US embassy cable - 05PARIS5471

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FRENCH DENY CHIRAC MESSAGE TO PAPADOPOLOUS; REMAIN CAGEY ABOUT ULTIMATE INTENTIONS

Identifier: 05PARIS5471
Wikileaks: View 05PARIS5471 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Paris
Created: 2005-08-11 18:04:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PREL PGOV FR TU EUN
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

111804Z Aug 05
C O N F I D E N T I A L PARIS 005471 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/11/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, FR, TU, EUN 
SUBJECT: FRENCH DENY CHIRAC MESSAGE TO PAPADOPOLOUS; REMAIN 
CAGEY ABOUT ULTIMATE INTENTIONS 
 
REF: A. PARIS 5307 
 
     B. ANKARA 4716 
 
Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt for reaso 
ns 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
1. (C) Summary:  Both Presidency and MFA contacts have denied 
Cypriot press reports that President Chirac last week passed 
a message to Cypriot President Papadopoulos in which he 
argued that EU accession talks with Turkey should not begin 
until Ankara recognized the Government of Cyprus, and asked 
for Papadopoulous' support.  The same contacts refuted 
related press reports that an MFA circular had been sent to 
French embassies setting out a change in the French position 
on opening EU accession talks with Turkey October 3.  Our 
understanding of the current French position is that: a) the 
Turkish declaration on Cyprus significantly changed the 
context for addressing Turkish accession negotiations; b) 
further discussion among Europeans is required; and, c) those 
discussions will inform France's eventual decision on whether 
to oppose opening negotiations on Oct. 3.   Comment:  As of 
now, we are authoritatively told, no decision has been taken 
that France will seek to block those talks.  That decision 
may well depend on the eventual line-up in the EU.  What we 
do not yet know is what kind of effort France will mount to 
influence the views of other EU members, in order to develop 
the basis -- a citical mass of support -- for a final 
decision to block accession talks.  The denial of such a 
message to Papadopoulos now does not rule out such outreach 
as we move closer to October 3. End Summary and Comment. 
 
 
2. (C) Dominique Boch, who in this vacation period is in 
effect acting diplomatic advisor to President Chirac, told us 
August 11 that Chirac had not sent a private message to 
Papadopoulos.  He stated that the GOF had publicly denied the 
report (although no such denial has surfaced on the official 
websites or has been picked up by the press). He also denied 
that any special directive had been communicated to French 
missions (as had been reported in conjunction with the press 
reports on a Chirac message).  The latter denial appeared to 
be an artful dodge, however, as Claire Raulin, MFA desk 
officer for enlargement, admitted instructions had been sent 
to French embassies on the issue; this was to be seen, 
however, as part of the normal information flow with 
embassies.  This message did not include a change of the 
French position, she said; it explained how to read Prime 
Minister de Villepin's August 2 statement on the recognition 
issue.  Pressed on the Chirac-Papadopoulos letter, Raulin 
stated clearly that "my knowledge of this subject is pretty 
broad, and that rumor is completely false." 
 
3. (C) All of our Presidency and MFA interlocutors have 
repeated to us that the Turkish declaration constitutes a 
"new fact" among the many considerations that will inform 
member states' views as discussions proceed and the decision 
is taken whether to move ahead with Turkey on October 3. 
They also underlined that the French very much want to assess 
and discuss this new element with their European partners, 
both at the August 24 COREPER and the September 1-2 Gymnich 
meetings before taking a decision on whether to open 
negotiations as scheduled.  This message has been consistent 
since we took up the issue last week following Villepin's 
remarks.  What the French are not saying is how much they 
will seek to influence other governments to reconsider the 
opening of talks. 
 
4. (C) Pascal LeDeunff, deputy chief of the MFA's Common 
Foreign Security Policy unit, noted that because of public 
opinion opposing Turkish membership, and because the of 
"failure of May 29," French authorities would have to be 
"even more vigilant than they were before" in examining EU 
accession issues.  According to Raulin, the MFA's legal 
office continues to examine whether the Turkish declaration 
legally invalidated the protocol signature -- a process that 
has not yet finished.  That decision will inform France's 
position at the August and September discussions among 
permreps and FMs respectively. 
Hofmann 

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