US embassy cable - 02RANGOON1274

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JAPANESE AMBASSADOR RAISES POLITICAL TRANSITION AND ECONOMIC REFORM WITH THAN SHWE

Identifier: 02RANGOON1274
Wikileaks: View 02RANGOON1274 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Rangoon
Created: 2002-10-01 10:35:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PREL BM JP
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L RANGOON 001274 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EAP/BCLTV AND DRL 
USCINCPAC FOR FPA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/30/2012 
TAGS: PREL, BM, JP 
SUBJECT: JAPANESE AMBASSADOR RAISES POLITICAL TRANSITION 
AND ECONOMIC REFORM WITH THAN SHWE 
 
REF: TOKYO 5480 
 
Classified By: COM Carmen Martinez. Reason: 1.5 (d). 
 
1. (C) Summary: Japanese Ambassador Yuji Miyamoto delivered a 
message from Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi when he 
presented his credentials to Than Shwe on September 16. 
According to sources at the Japanese Embassy, Miyamoto also 
went into some detail about political transition, Japanese 
aid, and economic reform in Burma. End Summary. 
 
2. (C) Japanese Aid: Koizumi's letter made three points.  It 
reaffirmed the historic friendship between Japan and Burma; 
it emphasized the importance of motion towards democracy; and 
it reiterated Foreign Minister Kawaguchi's offer to give 
special consideration to any aid projects that were agreed 
between the NLD and the government.  According to Koizumi's 
letter, such projects would be handled "outside normal 
channels," meaning that they would be approved and funded at 
no cost to Japan's normal aid budget in Burma.  Such projects 
would be, according to the letter, a pure bonus for the 
country. 
 
3. (C) Economic Reform: The Ambassador, on his own, raised 
economic reform issues.  He noted that Japan was finalizing 
its report on Structural Adjustment in Burma and asked Than 
Shwe to consider reading it in full.  Than Shwe simply nodded 
at that suggestion. 
 
4. (C) Political Transition: Than Shwe told the Ambassador 
that the GOB was committed to democratization.  However, he 
made no promises regarding the pace or timetable for change. 
Rather, he emphasized that national unity, education, and 
economic development had to come before democracy.  Burma had 
failed in the past, he argued, because it had not been ready 
for western-style democracy.  He wanted to be sure this time 
that it did not fail again. 
 
5. (C) Comment: Miyamoto made good use of his time with Than 
Shwe, delivering messages that need to get through, but which 
rarely reach Than Shwe.  The Japanese have also obviously 
done some thinking about the best way to encourage 
cooperation between the government and the NLD.  Hence, the 
offer of aid on basically no-cost terms. End Comment. 
Martinez 

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