US embassy cable - 05ANKARA4765

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TURKISH VIEWS ON RENEWAL OF ISAF'S UN MANDATE AND INTERNATIONAL USE OF FORCE

Identifier: 05ANKARA4765
Wikileaks: View 05ANKARA4765 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Ankara
Created: 2005-08-12 13:59:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: MARR PREL AF TU IZ NATO UNSC
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 004765 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/11/2015 
TAGS: MARR, PREL, AF, TU, IZ, NATO, UNSC 
SUBJECT: TURKISH VIEWS ON RENEWAL OF ISAF'S UN MANDATE AND 
INTERNATIONAL USE OF FORCE 
 
REF: A. STATE 146276 (NOTAL) 
     B. ANAKRA 4186 (NOTAL) 
 
Classified By: Acting DCM James R. Moore for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
1. (C) Polmilcouns raised ISAF's UN mandate with MFA Deputy 
Director General for NATO Affairs Fatih Ceylan on August 11 
as instructed ref A.  Ceylan said that some offices within 
MFA had been discussing the use of force, mandates and 
international legitimacy recently.  His office has argued 
that Turkey should avoid being overly rigid or legalistic in 
its approach because "you never know when we (Turkey) might 
need to do something."  On the specific issue of whether 
ISAF's UN mandate must be changed to allow expansion of 
ISAF's security role, Ceylan said the mandate was technically 
broad enough as is, although more explicit language in the 
mandate would make the expansion of ISAF's role easier to 
sell to the government and parliament.  He was sure that 
Turkey would not stand in the way of a consensus in Brussels. 
 Ceylan thought France and Germany would have reservations as 
might some other allies.  Winning the Germans over would be 
key, he stated. 
 
2. (C) Returning to Ceylan's comments on use of force, 
polmilcouns asked what conclusions had been reached.  Ceylan 
emphasized that no decisions had been made, merely a number 
of offices had gotten together to brainstorm.  He had argued 
the need to retain options in the event Turkey needed them 
some day.  He recalled the Kosovo crisis, how Turks had been 
on the scene prior to UN or NATO action.  Similar situation 
could come up in the future, he said.  Regarding mandates, he 
thought parliamentary approval might suffice.  Polmilcouns 
observed that that might suffice domestically, but 
parliamentary action alone would not provide international 
legitimacy.  Ceylan agreed. 
 
3. (C) Comment:  Regarding ISAF's UN mandate, it appears 
Turkey would welcome -- but not require -- a change for ISAF 
to take on an expanded security role.  On the broader issue 
of Turkey's use of force, Ceylan did not say what sparked the 
internal discussions, but we suspect it was statements by the 
Prime Minister and other senior government and military 
leaders in the past few weeks about the PKK terrorist 
organization and the prospects for "hot pursuit" into Iraq 
(ref b).  End comment. 
MCELDOWNEY 

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