US embassy cable - 05ANKARA4751

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 004751 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/22/2029 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PINS, ECON, TU, RS 
SUBJECT: TURCO-RUSSIAN RAPPROCHEMENT: SEVEN HOURS OF 
ERDOGAN-PUTIN TALKS IN SOCHI 
 
(U) Classified by Polcounselor John Kunstadter; reasons: E.O. 
12958 1.4 (b,d). 
 
1. (C) Summary: In the context of booming trade with Russia 
(heavily in the latter's favor) and growing emotional 
understanding between Turks and Russians, PM Erdogan 
continues to feel that he is building a partnership of equals 
with Putin.  What is lacking in Turkey is any rational 
analysis of Russia's aims toward Turkey or the political cost 
of Russia's dominance of natural gas supplies.  End summary. 
 
2. (U) Islam-oriented ruling AK party (AKP) used the 
mostly-captive Turkish media to trumpet PM Erdogan's 
"private" July 17-18 visit to Putin at Sochi, the two 
leaders' fourth meeting since December 2004, as a smashing 
success. 
 
3. (U) The banner headline and photo in July 19 Islamist 
"Yeni Safak", AKP's de facto party organ, sums up AKP's spin: 
"Bush Couldn't Have Had This Photo Taken: In their 4.5 hour 
conversation, Erdogan and Putin took up commercial and 
political subjects.  In contrast to U.S. President Bush, who 
had his picture with Erdogan taken while sitting down owing 
to their difference in height, Putin had their picture taken 
while walking together."  The photo, showing Erdogan 
swaggering with his left hand in his jacket pocket, was used 
by "Yeni Safak" to project the image of Erdogan as a 
self-confident equal of Putin. 
 
4. (U) Aside from the July 17 dinner conversation the talks 
included a July 18 breakfast and an exchange while walking in 
Putin's garden.  Sukru Kucuksahin, a columnist with deep 
sources in the Turkish State and a reputation for reliable 
journalism, reports in August 11 "Hurriyet" that Erdogan 
accepted Putin's offer to accompany him alone (with just two 
bodyguards) to a party for two and a half hours after the 
dinner.  Kucuksahin reports that Putin tried to ply Erdogan 
with wine while performer Nikolai Baskov sang. 
 
5. (C) Gaining a detailed readout of the meetings has been 
complicated by the restricted attendance in the meetings. 
Erdogan excluded MFA personnel, a point which MFA 
interlocutors have awkwardly admitted to us.   Egemen Bagis, 
an AKP MP whom Erdogan has normally used as a foreign policy 
advisor or as a translator to/from English, told us he was 
excluded from the July 17 dinner.  As we understand it, 
Erdogan continued his practice of avoiding  official 
notetaking on the Turkish side. 
 
6. (S) However, "Yeni Safak"'s coverage, sycophantic as it 
was, gives us some clues to the thrust of the talks.  In 
addition, we have spoken to Turkey's pre-eminent national 
security analyst, an exceptionally reliable contact for the 
past three years.  From his 12 years in military 
intelligence, including assignments in the Prime Ministry, 
the National Security Council, and the national police 
academy, he maintains an extensive network in the Prime 
Ministry and Turkey's three main intelligence organizations. 
Given that his previous readouts of sensitive meetings have 
proven exceptionally reliable, we include his summary of the 
visit based on a readout he got from what appears to be a 
source in the Turkish National Intelligence Organization 
(TNIO, which accompanies the Prime Minister's security detail 
and, as we understand, is in a position to learn the content 
of meetings through various means). 
 
7. (S) According to our contact's readout, Erdogan took only 
Energy Minister Guler with him to the dinner; Erdogan allowed 
the Russians to provide the interpretation both ways.  Putin 
was accompanied by a foreign policy advisor.  Erdogan 
reportedly asked for a reduction in the price of Russian 
natural gas through the Blue Stream (Black Sea) pipeline. 
Putin refused, saying that Russia had raised the price for 
Ukraine and Georgia, and Erdogan should thank him for not 
raising the price for Turkey.  Putin then reportedly pushed 
for Turkish agreement to extend the Blue Stream pipeline to 
Israel.  Erdogan reportedly agreed, but was rebuffed when he 
asked for an arrangement under which Turkey would sell the 
gas to Israel; Putin insisted that Russia sell the gas to 
Israel and that Turkey take only a transit fee (according to 
August 10 news reports, Russia's price offer to Israel is 
below the price Russia charges Turkey).  At the same time, 
hinting that Russia does not look favorably on growth of 
Ceyhan as an energy hub, Putin reportedly expressed 
reservations about a Samsun-Ceyhan oil pipeline to bypass the 
Straits. 
 
8. (C) On trade, Putin reportedly held out the prospect of 
raising the current $10 billion annual two-way trade figure 
-- heavily in Russia's favor -- to $25 billion in several 
years.  According to "Yeni Safak", Erdogan expressed thanks 
for Russia's decision to lift a ban on imports of Turkish 
fruits and vegetables (Putin had refused to take Erdogan's 
phone call on the subject a couple of weeks earlier).  Putin 
pressed Erdogan to show political support for Russian 
investors, including Alfa Group, which has just concluded a 
murky $3 billion deal leading to a sizable minority share in 
Turkey's leading cellphone operator Turkcell, and other 
companies now interested in the privatization of Turkey's 
major refinery and leading steel company.  Putin also 
promoted the Kamov, Russia's entry in the long-delayed tender 
for a major attack helicopter contract. 
 
9. (S) Our national security contact said Putin dangled the 
possibility of Turkish membership in the Shanghai Five, which 
Erdogan greeted favorably.  Putin reportedly then spoke 
against U.S. democratization efforts in the Caucasus and 
Central Asia, calling these efforts a plot to bring 
destabilization to both regions.  He suggested instead to 
Erdogan that Russia and Turkey cooperate in the Caucasus and 
Central Asia "according to local conditions."  On Cyprus, 
merely repeating the standard Russian position of support for 
the UN, Putin made no commitments regarding breaking the 
isolation of northern Cyprus.  Putin reportedly made a vague 
commitment to cooperate with Turkey on the PKK; in return 
Erdogan reportedly undertook tighter control of Chechen 
activities in Turkey. 
 
10. (C) "Yeni Safak" Ankara bureau chief Mustafa Karaalioglu, 
who accompanied the delegation, told us July 28 that Erdogan 
was deeply affected by the hospitality and amount of time 
Putin gave him and dazzled by the allure of a further boom in 
trade.  Karaalioglu described Erdogan as convinced he has 
established an exceptionally solid rapport with Putin.  In 
Karaalioglu's view Erdogan does not see Putin's drive to 
increase Russia's already dominant share of natural gas 
supplies to Turkey or Putin's bid sharply to raise Russia's 
share of FDI in key sectors such as natural gas distribution, 
refining, steel and telecoms as having any relevance for 
Turkey's sovereignty or independence. 
 
11. (C) Comment: For the AKP leadership and for many Turkish 
businessmen expanding relations with Russia is mainly a 
matter of making money.  Likewise, since bribery and 
kickbacks are an accepted part of doing business in Turkey, 
Turkish businessmen see conditions in Russia as normal. 
Novelty and the prospect of gain attract Turks and distract 
them from bad memories they would otherwise prefer to dwell 
on: relations with Russia are new and potentially lucrative 
in the most material of ways, and thus Turks see no reason to 
think of what the Russians have done to the Tartars since 
1552, what Putin's attitude is toward Muslims, what the 
Russians are doing in Chechnya. 
 
12. (C) Comment cont'd: There's an emotional component as 
well.  Turks see Russians as a huge and powerful nation that 
has a right to dominate the Caucasus and Central Asia and 
shares both a similar sense of having been a great empire now 
disrespected by the West (the Rappallo syndrome) and a 
preference for spontaneity, a trait the Turks think is 
lacking among Westerners.  Erdogan sees himself as a world 
statesman and is influenced by the thick pile of Putin's red 
carpet. 
 
13. (C) Comment cont'd: What is missing both in AKP and -- 
with rare exception -- across the Turkish press, academe and 
think tanks are any rational analyses of Russia's aims toward 
Turkey or its internal problems.  Erdogan seems indifferent 
to the political ramifications of Russia's dominant position 
in natural gas supplies and Russia's interest in buying up 
distribution networks.  The press and academe are dominated 
by leftists who have been unwilling to break their ties to 
Marxist second- and third-worldism.  Moreover, the Dogan 
group, Turkey's largest media group, wants to protect its bid 
to open a television station in Russia; "Zaman", Samanyolu 
TV, and the Writers and Journalists Foundation, the 
newspaper, TV channel, and professional association of the 
Islamist movement of Fethullah Gulen, want to protect the 
Gulen chain of schools in Russia and the Gulen "mission" to 
convert Russia (and all three have admitted to us that they 
pull their punches on Russia with these aims in mind); the 
Cukurova Group, owners of "Aksam", "Tercuman" and SkyTurk TV, 
wants to protect the interests of its mobile telephone 
company Turkcell.  With rare exception, think tanks are 
wrapped up in paranoid anti-Western emotionalism (the 1920 
Sevres Treaty syndrome) and are attracted by the "Eurasia 
alternative" to the West. 
 
14. (C) Comment cont'd: As long as Turks see profits ahead, 
feel awe at Russia's size, respond positively to Putin's 
masterly stroking of their emotional complexes, and choose to 
feel aggrieved by U.S. and EU policies, relations with Russia 
will continue to improve. 
MCELDOWNEY