US embassy cable - 05SANAA2317

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 07 SANAA 002317 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR NP/ECC - TGROEN, PVANSON, JGABRYSZEWSKI 
DOC FOR DCREED 
US COAST GUARD FOR USCG ACTIVITIES/MIO EUROPE MBEE 
US CUSTOMS FOR PWARKER, WLAWRENCE 
USDOE/NNSA FOR TPERRY 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/10/2015 
TAGS: ETTC, MNUC, PARM, PREL, KSTC, KNNP, YM, MARITIME SECURITY 
SUBJECT: EXBS ADVISOR VISIT AND PROGRAM STRATEGY JULY, 2005 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Thomas C. Krajeski for reasons 1.4 b and d. 
 
1. (U) SUMMARY.  During the period July 9-19, 2005, Export 
Controls and Related Border Security (EXBS) Advisor met with 
Yemeni officials and principal Embassy staff to discuss the 
current state of EXBS in Yemen.  Advisor met with senior 
representatives of the Ministry of Interior, the Yemen and 
Aden Free Zone Public Authority, the Coast Guard, the Border 
Guards, the National Atomic Energy Commission and the port 
officials in Aden and Hodeidah.  The Yemeni Coast Guard (YCG) 
provides excellent support to the traditional EXBS program. 
Other Yemeni organizations would like to replicate the 
success of the YCG and are anxious to receive EXBS assistance 
in training and equipment procurement.  END SUMMARY. 
 
----------------- 
MEETING SUMMARIES 
----------------- 
 
2. (U) On July 9-19, EXBS Advisor met with principal US 
Embassy staff to discuss the state of EXBS in Yemen.  Salient 
points of subsequent conversation were as follows: 
 
As in other countries of the region, EXBS infrastructure is 
lacking in Yemen.  Border Guards and Customs are undermanned, 
ill equipped, and generally poorly trained.  These 
deficiencies are exacerbated by prevalent corruption. 
 
Due to the long-term presence of a US Coast Guard Liaison 
Officer, (CAPT Robert D. Innes, USCG, US Maritime Advisor 
Southwest Asia/East Africa,) the YCG has developed into a 
professional service that forms the backbone of the Yemeni 
Export Controls System.  The YCG has traditional missions of 
maritime security, safety, protection of the environment, 
movement and development of maritime traffic, and a coastal 
national defense role.  The YCG differs from the USCG in five 
ways: (1) it has no ice breaking mission, (2) it is not the 
lead agency for search and rescue (this is the charter of the 
Ministry of Transportation), (3) it has no repair or 
maintenance role with respect to buoys and light houses, (4) 
it has no regulatory role and (5) it has no customs role. 
 
The YCG is under the Ministry of Interior and as such has 
arrest authority.  Its officers and sailors are law 
enforcement officers with responsibilities and authorities 
that end at the shoreline. 
 
The YCG has received significant support from the US as well 
as European and Asian allied states. 
 
The success of the YCG is the envy of the Yemeni government. 
Current discussions among various Yemeni officials are 
exploring the possibility of facilitating the replication of 
this success with a specialized Border Guard element and a 
cleaned-up and modernized customs service.  Yemeni officials 
are aware one of the main reasons the YCG was effective in 
developing into a professional service was because a resident 
USCG expert helped prepare a detailed and realistic ten year 
development plan with achievable milestones. 
 
Country team believes similar development among the border 
guard and customs elements of Yemen can be enhanced by the 
presence of a resident subject matter expert (perhaps from 
DHS-CPB) who will work with the Yemenis on a day-to-day basis 
as CAPT Innes did with the YCG. 
 
3. (U) On July 12, EXBS Advisor met with the following 
officials of the Coast Guard Authority, Ministry of Interior: 
Brigadier General Ali A. Rasa,a, Chairman (Commander); 
Brigadier General Saleh A. Mujally, Vice Chairman (Deputy 
Commander); Colonel Ali M. Alsubhi, General Operations 
Manager and Colonel Fouad S. S. Ba-Suliman, Director of 
Communications. Salient points of subsequent conversation 
were as follows: 
 
The Yemeni ports are the &door to the world8 for Yemen and 
its citizens.  Maritime controls will have the most immediate 
effect in terms of creating a viable and effective export 
controls system.  Once maritime controls are in place then 
Yemeni officials should give attention to creating similar 
capacity to secure land borders and then commercial land 
portals.  An integrated national maritime operations network 
will provide the best means to monitor the majority of 
movements of both cargo and persons into and out of Yemen. 
 
The Yemen government expects to create similar systems of 
control for Yemeni airspace and land borders. 
 
The YCG has received substantial support for the US and other 
allied naval and coast guard services. 
The YCG still needs assistance in the following areas: 
a.    Communications Equipment 
b.    Classroom furniture and teaching Aids for YCG Academy 
c.    Spare parts and tools for fleet maintenance 
d.    Portable buildings for offices and billeting at 
existing and future     operational bases 
e.    Computer network for operations center in Sana,a and 
the planned             district operations centers in 
Hodeidah Aden, Mukalla, Al-Salif,         Al-Mokha, and Bir 
Ali 
f.    Permanent piers at select operational sites 
 
The YCG has adopted the USCG doctrine of making engineering 
and logistics the driving force and basis for design of force 
structure and operations.  To continue their export controls 
mission, the YCG will need additional logistical support in 
terms of upgraded boats/ships and maintenance equipment to 
maintain inventory and prolong operational life of the fleet. 
 In addition to equipment, tools and perishable supplies, the 
YCG needs experienced enlisted technicians, mechanics, 
machinists and supply specialists to come to Yemen on 
extended assignment to teach their enlisted counterparts the 
practices and procedures that will lengthen the serviceable 
life of the fleet. 
 
The Yemeni government is using the YCG as a model for export 
controls and related security organization on a national 
level and with regional allies such as Kenya, Djibouti and 
Eritrea. 
 
4. (U) On July 12, EXBS Advisor met with Brigadier General 
Abdul Illah Atif, Director (Commander) of the Border Guards, 
Ministry of Defense.  Salient points of subsequent 
conversation were as follows: 
 
The Border Guards (BG) is a 1700 man paramilitary unit 
charged with patrolling and securing the land borders and 
select coastal regions.  Effectiveness in the north and 
northeast tribal areas is problematic due to the influence 
and control of tribal leaders and the ruggedness of the 
mountain and desert terrain. 
 
Some cooperation with Saudi officials occurs along common 
land borders. 
 
In the past, the BG recruited members from the tribal areas 
to assist in improving their operational success in the 
tribal regions.  This practice has now stopped.  The BG does 
not have a professional recruitment process. 
 
The BG requested assistance in the following areas: 
 
a.    Prefabricated buildings for Border posts 
b.    Generators for power at border facilities 
c.    Communications Equipment 
d.    Patrol vehicles 
e.    Optic, including binoculars, night vision and static 
sensors, and 
f.    Training for border operations 
 
 
 
5.    (U) On July 13, EXBS Advisor met with the following 
officials of the National Atomic Energy Commission (NATEC), 
Dr. Moustafa Yahia Bahran, Science and Technology Advisor to 
the President and Chairman of the NATEC and Eng. Khaled 
Abdullah Al-Ahmed, Director General Registration, Licensing 
and Radiation Inspection Directorate.  Salient points of 
subsequent conversation were as follows: 
 
The Yemeni government is currently reviewing a law to 
transfer the charter for radiological and nuclear licensing 
from the Ministry of Health to NATEC.  Most of these sources 
are medical and dental in nature.  A few sources are resident 
in the physics laboratories of Sana,a University. 
 
NATEC has 13 personnel certified by an IAEA sponsored program 
resident at the University of Damascus. 
 
IAEA has chosen Yemen as a regional center for its programs 
and nonproliferation initiatives.  In May, NATEC hosted the 
first workshops for &RIAS III,8 the IAEA Regulatory 
Authority Information System. 
 
Yemen claims to have an &excellent8 control system for 
radiological sources since there are only 200 sources in 
country.  Yemen has no  graveyard, for depleted sources. 
All depleted sources are re-exported to original suppliers. 
 
The Yemen Government and NATEC are currently reviewing a 
proposed Memorandum of Understanding with the U.S. Department 
of Energy concerning the placement of specialized monitoring 
equipment at the ports of Aden and Hodeidah, the 
international airports of Sana,a and Aden and the northern 
land border crossing with Saudi Arabia located at Harath. 
According to a scientific study conducted by NATEC, placement 
of proper equipment at these sites will address &80% of the 
problem.8  (NOTE:  Although NATEC assertion of 80% coverage 
of the problem may be true, this is only 80% of the potential 
 radiological, problem since the sensors in question will 
not detect other substances of concern and the current border 
security and customs elements appear, according to country 
team, to be ineffective and inconsistent in their assigned 
roles.) 
 
NATEC had a detailed and phased plan for development and 
implementation of a national radiological detection 
infrastructure.  Officials of NATEC are willing to discuss 
this plan in detail with US officials of the Department of 
Energy subsequent to appropriate request and approval of 
official exchange of information. 
 
NATEC is concerned about the possibility of storage and/or 
transshipment of radiological/nuclear items or related 
dual-use technology in or through Yemen.  Officials of NATEC 
believe there is troubling &linkage8 between the illicit 
drugs trade, scam marketing of  Red Mercury, and smuggling 
infrastructure that could be used to smuggle radiological 
materials or other WMD or related technology. 
 
At some point in the future as Yemeni oil reserves are 
depleted, Yemen may need to invite representatives from the 
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission to Yemen to discuss 
policies and procedures for peaceful use of nuclear power for 
generation of electricity. 
 
6. (U) On July 13, EXBS Advisor met with Brigadier General 
Ahmed Al-Sunidar, Director General of the Office of the 
Interior Minister, Ministry of Interior.  Salient points of 
subsequent conversation were as follows: 
 
The national priority is to complete the plan for coastal 
security begun by the YCG. 
 
The Ministry is considering creation of an elite Border Guard 
element to replace the existing Ministry of Defense Border 
Guards.  Should the ministry stand up this unit, it intends 
to use the YCG model to create a professional, trustworthy 
and efficient border element to mirror the maritime success 
of the YCG.  The Ministry may want to begin with a 100-man 
unit and deploy to select sites along the border as a  proof 
of principle., 
 
(NOTE:  Should the Ministry of Interior proceed with this 
plan to create an elite land-based law Enforcement element to 
mirror the YCG, EXBS support can be leveraged if an 
appropriate U.S. subject matter expert is assigned to Yemen 
for two to three years to assist in the establishment of a 
viable border protection element from the ground up.) 
 
7. (U) On July 18, EXBS Advisor toured the port of Aden and 
met with the following officials of the Aden District, Coast 
Guard Authority, Ministry of Interior: Staff Colonel Lotf A. 
H. Al-Baraty, General Director (Commander); Major Shugaa, 
Operations Officer and other select staff members not 
identified by name or title. Salient points of subsequent 
conversation were as follows: 
 
At present, YCG patrol zones generally extend to ten miles 
but the YCG would like to increase that distance to monitor 
maritime smuggling more effectively.  To increase the patrol 
zone, the YCG needs larger vessels than those now in inventory 
 
The YCG needs logistical support, both in terms of equipment 
and resident technicians, mechanics and machinists to train 
the YCG enlisted cadre. 
 
Some Evinrude outboard engines have proven to be consistently 
unreliable, while Yamaha model 200 outboard motors have 
endured the operational requirements well.  (Note:  EXBS 
Advisor will provide photographs of respective motors to 
NP/ECC under separate cover.) 
 
Some basic search and rescue equipment is available in 
inventory but personnel need additional training in S&R 
operations. 
 
8. (U) On July 18, EXBS Advisor toured the Aden container 
terminal and met with the following officials: Mr. Kor Ler 
Hian, General Manager/Senior Manager (Engineering), OPM Aden, 
Aden Container Terminal and Mr. Adnan M. O. Al-Kaff, Director 
for Corporate Affairs and Senior Manager-Human Resources, OPM 
Aden, Aden Container Terminal. Salient points of subsequent 
conversation were as follows: 
 
 
No checks on transshipments currently exist.  Yemeni Customs 
seals the container before entry into the terminal and no one 
opens them again.  The Container Terminal operations 
personnel only check for unbroken seals and correct paperwork. 
 
Less than 1% of the terminal cargo goes to the United States. 
 The U.S. provides no significant imports to Yemen via the 
terminal.  Most of the terminal traffic is imports to Yemen, 
much of which is foodstuffs and textiles. 
 
Most truckers belong to small and privately owned companies. 
Yemeni and port security screen all truckers before they 
enter the port facility and then again before they enter the 
container terminal.  Companies with multiple trucks apply for 
driver passes for their employees.  Private truckers apply on 
their own. 
 
Night security at the container terminal includes lights, 
cameras, a two-meter fence, and roving unarmed guards. 
 
Existing protocols for handling a &problem container8 are 
written and practiced.  The specific problem or  alert, on 
the container dictates if the terminal officials contact the 
YCG or other specialized elements of the Ministry of Interior 
and the Yemeni security services. 
Occasionally jurisdictional confusion in the port and the 
terminal complicates operations since the Free Zone Security 
reports to the Free Zone Manager and other governmental 
elements, including the YCG, report to the Ministry of 
Interior and the office of the Governor of Aden. 
 
There is little incentive for authorities to invest in the 
Free Zone since investment undermines profitable smuggling 
activity. 
 
The terminal needs to improve its security in terms of an 
ability to scan containers for illicit radiological, chemical 
and biological materials and related technology or components. 
 
(NOTE:  The Container terminal is modern.  Equipment is new. 
Design of the Terminal lends itself to application and 
installation of  chokepoint sensor arrays.,) 
 
9.    (U) On July 18, EXBS Advisor toured met with the 
following officials of the Yemen Free Zone Public Authority 
(YFZPA), located in Aden: Dr. Mohammad Hamood Alwadan, Vice 
Chairman, YFZPA and Mr. Mohammad M. Zemam, Manager, Port 
Cities Development Program, YFZPA. Salient points of 
subsequent conversation were as follows: 
 
Dubai Ports International (DPI) out of Dubai, United Arab 
Emirates is the developer of YFZPA.  Development plans exist 
to link the container terminal to the international airport 
to improve processing of air cargo. 
 
Aden is not off the &ports at risk list.8  (NOTE:  YFZPA 
did not identify the exact list referenced, but given the 
context of their comment it is probably a port/shipping risk 
list prepared by shipping insurance companies such as Lloyds 
of London.) 
 
YFZPA is seeking individual investors to handle development 
of specific sectors of the free zone to include tourism, 
heavy industry and manufacturing, shipping, recycling and 
petro-chemical storage and refinement. 
 
The steel recycling plant is due to open in late August 2005. 
 
(NOTE:  Dr. Alwadan provided Advisor an English copy of the 
Free Zone law No 4 of the year 1993 and a copy of the YFZPA 
2004 Aden Free Zone Facilities and Incentives/Investment & 
Development Opportunities Brochure.) 
 
10.   (C) On July 18, EXBS Advisor met with Mr. Basher 
Bashaheel, Operating Manager, Al-Ayyam Newspaper, (the only 
independent daily newspaper in Yemen.)  Salient points of 
subsequent conversation were as follows: 
 
Smuggling of diesel fuel is big business in Aden.  According 
to investigative reporting, smugglers typically buy fuel at 
$120 per ton and sell it for $425 per ton. 
 
An organized criminal element controls all facets of the 
supply chain in the port of Aden. 
 
English-Arabic translation of shipping documentation is a 
&magnet8 for corruption.  Pay the right person and the 
documentation can say anything it needs to say.  There are 
few existing checks and balances for translation verses 
reality of cargo. 
 
Many are of the opinion that the Yemeni Customs is the single 
worst obstacle to foreign investment due to their rampant 
corruption. 
 
The commercial courts need a "major overhaul."  Citizens need 
to have the right to sue government officials and Ministers 
need to be accountable to institutions and the public. 
 
Omani officials are willing to work closely with Yemeni 
officials to improve border security.  Perhaps the Yemeni 
government could use future success along the Omani-Yemeni 
border to build a model for border operations and improve the 
security along the northern border with Saudi Arabia in the 
Harath region. 
 
11.   (U) On July 19, EXBS Advisor toured the port of 
Hodeidah and met with the following officials: Colonel 
Abdulla Al-Hamadani, Director General of Security ) Hodeidah 
Port, Hodeidah District, Coast Guard Authority, Ministry of 
Interior and Mr. Musa Dal Mohneg (sic), Yemeni Governmental 
Manager of the Hodeidah Container Terminal and other select 
staff members not identified by name or title. Salient points 
of subsequent conversation were as follows: 
 
Cargo entering the port is mainly grain, wood and iron for 
internal Yemeni consumption. 
 
(NOTE:  Port facilities appear to be 15-20 years old and in a 
general state of disrepair and visible decline.  Advisor saw 
no evidence of recent capital improvement in the port or its 
facilities.) 
 
12.   (C) On July 19, EXBS Advisor intended to tour the 
Harath border crossing, but the trip was cancelled due to a 
country-wide ROYG ban on diplomatic travel for security 
reasons.  (NOTE:  On July 20, 2005, riot erupted at several 
locations in Yemen due to government cessation of fuel 
subsidies.) 
 
--------------------- 
EXBS COUNTRY STRATEGY 
--------------------- 
13.  Following meetings, tours and extensive discussions with 
Yemeni and U.S officials, Advisor recommends the following 
strategy for EXBS in Yemen: 
A. (U) Fund acquisition and installation of computer 
equipment for the Yemeni Coast Guard National Operations 
Center at its headquarters in Sana,a.  This project would 
cost around $100,000 and would cover approximately 100 
workstations, 6 servers, situation monitors and related 
cabling or wireless connections.  The six servers would be 
dedicated to classified and unclassified nodes of the 
operation center,s communications, email and applications. 
Embassy has identified a trusted and competent contractor, 
which has done excellent work on behalf of the Embassy on 
other projects.  This operations center would provide the 
automated infrastructure for the YCG to perform its EXBS 
mission.  The existence of this center would then provide the 
Yemen government a model on which to build an effective 
land-based export controls and related border security 
element. 
 
B. (C) Due to existing complications of jurisdiction and 
localized control in the northern tribal areas. EXBS should 
insist border monitoring sensors be placed on the Saudi side 
of the border where they are more likely to be protected from 
damage or theft.  Assistance programs can augment a 
Saudi-side sensor array system with a mid-size and non-lethal 
unmanned remote piloted vehicle system such as the Hunter 
vehicle on the Yemeni side of the border.  After appropriate 
training, an appropriate  element like the border guard/law 
enforcement unit the Ministry of Interior is considering 
could operate and secure the system.  The system could 
effectively monitor corridors of ingress and regress 
identified with smuggling operations.  The product of such a 
system could be linked to a Yemeni Quick Reaction Law 
Enforcement unit empowered to respond, seal a localized area, 
seize as appropriate and extract before smuggling or tribal 
forces could mass and respond.  The product of this system 
could also easily be rendered  omni-directional, ensuring 
U.S. capability to monitor the  take., 
C. (U) Due to the unique challenges of the Yemeni land 
borders, success in the creation of a land-based export 
controls and related border security element will be enhanced 
by the long-term presence of a resident subject matter expert 
familiar with border operations and state-of-the art 
technology such as the Hunter system.  Advisor recommends the 
interagency group seriously consider funding such a position. 
 Advisor also recommend such an individual be capable and 
willing to spend extended periods in the field with Yemen 
units.  Advisor further suggests this expert be someone who 
has successfully performed in the EPIC/JTF6 environment and 
who is familiar with both the technological and human 
challenges of maintaining effective border security 
operations along an extensive and rugged land border. 
 
D. (C) Some training for Yemen elements may be more 
effectively and efficiently conducted via Jordanian 
joint-training facilities.  Advisor recommends EXBS explore 
this option. 
 
E. (C) Cooperation between Saudi and Yemeni officials has 
historically been difficult, but, it may be possible to 
engage Saudi Arabia in the EXBS arena by proposing they erect 
a border monitoring sensor array and share the  take, with 
Yemeni officials in return for the Yemeni officials sharing 
their  take, from the Hunter)type system.  Perhaps, Yemen 
can make similar arrangements with Oman, i.e., have the 
Omanis place static sensor arrays on their side of the border 
and then exchange the product of both the static and URPV 
systems between relevant EXBS elements in Oman and Yemen. 
 
F. (U) Facilitate U.S. Department of Energy CORE/SLD Program 
and MEGAPORTS Initiative engagement with Yemen and its NATEC. 
 
G.(U) Once the YCG is established, a mirror land-based EXBS 
element in place and the NATEC monitoring infrastructure up 
and running, Embassy officials can develop appropriate policy 
discussions with Yemeni officials on the reform of the 
Customs service and EXBS can stand ready to support a 
reformed Customs service, providing relevant training and 
equipment to control the commercial portals of Yemen. 
 
14. (U) Any questions or comments can be directed to Joseph 
C. Irvine, EXBS Advisor to Jordan & the Middle East, 
Telephone:(962 6) 590-6550/6558, Fax: (962 6) 592-7653, 
Email: IrvineJC@state.gov. 
 
15.  (U) Cable cleared by Joseph Irvine, AMEMBASSY Jordan. 
Krajeski