US embassy cable - 02AMMAN5595

C O N F I D E N T I A L AMMAN 005595 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/25/2012 
TAGS: KPAL, PREL, PGOV, IS, JO 
SUBJECT: JORDANIANS CRITICAL OF U.S. AND ARAB POSITIONS ON 
THE MUQATTA SIEGE 
 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR EDWARD W. GNEHM FOR REASONS 1.5 (B) AND (D) 
 
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SUMMARY 
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1. (C)  When Poloff recently queried a number of Jordanian 
contacts about the Muqatta siege, most had surprisingly 
little sympathy for Arafat, but quite a bit of antipathy for 
U.S. "acquiescence" in the Israeli actions and Arab leaders' 
lethargic response to the situation.  End Summary. 
 
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PEOPLE PROTESTING THEIR OWN PLIGHT, NOT ARAFAT'S 
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2. (C) There is wide-spread criticism in Jordan of the 
Israeli siege of Muqatta and wide-spread belief that Israel 
would not take such steps without at least tacit U.S. 
approval.  Arab states are also taking some of the heat for 
the current stand-off.  One contact complained that the Arab 
states had not done anything for the Palestinians since the 
Beirut Summit.  Former Royal Court Advisor Adnan Abu Odeh 
pointed to a recent segment on Al-Jazeira, where an elderly 
Palestinian woman cursed both Sharon and the Arab leaders for 
their current state.  Abu Odeh cautioned that this was 
emblematic of Arab feelings, "the Arab leaders are silently 
watching the Palestinians...this equalizes them with Sharon 
in the minds of people." 
 
3. (C) The siege of Arafat has generated little sympathy for 
the Palestinian leader from our Jordanian contacts.  Many 
contacts argued that the Palestinian protesters in the West 
Bank and Gaza were protesting their own plight, not Arafat's. 
 Ghazi al-Sa'di, owner of the al-Jalil publishing house, said 
that the Palestinian protesters were demonstrating for their 
own dignity, and not for Arafat the person.  Abu Odeh  opined 
that "people also hit the streets because they were looking 
for an opportunity to get out of the house"--a reference to 
the Israeli-imposed curfews.  Most contacts scoffed at 
Israel's attempt to link the siege to counterterrorism 
measures.  One contact said "what Sharon is doing is going to 
convince the Palestinians to support Hamas, instead of 
Arafat." 
 
4. (C) One contact, who has not shown a great deal of 
sympathy for Palestinians in the past, was extremely critical 
of the Israeli destruction of Palestinian Authority 
buildings, and believed Sharon's intentions were even more 
nefarious.  "Sharon is destroying the Palestinian 
infrastructure, not only the Palestinian Authority." 
 
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PALESTINIAN REFORM MUST GO ON 
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5. (C) Abu Odeh, an avowed Arafat critic, pleaded to Poloff 
that the U.S. must not allow the siege to derail Palestinian 
reform.  "You must not allow Arafat to run in elections.  If 
his is reelected, his people will feel validated."  Abu Odeh 
urged that a constitution be drafted as soon as possible, 
naming Arafat as a symbolic President, and spelling out 
elections for Prime Minister."  When asked how Arafat could 
be persuaded to accept this, Abu Odeh responded that Egyptian 
and Saudi mediators need to "put it in clear terms for 
him--it's either a symbolic role or exile.  Arafat is a 
tactician; if he only has two choices, then he will chose the 
symbolic role."  Abu Odeh, whose extended family resides in 
Nabulus, told Poloff that Arafat has the support of his 
cronies and some support in the camps, but little support in 
the cities.  Abu Odeh also talked at length about the 
debilitating effect of the curfew on Nabulus and urged the 
U.S. to improve the humanitarian situation on the ground to 
encourage Palestinian participation in reform and elections. 
 
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COMMENT 
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6. (C) The siege of Muqatta has once again raised questions 
here not just about Israeli treatment of Arafat or 
Palestinians in general (which Jordanians assume will be 
bad), but about the commitment of the U.S. and Arab leaders 
to an eventual resolution of the conflict. 
GNEHM