US embassy cable - 05VIENNA2699

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 VIENNA 002699 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EUR/AGS (VIKMANIS-KELLER) EUR/ERA AND INR/EU 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/04/2015 
 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, ECIN, EFIN, AU, EUN 
SUBJECT: AUSTRIA'S 2006 EU PRESIDENCY: CHANCELLOR 
 
 
SCHUESSEL'S GAME PLAN 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires a.i. Carol van Voorst 
 
Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d) 
 
1.  (C)  Summary: Austrian Chancellor Wolfgang Schuessel 
 
brings a formidable toolbox of political skills and savvy to 
 
his task of directing Austria's EU presidency in the first 
 
half of 2006.  Ever conscious of the inherent limitations of 
 
stepping into the Presidency from one of the EU's smaller 
 
member states, Schuessel will try to avoid letting 
 
controversial issues like the EU budget and disputes over 
 
Turkish EU accession take over his Presidency agenda. 
 
Instead, he will look for opportunities to achieve progress 
 
in other areas, particularly the Balkans and law enforcement 
 
cooperation.  Domestic political considerations, including an 
 
attachment to a traditional concept of neutrality and a 
 
desire for commercial opportunities wherever they may arise, 
 
shape Austrian approaches to international issues in ways 
 
that sometimes run counter to U.S. interests.  While 
 
Schuessel is clearly interested in good relations with the 
 
U.S., he sometimes has trouble finding the right tone.  If 
 
faced with an apparent conflict between major EU states and 
 
the U.S., Schuessel's instinct will be to follow an EU 
 
consensus.  We should intensify efforts to define and 
 
communicate our goals for the Austrian EU Presidency well in 
 
advance of the January 1, 2006 start date.  End summary. 
 
2.  (C)  Austria's preparations for its Presidency during the 
 
first half of 2006 are well underway.  Lacking the global and 
 
regional influence of the current UK Presidency, Austria will 
 
strive to keep EU member states' expectations low even as it 
 
forges ahead on key issues.  In political terms, the 
 
Austrians will define success as good management of the EU's 
 
heavy agenda of meetings, culminating in a U.S.-EU Summit. 
 
The Austrians will try to have an impact on certain 
 
substantive issues, especially finding a way forward on the 
 
EU's seven-year budget framework.  However, they are 
 
skeptical of their abilities to influence the EU heavyweight 
 
nations.  They abhor sticking their collective neck out, and 
 
they have a tendency to opt for process rather than outcome. 
 
These tendencies suggest Austria, as EU president, will favor 
 
going along with the crowd rather than making waves. 
 
3.  (C)  Chancellor Wolfgang Schuessel will be the 
 
personification of the Austrian EU Presidency.  Now in his 
 
fifth year as Head of Government, Schuessel was Foreign 
 
Minister during Austria's 1998 presidency, an experience 
 
which inspired him to compile a booklet called "Eurospeak: A 
 
Light-Hearted and Illustrated Key to EU Jargon."  Schuessel 
 
will bring confidence, experience, and considerable political 
 
acumen to the Austrian Presidency.  A good deal of U.S. time 
 
and persuasion will be necessary, however, to get Schuessel 
 
to invest himself in any U.S.-led initiatives that do not 
 
have the full blessing of the EU powers. 
 
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Schuessel's EU Priorities 
 
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4.  (C)  BUDGET:  Austria is a modest net payer into EU 
 
coffers and prides itself on its good relations with the new 
 
EU member states to its east.  While this should enable 
 
Austria to act as mediator on the budget question, this may 
 
not be correct.  Austria has a small but effective 
 
agricultural lobby (an important constituent of Schuessel's 
 
People's Party) which has a stake in continuing Common 
 
Agricultural Policy disbursements.  Schuessel will make his 
 
best effort to facilitate an accommodation between the major 
 
players on the budget framework.  Austria will provide for a 
 
flow of information among Member States, record areas of 
 
agreement, facilitate dialogue and keep options open by 
 
encouraging efforts at compromise.  However, Schuessel will 
 
probably not go out on a limb in hopes of brokering a deal. 
 
He is unlikely to lead the way in offering concessions or 
 
seek to link the finance issues to other questions.  If 
 
budget discussions reach an impasse and he judges that he 
 
does not have the momentum to produce a full resolution, 
 
Schuessel may try to fall back on an ad-hoc agreement that 
 
will pass the problem on to the next presidency. 
 
5.  (C)  TURKEY: Another issue that Schuessel will be content 
 
to deflect is Turkey.  Some observers have made much of 
 
Austrian statements that the EU's accession negotiations with 
 
Turkey should be "open-ended."  At the same time, Schuessel 
 
and his Foreign Minister have said unequivocally that 
 
accession negotiations will begin on October 3, 2005.  To 
 
Schuessel, there is nothing mutually exclusive about these 
 
statements.  Turkey, he reasons, has the chance to qualify 
 
for accession in exactly the same way that Austria did.  He 
 
would argue that to say that it may not be able to do so is 
 
to state the obvious.  Meanwhile, by an overwhelming margin, 
 
Schuessel's constituents are vociferously opposed to Turkish 
 
accession.  In his view, it would be counterproductive (as 
 
well as politically risky) not to acknowledge their concerns. 
 
In fact, since the talks are scheduled to begin under the UK 
 
Presidency, and observers expect them to go on for at least a 
 
decade, Schuessel may well succeed in finessing the issue. 
 
Unless something occurs to derail the October 3 start of 
 
negotiations, Schuessel will be disinclined to risk any 
 
domestic political capital on the EU-Turkey question. 
 
6.  (C) BALKANS: Austria has long defined the Balkans as its 
 
area of top strategic concern.  Austria has committed almost 
 
a thousand troops to peacekeeping missions in the Balkans. 
 
It has also invested diplomatic energy in cultivating 
 
contacts across the spectrum in key areas such as Kosovo. 
 
Schuessel would dearly love to have a positive impact during 
 
the Austrian presidency.  However, he remains cautious: while 
 
he has floated the idea of hosting a follow-up to the 
 
Thessaloniki conference during his presidency, he will avoid 
 
excessive activity absent a reasonable chance of progress. 
 
He will proceed if conditions seem right.  He will look for 
 
assurances of willingness on the part of the parties and 
 
interested observers (i.e., the U.S. and Austria's EU 
 
partners) to make and facilitate viable compromises.  Austria 
 
is also intent on fostering progress on fulfilling Croatia's 
 
EU ambitions.  Foreign Minister Ursula Plassnik -- a close 
 
confidante and protege of Schuessel's -- has been outspoken 
 
in calling for an early start to accession talks.  More than 
 
many countries, Austria is willing to accept at face value 
 
Croatian protestations of good will on surrendering Gotovina. 
 
Using the argument that EU membership will extend stability 
 
to an unstable region, Austria will seek to build a consensus 
 
for putting Croatia on the road to accession. 
 
7.  (C)  CRIME AND CORRUPTION:  Schuessel and his government 
 
have worked for years to develop regional law enforcement 
 
cooperation.  In 2000, the Austrian Interior Ministry 
 
initiated the Salzburg Forum, an informal gathering of 
 
Central and Eastern European Interior Ministers to coordinate 
 
border security, anti-corruption, and counter-terrorism 
 
policies.   This component of Austria's presidency strategy 
 
will culminate in a meeting of Interior and Foreign Ministers 
 
on May 4-5 in Vienna.  Austria hopes that EU and partner 
 
countries will adopt a "Vienna Declaration," including 
 
measures to enhance border security and combat terrorism and 
 
organized crime.  The Austrians very much want the U.S. 
 
Attorney General to attend. 
 
8.  (C)  U.S.-EU SUMMIT:  Schuessel has already put his top 
 
advisors to work to confirm U.S. participation in the U.S.-EU 
 
summit, which, according to pattern, should take place in 
 
Austria.  Our unwillingness to commit now to summit dates 
 
confuses the Austrians.  As a practical matter, they consider 
 
it obvious that the staff of the world's most important and 
 
busiest leader, who travels with a huge logistical footprint, 
 
would want to make travel plans well in advance.  Far from 
 
thinking that they are badgering us, the Austrians think they 
 
are being practical.  Having already scheduled the EU's 
 
summit with the Latin American and Caribbean countries in May 
 
-- an event involving 60 delegations -- the Austrians 
 
consider it reasonable to ask us to choose now whatever dates 
 
we want. 
 
9.  (C)  Ministerial Contacts:  As a prelude to the Austrian 
 
Presidency, Schuessel and several key ministers --Foreign, 
 
Interior, Justice, Defense and Economic -- have expressed 
 
intent to travel to Washington in Autumn 2005.  The Austrians 
 
see this as a natural step before they assume the presidency. 
 
They expect the U.S. will want to make its views known to 
 
the EU, and see it as the Presidency's role to perform this 
 
function. 
 
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Broader Foreign Policy:  Neutrality and Business 
 
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10.  (C)  After flirting with moving Austria toward NATO 
 
membership during his first two years as Chancellor, 
 
Schuessel recognized that the Austrian public was unready for 
 
such a shift.  He now stands by Austrian neutrality -- an 
 
amorphous concept that means, essentially, that Austria will 
 
not participate in or support military action without a UN or 
 
EU mandate.  Austria did not permit military overflights in 
 
support of the Kosovo air campaign or Operation Iraqi 
 
Freedom.  The concept of neutrality has also meant that 
 
Austria deals with all countries on the basis of Austrian 
 
interests.  Austria defined itself during the Cold War as a 
 
bridge between competing blocs.  Now, Austria pays homage to 
 
the ideal of good relations with all countries.  Austria will 
 
always tend to seek increased dialogue, even if the prospects 
 
for any practical outcome of that dialogue are poor. 
 
Commercial interests can and do drive Austrian policy.  In 
 
countries of concern, where Austrian firms may be among only 
 
a few Western companies, the Austrian policy of "constructive 
 
dialogue" can reinforce a tendency to downplay political and 
 
security concerns when faced with attractive business 
 
opportunities. 
 
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Domestic Interests:  All Politics is Local 
 
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11.  (C)  Schuessel is most comfortable with classical power 
 
politics: the art of maneuvering to achieve a set of goals. 
 
In contrast to his accommodating posture toward international 
 
partners, Schuessel is not at all shy about head-on 
 
confrontations with domestic opponents.  His top priority is 
 
his economic and social reform agenda.  To the extent that 
 
foreign policy threatens his domestic standing (e.g., with 
 
popular expressions of displeasure at the prospect Turkish EU 
 
membership), Schuessel will act to shore up domestic support. 
 
This does not mean that he lacks political courage -- as in 
 
his government's recent decision to deploy up to 100 troops 
 
for Afghan election security.  While this has not yet proven 
 
controversial, it also did not score him any domestic points. 
 
In general, Schuessel will want to see some concrete foreign 
 
policy benefits to make up for domestic downside risk. 
 
12.  (C) CONCLUSION: Schuessel wants a successful EU 
 
Presidency.  He is politically savvy enough to want to avoid 
 
obvious quagmires, but also to seize opportunities when they 
 
arise.  He and his government will try to define a set of 
 
realistic, achievable objectives.  They will not seek to 
 
drive EU policy; neither will they want a role as advocates 
 
within the EU for U.S. interests.  If we want Schuessel to 
 
understand and support our broad policy goals, we should 
 
intensify our efforts to communicate them at a high level 
 
well in advance of January 1.  His requested visit to the 
 
U.S. in November or December will provide the perfect 
 
opportunity to do so. 
 
van Voorst