMM) proposal to meet with the GSL to 
review and strengthen the CFA, a proposal that the 
GSL had accepted with alacrity (Palihakkara 
commented "we would sit down with them tomorrow" 
if the LTTE agreed to the proposal).  Noting that 
the "longtime LTTE strategy" is to commit acts in 
the hope of provoking a "Sinhalese backlash," 
Dhanapala vowed that the GSL would adhere to the 
CFA because "public opinion clearly wants the CFA 
and the peace process to continue."  Japanese 
Ambassador Suda asked Dhanapala to clarify the 
GSL's intention regarding the LTTE since it seemed 
he was saying that the Tigers needed to be engaged 
and bashed simultaneously.  Dhanapala replied that 
the GSL would continue the CFA and continue to 
treat the LTTE in the "de-proscribed" manner 
started by the previous government but "all beyond 
that will be reviewed."  Palihakkara interjected 
that the LTTE clearly responds to pressure, citing 
the example of recent UN criticism of the 
Tigers' child soldier recruitment which triggered 
an angry LTTE rebuttal.  "They may respond 
negatively but they respond." 
 
Co-Chairs Huddle to Review Limited Options 
------------------------------------------ 
 
11.  (C)  Meeting after the GSL diplomatic 
briefing, Colombo co-chair representatives 
(Charge', British High Commissioner Evans, 
Norwegian Ambassador Brattskar, Japanese 
Ambassador Suda and EC Charge' Wilton) agreed that 
the GSL presentation had been heartfelt but 
somewhat schizophrenic in nature.  As Brattskar 
put it, "they want to maintain the CFA without 
engaging the LTTE."  Moreover, some of the 
activities the GSL had seized on in its briefing 
had largely become non-issues well before 
Kadirgamar's assassination (no interest in 
European capitals in receiving another LTTE 
roadshow, sharp decline in diplomatic visits to 
Kilinochchi in recent months) and been initiated 
for the express purpose of supporting the peace 
process in consultation with the GSL. 
 
12.  (C)  Brattskar advised that he had spoken by 
phone to LTTE peace secretariat chief Pulidevan 
August 13 and told him that nobody accepted the 
LTTE denial of responsibility for the 
assassination.  He advised Pulidevan that the LTTE 
needs to announce soon that it is willing to sit 
down and discuss the CFA with the GSL and it needs 
to take steps to ensure no escalation of violence. 
Brattskar said Pulidevan had reassured him of LTTE 
commitment to the CFA and the peace process. 
Brattskar commented that he was a bit jaundiced 
about the GSL's declared willingness to discuss 
the CFA with the LTTE since it was not clear to 
him that the GSL would be willing to stop its 
"obvious support" to the Karuna faction in the 
"dirty war" on the edges of the CFA in order to 
get the LTTE to the table.  Nonetheless, Brattskar 
stated, Norway's highest priority as peace process 
facilitator is to get the two sides to the table 
for CFA discussions. 
 
13.  (C) Discussion then turned to what the co- 
chairs should do in the face of such a grim set of 
circumstances (and the GSL's stated desire to have 
the co-chairs "do more").  All agreed with Suda 
that it was difficult to envision what a co-chair 
statement issued shortly after Kadirgamar's 
funeral could usefully say beyond condemning the 
assassination.  Brattskar noted that Norwegian 
Foreign Minister Petersen (arriving shortly with 
DFM Helgesen to represent Norway at Kadirgamar's 
funeral) would call on President Kumaratunga after 
the funeral and said Petersen would try to draw 
her out on what she thought a useful co-chair role 
might be.  Brattskar said that discussion might 
crystallize things a bit and he undertook to try 
to arrange a co-chair meeting with Petersen before 
his departure (if his tight schedule permits). 
Brattskar also noted the Norwegians had concluded 
that they needed to insist on more frequent 
contact with Prabhakaran in their visits to 
Kilinochchi ("since we have no idea if he gets 
briefed on our discussions") and that they needed 
to make a greater effort to engage with the LTTE's 
Anton Balasingham in London (Petersen plans to see 
him on his way back to Oslo after the funeral) 
since "he's the only one who understands the 
outside world."  Brattskar noted that Petersen and 
Helgesen would not travel to Kilinochchi during 
this visit.  ("They are coming to mourn Lakshman; 
anything beyond that would be inappropriate.") 
Evans suggested, and the others agreed, that co- 
chair countries take a hard look at whether they 
could do more regarding LTTE and TRO fund raising 
in their respective countries.  Suda advised that 
Japan remained willing to host a co-chairs meeting 
in October but suggested (to general agreement) 
that it would perhaps make sense for the next 
meeting to take place in New York in September on 
the margins of UNGA. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
14.  (C)  The contradictory line of simultaneously 
isolating and engaging the LTTE put to the 
diplomatic community by the GSL undoubtedly 
reflects divisions among GSL policymakers in the 
emotional aftermath of Kadirgamar's brutal murder. 
We suspect the GSL will shake its position out a 
bit more in the days ahead; Norwegian Foreign 
Minister Petersen's call on President Kumaratunga 
may be useful in this regard.  In terms of co- 
chair next steps, a joint statement might be 
useful but it is difficult to see what could be 
said beyond condemnation of Kadirgamar's 
assassination and the usual calls for restraint 
and continuation of the peace process.  Indeed, 
the co-chairs are increasingly in the position of 
being expected to issue public statements but then 
being derided for "only" making public statements. 
As we sort all this out, however, one thing is 
clear: it is more important than ever that the USG 
take the serious look at LTTE and TRO fundraising 
in the United States that we have been suggesting 
since late last year (Ref B). 
ENTWISTLE