US embassy cable - 02KATHMANDU1890

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 KATHMANDU 001890 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SA/INS 
LONDON FOR POL - RIEDEL 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/20/2012 
TAGS: PHUM, MCAP, PTER, NP, Human Rights 
SUBJECT: NEPALI ARMY'S EVOLVING APPROACH TO HUMAN RIGHTS 
 
REF: A. (A) KATHMANDU 1372 
 
     B. (B) KATHMANDU 1118 
     C. (C) KATHMANDU 1191 
     D. (D) KATHMANDU 1465 
 
Classified By: POL PMAHONEY.  REASON:  1.5 (B,D). 
 
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SUMMARY 
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1.  (C)  In the ten months it has been mobilized against 
Maoist insurgents, the Royal Nepal Army (RNA) has had to 
change from a ceremonial, parade-ground army, occasionally 
deployed in UN Peacekeeping Operations, to a combat-ready 
fighting force, expected to counter and overcome an enemy who 
uses guerrilla tactics and outright terrorism to advance its 
aims.  Among the many tools RNA troops and their leadership 
lacked when called into action were adequate human rights 
training and mechanisms to investigate allegations of 
violations.  The RNA leadership initially appeared reluctant 
to address such allegations, but has since developed a unit 
within the office of its Judge Advocate General to review 
complaints.  The quality and adequacy of these investigations 
are yet to be proven.  In the meantime, the Embassy is 
providing training to help improve soldiers' awareness of 
human rights in the field and best practices in conducting 
investigations of violations.  The Embassy believes remaining 
engaged with the RNA through a sustained dialogue on human 
rights is the best way to ensure that respect for human 
rights in institutionalized during the Army's difficult 
transition from a parade-ground army to a capable fighting 
force.  End summary. 
 
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FROM THE PARADE GROUND TO THE TRENCHES 
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2.  (SBU) During the first five years of Nepal's six-year-old 
Maoist insurgency, the Royal Nepal Army (RNA), under the 
technical command of the country's constitutional monarch, 
remained in its barracks, emerging only to take part in 
ceremonial Palace functions or to participate in sought-after 
UN Peacekeeping missions.  The brunt of the Maoists' 
anti-government wrath at that time was largely borne by the 
civilian police, more than 500 of whom were killed by the 
insurgents in the first five years of the conflict.  During 
those years, individual police were guilty of a number of 
human rights violations against rural populations in 
conflict-affected areas, the most sensational being the 
infamous Kilo Sera To operation in 1998, in which numerous 
suspects were killed, tortured and arrested. 
 
3.  (SBU) The RNA's role changed virtually overnight November 
23 when Maoists, who had unilaterally broken a four-month 
ceasefire just a day before, attacked an army barracks, 
killing 11 soldiers and their commanding officer.  By 
November 26, King Gyanendra, the RNA's Supreme Commander, had 
declared a state of emergency which suspended nearly all 
civil rights guaranteed by the Constitution and mobilized the 
RNA against the insurgents.  Since then, more than 200 RNA 
soldiers have died in the conflict. 
 
4.  (SBU)  Most Nepalis, weary of the insurgency, welcomed 
the deployment of the RNA, which was widely perceived as more 
professional, better disciplined, and better equipped than 
the police.  The Army's close association with the 
Palace--which had previously also remained largely aloof from 
the conflict--helped foster that perception.  Sanguine 
predictions from the beleaguered population that the Army 
would finish off the insurgents within a few months were 
common. 
 
5.  (C)  But in many ways the RNA was, at the time, 
particularly ill suited to counter a guerrilla insurgency. 
Despite the ongoing conflict--and the obvious possibility 
that the RNA might one day be mobilized--the military budget 
had been slashed over successive years.  Their weapons, 
uniforms, and boots may have looked nice on a parade ground 
but proved unable to withstand battle conditions in difficult 
terrain.  The RNA leadership, most of whom are members of the 
elite Chhetri caste of the King, had spent most of their 
relatively comfortable careers to date insulated from public 
criticism of their performance.  Becoming suddenly 
accountable to a civilian government and a public with 
inflated expectations was not a comfortable transition. 
Their officers--generally also from the higher castes--tended 
to be aloof from lower-caste speaking ethnic minorities who 
predominate in Maoist-affected areas, making it difficult for 
them to gain popular support or to exploit local intelligence 
assets. 
 
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MAOISTS WAGE DIRTY WAR 
----------------------- 
 
6.  (SBU)  Since the RNA's deployment, the operational tempo 
on both sides has increased dramatically.  Of the 5,353 
Nepalis who have been killed in the insurgency since it began 
in February 1996, more than half (3,055) have died since the 
beginning of 2002 alone.  The Maoists have recently stepped 
up their campaign of terror against innocent civilians, most 
likely in an effort to discourage participation in national 
elections in November.  In the first two weeks of September, 
the insurgents killed more civilians than they had in any 
single month of 2002.  Nor have the Maoists relented in their 
attacks against the security forces, killing more than 100 
policemen and soldiers in two separate, mass attacks 
September 7 and 8. 
 
7.  (U)  The Maoists' use of brutal tactics against their 
targets, many of whom are civilian, is undeniable.  They have 
murdered teachers, local political workers, and simple 
farmers by decapitation, slashing them with knives, and 
beating them to death, sometimes torturing their victims 
before killing them. They have  dragooned countless unwilling 
villagers into their ranks, using many, including children, 
as human shields.  They bomb residential, commercial and 
government edifices without prior warning, and have made a 
practice of destroying rural infrastructure--bridges, roads, 
micro-hydroelectric schemes, drinking water projects, schools 
and health posts--leaving thousands without electricity, 
water, or access to the outside world.  They launch human 
wave attacks to overrun fixed positions, and have summarily 
executed those who are wounded or surrender to them.  They 
wreak revenge on police and soldiers by assassinating members 
of their family. 
 
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ACCOUNTABILITY DIFFICULT UNDER STATE OF EMERGENCY 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
8.  (C)  The high operational tempo; the lack of appropriate 
equipment, adequate manpower, and sufficient training; the 
pressures of having to negotiate remote, often inaccessible 
terrain; the difficulty of distinguishing friend from foe in 
a domestic insurgency; the ineffectiveness of civilian 
government in conflict-affected areas; the brutality of 
Maoist tactics--all of these factors undoubtedly complicate 
the RNA's mission.  The state of emergency, which remained in 
near-continuous operation from November 26-August 28, was 
intended to help mitigate the difficult circumstances under 
which the RNA found itself required to operate.  (Note:  Some 
critics contend the RNA leadership made deployment 
conditional upon the declaration of a state of emergency.  We 
have no proof that the RNA made such a demand, but have heard 
its leadership assert that the state of emergency makes their 
job easier.  End note.) 
 
9.  (C)  The state of emergency, which was initially ratified 
by the now-defunct Parliament in February, suspended all 
constitutionally guaranteed civil rights except the right to 
habeas corpus.  Most important, the emergency granted the 
police, paramilitary Armed Police Force, and Army broad 
powers to search without a warrant and to detain suspects 
without charge for 90 days (with the possibility of another 
90-day extension).  The ordinance did not explicitly require 
the security forces to maintain a log of individuals taken 
into custody, nor did it make provision for notification of 
the families of detainees--let alone visits by family or 
legal counsel.  (The ICRC is routinely told by the RNA that 
the military does not have any detainees--even though Embassy 
personnel have seen some detainees during visits to 
barracks.) 
 
 
10.  (SBU)  Restrictions on free press--both as a result of 
self-censorship and the suspension of the right to 
information--also cloud the situation.  The press corps, 
often legitimately afraid of venturing into conflict-affected 
areas, generally rely upon verbatim Ministry of Defense press 
releases for information.  The bulk of these press releases 
offer a one-line report of the killing of one or two Maoists 
without further clarification of the nature of the 
engagement, the identity of the Maoists, or whether any 
security forces were killed or injured.  (The exceptions, of 
course, are accounts of major engagements, where press 
coverage is more extensive.)  The overwhelming majority of 
those killed in the conflict this year--75 percent--are those 
described as Maoists in Ministry of Defense press releases. 
(Note:  Official accounts of Maoist dead in large engagements 
are generally unreliable.  Wherever conflicting numbers have 
been offered, we have consistently recorded the more 
conservative estimate.  According to the Government's 
official tally, the Maoist death toll is much higher.  End 
note.)  At a May 28 battle at Khara, Rukum, the RNA 
officially claimed 300 Maoists were killed--but none wounded 
or taken prisoner.  The Ministry of Defense has reported at 
least 260 separate incidents since January in which a single 
Maoist was killed by security forces with no further 
reporting on other Maoists injured or taken prisoner in the 
incident, or the nature of the engagement.  It thus remains 
unclear exactuly under what circumstances these 260 
individuals died.  However, when poloff asked RNA officers 
why so many individual Maoists were getting killed with no 
corresponding reporting of a battle or engagement, the 
officers explained that most were "shot while trying to 
escape." 
 
11.  (C)  The RNA's overarching suspicion of most human 
rights organizations as overly sympathetic to the Maoists 
limits the Army's interaction with these groups.  Many of 
these organizations are equally suspicious of the RNA.  One 
NGO that treats victims of torture regardless of political 
affiliation has had to cease operations in some areas, its 
director says, because of Army pressure.  The National Human 
Rights Commission, the ostensibly autonomous constitutional 
body with responsibility for investigating violations, is 
highly politicized and largely dysfunctional.  (As noted Ref 
D, we believe the National Human Rights Commission is deeply 
flawed.)  With the expiration of the terms of local 
government officials in July, one last source of independent 
information in some of these remote areas has dried up.  The 
combination of these factors--limited press coverage, a weak 
civil society, and the absence now of any independently 
elected political leadership at either the national or local 
levels--has left Nepal with an inadequate system of checks 
and balances to the near-unlimited right of security forces 
to detain and question.  Under such conditions--where all we 
may ever have is a one-source allegation of an abuse--it is 
especially difficult to determine the credibility of either 
version. 
 
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RNA HUMAN RIGHTS CELL 
--------------------- 
 
12.  (C)   In July the RNA announced the formation of a human 
rights cell under the direction of the Judge Advocate General 
(Ref A) to review the results of investigations into alleged 
violations.  According to JAG Brig. Gen. B.A. Sharma, who 
heads the cell, the unit has received no complaints thus far 
of extra-judicial killings.  Instead, most inquiries focus on 
determining the whereabouts of suspects believed to be in RNA 
custody.  Since the RNA maintains no central log of detainees 
and because suspects often refuse to reveal their true names, 
Sharma said, it is difficult to determine whether the missing 
people are indeed in RNA custody.  Sometimes detainees do not 
want it known they are in RNA custody for fear of Maoist 
retaliation against their family, he suggested.  Sometimes 
the RNA has to keep prisoners at its barracks because local 
jails are full.  The RNA still has to fix the procedures for 
determining the whereabouts of detainees; as of now his unit 
simply asks the local commander if the person in question is 
in his custody.  The Army is now starting to notify the Chief 
District Officer (the senior civil servant in the district) 
of the names of individuals in its custody.  Sharma said he 
has advised commanders to notify the families of detainees of 
their whereabouts and their welfare. 
 
13.  (C)  Poloff asked about any other pending 
investigations, including the promised inquiry into the death 
in custody of Kancha Dongol March 15 (Ref C).  That 
investigation is underway; its likely outcome, according to 
the major spearheading the inquiry, is a finding that Dongol 
(who sustained six gun shots and whose body showed evidence 
of torture) made a grab for one of his captors' guns.  An 
investigation into the November 30 killings of five villagers 
in Rolpa, who were shot from an RNA helicopter, had revealed 
that the aircraft had been fired on first.  Poloff asked 
about the May 1 shootings of six men in Sindhupalchowk (Ref 
B), noting recent coverage of the event in a London 
newspaper.  Sharma replied that an inquiry had revealed that 
the six men had fired on RNA soldiers--a version that differs 
significantly from that offered Ref B by both the CDO and the 
local police commander.  Poloff asked about the June 29 
killings by the RNA of four suspected Maoists in Ramite 
Khola, Morang.  According to a report from a local NGO, the 
four men were kept handcuffed on display in the public market 
for part of the day and then taken near a school where they 
were shot.  Sharma said he was unaware of the incident and 
would look into it. 
 
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SIGNS OF PROGRESS 
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14.  (C) The RNA leadership has on numerous occasions assured 
us of its willingness to respect international human rights 
standards and has agreed to accept training for its troops 
and officers on the topic.  Although all soldiers are 
educated on Rules of Engagement and are aware that they 
should not torture or kill suspects, the exigencies of the 
situation necessitated deployment without adequate training 
on human rights during conflict, the officers have explained. 
 The RNA's top leadership is well aware of the negative 
effect human rights violations would have on our expanding 
military-to-military relationship and related security 
assistance--as well as on ther own forces' good order and 
discipline.  Nonetheless, they clearly view the dirty-war 
tactics of their Maoist adversaries as a mitigating factor, 
making compliance with human rights standards difficult. 
 
15.  (C)  Despite this attitude, we are seeing some 
significant progress. The reactivation of a Joint Combined 
Exercise and Training (JCET) program after a five-year hiatus 
has intensified our human rights dialogue with the RNA.  We 
(and the British) pressed the RNA to develop the independent 
human rights cell so formed in July.  (Previously all 
complaints were investigated by the commander of the suspect 
unit himself.)  While the quality and breadth of the 
investigations undertaken by this unit remain to be seen, the 
RNA's willingness to accept training in this area is a 
reassuring sign.  The UK government is examining the 
possibility of detailing a British army officer to the unit 
to assist it in its early stages.  In addition, 14 RNA 
officers, at the rank of Colonel and above, attended a 
September 25-26 workshop on the Law of Armed Conflict, with 
training jointly offered by representatives of the ICRC and 
the USG's Defense Institute of International Legal Studies. 
16.  (C)  Without other independent organs like the media and 
human rights groups operating in conflict-ridden areas, it is 
difficult either to corroborate or refute the RNA's version 
of events, or to gather "credible evidence" of violations 
that amounts to much more than allegations.  The absence of 
checks and balances during the state of emergency, which 
expired August 28, allowed the RNA to operate with a certain 
degree of impunity.  That said, the RNA is now developing, 
like so much else in its repertoire, rules to implement the 
human rights standards it knows it must inculcate in its 
soldiers. Progress, especially initially, has been rocky but 
is showing some improvement.  To the extent possible, it is 
important to remain engaged with the RNA, via our ongoing 
dialogue on human rights, as it begins this important 
process. 
 
HALE