US embassy cable - 02ABUJA2766

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 002766 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/26/2012 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, ZI, NI 
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: COMMONWEALTH TROIKA ON ZIMBABWE -- A 
MEXICAN STANDOFF 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY DCM ANDREWS. REASONS 1.5 (B) AND (D). 
 
 
1.  (C) Summary: Presidential International Affairs Advisor 
Ad'Obe Obe September 25 told Polcouns that the September 23 
Commonwealth Troika meeting ended in stalemate. Australian PM 
Howard pushed to suspend Zimbabwe from the Commonwealth and 
for other sanctions to show displeasure over GOZ land 
seizures and stalled political negotiations with Mugabe's 
opposition. Diametrically opposite Howard was South Africa's 
Mbeki, who insisted the Troika lacked the mandate to suspend 
Zimbabwe or authorize sanctions. He wanted to give Zimbabwe 
and Mugabe more time to work toward political dialogue. 
Somewhere between, but clearly leaning towards Mugabe, stood 
Obasanjo. With neither Howard nor Mbeki softening his 
position, Obasanjo ultimately sided with Mbeki, and the 
meeting ended with no action taken against Zimbabwe.  End 
Ssummary. 
 
 
2. (C) During a September 25 meeting with PolCouns, 
Presidential Advisor Obe stated that the Abuja Troika was 
President Obasanjo's idea. On the margins of the WSSD, 
Obasanjo met serially with Australian PM Howard, South 
African President Mbeki and Mugabe.  All three agreed to the 
Abuja meeting. 
 
 
3. (C) Trouble started when Howard, asserting his prerogative 
as current Commonwealth Chairman, took it upon himself to 
organize the meeting.  In tandem with Commonwealth Secretary 
General McKinnon, Howard prepared the agenda and invitations 
with minimal consultations with Abuja and presumably 
Pretoria, commented Obe. Feeling that Howard was hijacking 
the meeting, Obasanjo briefly considered its cancellation but 
thought that would do more harm than good. 
 
 
4. (C) Obe described the invitation to Mugabe as insulting. 
The only plausible explanation for the invitation's terseness 
was an intention to provoke the Zimbabwean leader, Obe 
maintained. Adding to the perceived insult, the invitation 
was publicized on the Internet. Mugabe, believing his public 
humiliation and embarrassment was Howard's aim, decided 
against attending the session.  Obasanjo attempted to 
convince Mugabe to rethink his nonattendance by stating that 
the issues raised by Howard were mere points for discussion, 
not foregone conclusions.  Obasanjo's entreaty was 
ineffectual.  At the end of their conversations, Mugabe 
sealed his absence by offering that he would attend on the 
condition that the status of Australia's Aborigines was the 
first item discussed by the Troika. 
 
 
5. (C) Upon hearing that Mugabe changed his mind, Mbeki also 
decided not to show. According to Obe, there was a flurry of 
phone calls between Howard, Obasanjo and Mbeki.  After much 
heavy pushing, Mbeki was turned back toward to Abuja. By then 
however, pre-meeting atmospherics were decidedly negative and 
this palpable tension was an active participant in the Abuja 
meeting. 
 
 
6. (C) In Abuja, Howard strongly advocated that the Troika 
toss the book at Mugabe by suspending Zimbabwe from the 
Commonwealth for the land seizures and for stalling the 
political dialogue. Mbeki steadfastly opposed Howard, 
claiming the Troika lacked the mandate to suspend Zimbabwe 
from the Commonwealth or to approve other sanctions. 
Initially, Obasanjo tried to find middle ground then pull 
Howard and Mbeki toward consensus so that the meeting could 
end with a unified position. However, neither Mbeki nor 
Howard budged, forcing Obasanjo to decide between the two. 
Predictably, Obasanjo cast his deciding vote in Mbeki's favor. 
 
 
7. (C) According to Obe, the meeting rekindled the tempers 
that flared during the Commonwealth Summit in Australia. 
There, African leaders criticized British PM Blair for 
failing to give sufficient weight to the history of social 
and racial injustice underlying the GOZ position on land 
seizures.  This time in Abuja, Mbeki took Howard to task for 
being insensitive to Zimbabwe's history. Becoming 
increasingly animated, Obe stated that both Howard and 
Commonwealth Secretary McKinnon were not attempting to be 
impartial, but were carrying Britain's water at this meeting. 
 He stressed that both Mbeki and Obasanjo were rankled that 
the British and Howard seemed indifferent to the equities and 
emotions underlying the Zimbabwean land dispute. 
 
 
8. (C) The British lend more weight to the plight of 4,000 
farmers than the whole issue of Zimbabwean independence, Obe 
bristled. Mugabe had repeatedly stated the independence 
struggle was over land. There were black Zimbabweans who 
remembered living on and owning the farms now occupied by 
white farmers. If those lands did not devolve to the blacks, 
the struggle for independence would be incomplete.  It was 
this quest to gain recompense for past injustices that made 
most African leaders sympathetic to Mugabe, Obe asserted. 
Unless the West realized the strength of this sentiment, 
there would be continued friction and misunderstanding 
between the West and Africa concerning the way forward in 
Zimbabwe. 
 
 
9. (C) Reflecting on the dynamics at the Troika meeting, Obe 
remarked that it was naive to expect Mbeki to energetically 
oppose Mugabe. The rank-and-file in Mbeki's ANC strongly 
sympathized with Mugabe. If Mbeki openly sided with Britain 
against Mugabe, he would suffer a tremendous domestic back 
lash, particularly given that South Africa's day of reckoning 
on the land redistribution lies in the future, Obe opined. 
 
 
10. (C) While Nigeria did not have to grapple with the same 
dilemma facing Mbeki and South Africa, President Obasanjo 
felt some personal responsibility for Zimbabwe, Obe 
continued. In 1979, then military Head of State Obasanjo 
encouraged Mugabe to accept the proposed Zimbabwean 
constitution, which placed a 10-year moratorium on the land 
question. In 1989, when the 10-year ban ended, then African 
statesman Obasanjo joined the chorus of other voices 
counseling Mugabe not to move forward with land reform. It 
was feared that events in Zimbabwe could cause apartheid 
hard-liners to retrench in South Africa and scuttle the 
emergent reforms beginning to take place.  Having twice 
advised Mugabe to idle himself, Obasanjo now felt some 
sympathy for the principle underlying Mugabe's actions, 
although he did not agree with Mugabe's tactics. 
Consequently, Obasanjo was very reluctant to excoriate the 
Zimbabwean and instead wanted to maintain dialogue with him. 
 
 
11. (C) Regarding Mugabe, Obe posited that Mugabe generally 
had accomplished his goals on land seizures; he considered 
himself as presenting the world with a fait accompli as to 
the farms recently seized. However, Obe pointed out Mugabe 
was careful that his land seizures did not leave affected 
farmers landless. He only seized the lands of people who 
owned multiple farms. Because Mugabe was more comfortable 
with what he has done on land redistribution, now might be 
the best time to nudge him to a more conciliatory stance on 
internal political dialogue, Obe offered. 
 
 
12. (C) Comment: By his very nature, Obe is an acerbic, 
sometimes combative personality, so his comments must be seen 
in this light. The friction attendant at the Abuja Troika 
might not be quite as intense as he described. However, he is 
not prone to invent things that did not happen. We think his 
account is generally indicative of what happened.  Thus, 
instead of bridging the differences between the African 
leaders and the Western outlooks on Zimbabwe, the Troika only 
accentuated these divergent viewpoints. 
JETER