US embassy cable - 05ANKARA4716

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 004716 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/11/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, TU, CY, EU Accession 
SUBJECT: REACTION TO TURKISH DECLARATION OF NON-RECOGNITION 
OF CYPRUS 
 
REF: A. ANKARA 4486 
 
     B. PARIS 5307 
     C. PARIS 5350 
 
 (U) Classified by Political Counselor John Kunstadter, E.O. 
12958, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
1.  (C) Summary:  Turkey's July 29 declaration that is does 
not recognize the Republic of Cyprus (ROC) (ref A) has raised 
little controversy among EU diplomats in Ankara:  it is what 
most expected, and not as extreme as some feared.  Turkish 
media cautiously welcomed the protocol and non-recognition 
declaration.  Turkish reaction to French PM de Villepin's 
August 2 statement implying accession negotiations cannot go 
forward absent recognition (refs B and C) has been 
restrained.  EU diplomats here, including the UK, expect 
Cyprus-related objections to be resolved before October 3, 
but worry about attempts by the French and others to make 
textual changes to the negotiating framework for Turkey. 
After October 3, demands that Turkey open ports and airports 
to the ROC will become a serious issue.  End Summary. 
 
 
Turkish Declaration Raises Little Controversy 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
2.  (C) Turkey's July 29 declaration that extension of the 
Customs Union does not constitute recognition of the ROC has 
raised little controversy among EU diplomats in Ankara.  The 
declaration was along the lines most expected and not as 
extreme as some feared.  The French DCM claims that the 
declaration is a "new element" that calls into question 
Turkey's will to implement the protocol, but this flies in 
the face of the fact that the declaration was 
widely-discussed beforehand -- and in the face of her own 
apparent surprise at PM de Villepin's reaction to it. 
 
3.  (C) In the end, no one, not even term President and 
Turkey supporter UK, saw the declaration text before its 
release.  MFA Northeastern Mediterranean Affairs A/DDG Bilman 
would not even let junior diplomats in his own department 
work on it.  However, UK Ambassador Westmacott held extended 
discussions with Bilman and his boss, Deputy U/S Apakan, and 
made specific recommendations on the text. 
 
4.  (U) Turkish media cautiously welcomed the protocol 
signing and the non-recognition declaration.  Cuneyt Ulsever, 
a columnist for "Hurriyet" who has been highly critical of 
the Erdogan government in recent weeks, wrote that the 
government "should be congratulated" on the move.  Oktay 
Eksi, another "Hurriyet" columnist with strong links to the 
Turkish secular establishment, welcomed the signing as 
another step toward EU membership talks, but expressed 
concerns about EU reaction to Turkey,s declaration and the 
long-term implications of the protocol for Turkish Cypriots. 
The pro-Government Islamist "Yeni Safak" hailed the start of 
the "countdown to EU negotiations," highlighting the Prime 
Minister,s comments that Turkey is "rolling up its sleeves" 
for an EU process that will be "as delicate as knitting 
lace."  The paper also reported Foreign Minister Gul,s claim 
that Turkey had "fulfilled its commitment of December 17" and 
his assertion that there are "no more obstacles" in Turkey,s 
path to accession talks.  A sour note was sounded by the 
leftist-nationalist "Cumhuriyet" which stressed that the 
protocol had been signed "despite every warning."  The paper 
raised the possibility of an EU counter-declaration and 
predicted that Cyprus could veto Turkey,s accession talks 
despite the Government's action.  All media noted the 
criticism of opposition party leaders to the signing of the 
protocol, but with the exception of "Cumhuriyet," major 
dailies gave the naysayers short shrift. 
 
5.  (C) According to UK PolChief Miller, FM Gul was pleased 
by the Turkish media reaction. 
 
Restrained Reaction to de Villepin Statement 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
6.  (C) Turkish reaction to PM de Villepin's August 2 
statement that opening negotiations is not "conceivable" 
absent Turkish recognition of the ROC has been restrained. 
PM Erdogan said he was "saddened" by the news, but he and PM 
Gul have both avoided extreme rhetoric.  We will encourage 
Turkish officials to continue along these lines and avoid 
giving ammunition to EU Turkey-skeptics before October 3. 
 
7.  (C) Our EU contacts here ascribe de Villepin's statement 
to French domestic politics instead of a serious intention to 
block the October 3 opening of negotiations absent Turkish 
recognition of the ROC.  Miller and the Danish DCM both 
expect ostensible French Cyprus-related objections to be 
resolved after the August 25 COREPER and September 1-2 
Gymnich meetings. 
 
8.  (C) In the wake of the extension protocol, the 
non-recognition declaration, and de Villepin's statement, 
Turkish MFA U/S Tuygan told the UK that the MFA is 
considering a swing through selected EU capitals (possibly 
including Paris, Vienna and the Hague) by either him or FM 
Gul.  Timing is a question mark; Ankara and EU capitals are 
in an August vacation lull. 
 
Next Steps 
---------- 
 
9.  (C) The UK is preparing a draft counter-declaration for 
discussion at the August 25 COREPER.  According to PolChief 
Miller, the declaration will welcome Turkish signing of the 
extension protocol; note the unilateral nature of the Turkish 
non-recognition declaration; and note that the ROC has 
acceded to the EU.  It may also include a statement that the 
members states look forward to implementation of the 
extension protocol. 
 
10.  (C) EU diplomats here expect the ROC to push the EU to 
require Turkey to open its ports and airports to the ROC 
before October 3, but do not anticipate this will succeed. 
However, port and airports will become a deadly serious issue 
after October 3.  The Turks fiercely oppose this, 
particularly when "TRNC" port and airports remain closed to 
EU trade.  Unilateral Turkish concession on this score will 
spark a firestorm of domestic criticism.  Miller hopes the EU 
can give the GOT a Cyprus-related political concession to 
serve as a fig leaf for opening ports and airports. 
 
11.  (C) Contradictory statements from GOT officials make it 
unclear whether the GOT intends to submit the extension 
protocol for parliamentary ratification.  If the GOT does 
decide to submit the protocol, parliament can ratify by 
simple majority.  We expect that, if the GOT does submit the 
protocol to parliament, it will not do so before October 3; 
Miller agrees.  PM Erdogan's AKP has 355 of 550 deputies, but 
the numerical advantage could be weakened in the event of 
more controversy between Turkey and the EU on issues like 
ports and airports or the content of Turkey's negotiating 
framework. 
 
Concerns About the Negotiating Framework 
---------------------------------------- 
 
12.  (C) Although he expects Cyprus issues will not in the 
end block the October 3 opening of negotiations, the 
well-connected Danish DCM is worried there is not enough time 
before October 3 to resolve anticipated French, Austrian, 
Greek and ROC demands for changes to the negotiating 
framework text.  UK PolChief Miller calls this "doable" 
before October 3 but admits the UK is nervous about France. 
The UK Embassy expects that the French will use what they 
will portray as a concession in dropping Cyprus-related 
objections to push for a tougher text.  Miller told us the 
French have not yet proposed specific textual changes, but 
she anticipates the French will seek to expand language on 
the open-ended nature of negotiations, a hot-button issue for 
the Turks. 
MCELDOWNEY