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| Identifier: | 05SINGAPORE2420 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 05SINGAPORE2420 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | Embassy Singapore |
| Created: | 2005-08-11 07:29:00 |
| Classification: | CONFIDENTIAL |
| Tags: | KNNP PARM ETTC PREL OTRA SN |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SINGAPORE 002420 SIPDIS FOR UNDER SECRETARY JOSEPH FROM AMBASSADOR LAVIN E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/05/2015 TAGS: KNNP, PARM, ETTC, PREL, OTRA, SN SUBJECT: SINGAPORE SCENESETTER FOR UNDER SECRETARY JOSEPH Classified By: Ambassador Franklin L. Lavin for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 1. (C) I look forward to welcoming you to Singapore next week. My staff and I are working to ensure a very positive and productive visit. Your visit comes at an ideal time to: -- thank Singapore for its strong commitment to the Proliferation Security Initiative and global counterproliferation efforts; -- encourage Singapore to take further steps to ensure that proliferators and terrorists do not misuse its port; -- solidify our growing cooperative relationship on combating proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their components; and -- highlight our close security relationship, enshrined in the new Strategic Framework Agreement, and the importance of the interoperability of our armed forces. A Strong Partner ---------------- 2. (U) Our excellent security relationship with Singapore is at a high-water mark, though it is constrained by Singapore's desire to be close partners, but not an ally. Singapore is a valuable logistics hub and has supported U.S. forces engaged in OEF, OIF and tsunami relief. Our military training and exercise program is extensive, and we hope to enhance our interoperability if Singapore chooses the F-15 over the French Rafale for its Next Generation Fighter. In July, President Bush and Prime Minister Lee signed the Strategic Framework Agreement (SFA), which lays the foundation to expand our strong ties and specifically notes the importance of enhanced cooperation on nonproliferation. 3. (SBU) Singapore supports the United States' global nonproliferation agenda and trade security initiatives. It was the first country in East Asia to join the Container Security Initiative (2002) and the Megaports Initiative (2005), and participates enthusiastically in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). Singapore has supported our efforts to raise the profile for nonproliferation at the United Nations, and has been helpful, as a member of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors, in pressing for greater accountability for Iran. 4. (SBU) A high-profile terrorist target itself, Singapore recognizes its own interests in controlling trade in dangerous goods. Though it has tended to focus more on terrorists' misuse of the trading system rather than proliferation by state actors, Singapore's mindset is shifting. Enacted in January 2003, its first strategic goods control law imposes controls on a range of sensitive goods and technology. Over the past two years, Singapore has concentrated on refining implementing regulations, training customs and border control officers, and reaching out to industry to raise awareness and compliance. Export Controls Still A Work in Progress ---------------------------------------- 5. (C) While these measures are welcome, Singapore's trade controls still fall short of international best practices. The GOS does not yet adhere to key multilateral instruments such as the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and the Australia Group, though your lunch host MFA Second Permanent Secretary Bilahari Kausikan has told us Singapore plans to SIPDIS sign up to these regimes "eventually." Singapore now controls only a subset of the items covered by these agreements and relies on catch-all clauses to forbid trade in goods destined for weapons of mass destruction. Singapore also collects little data on most transit and transshipment cargo, which handicaps enforcement. 6. (C) Singapore's port, one of the busiest in the world, remains critical to its economy; the government carefully weighs the potential impact of stricter trade controls on its efficiency and competitiveness as a trading hub. Over the last year, extensive U.S.-provided customs training has improved Singapore's understanding of how a comprehensive control system works and has eased fears that such a system would overwhelm their limited manpower and technical expertise. You will want to make the point that the majority of successful trading nations have implemented internationally agreed export controls, at little cost to legitimate trade. Opportunity to Advance U.S. Interests ------------------------------------- 7. (C) We believe Singapore is ready to take another big step toward bringing its strategic goods control regime in line with international best practices. During his July 12 joint press conference with the President in Washington, the Prime Minister himself pointed out that the SFA commits Singapore to work with the United States to do more to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Your visit, while highlighting our close partnership and Singapore's good work against proliferation through PSI and other programs, could provide the impetus the GOS needs to resolve to become a full participant in the global effort to prevent proliferation. Good next steps would be Singapore's unilaterally aligning its control lists with agreed international ones, collecting more information on transit and transshipped cargoes, and beginning the legal procedures for joining key international control regimes. Public and Private Messages --------------------------- 8. (C) We recommend that your public message emphasize our appreciation for our excellent security ties and Singapore's good work on nonproliferation, as demonstrated by the ongoing PSI exercise, and our desire to work together as Singapore continues to refine its export control regime. Privately, your message to the GOS should be more frank: despite Singapore's impressive progress over the past few years, much remains to be done. Given Singapore's prominent role in global trade, it must fully commit to keeping dangerous items out of the reach of terrorists or nations that intend us harm. By not fully participating in the international control regimes, Singapore is open to exploitation by countries like North Korea and others who use it as a "cut out" to procure items that other major traders will not sell them. Further, a strong proliferation regime and aggressive cooperation with us is a key component of our growing security relationship, as Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong pointed out in Washington. Singapore needs to make its export control regime truly world class. We look forward to building a strong, cooperative enforcement relationship. We will launch the effort to strengthen that relationship with the visit this fall by a team of U.S. proliferation experts. LAVIN
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