US embassy cable - 05LAGOS1251

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 LAGOS 001251 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/30/2009 
TAGS: PGOV, NI 
SUBJECT: KADUNA GOVERNOR SAYS A NORTHERN GOVERNOR WILL 
LIKELY EMERGE AS PDP NOMINEE FOR 2007 
 
 
Classified By: Consul General Brian L. Browne per 1.4 b and d 
 
1. (C) Summary:  During a July 27th meeting with the Consul 
General Kaduna State Governor Ahmed Makarfi predicted that 
one of the PDP Northern governors would get the ruling 
party's PDP presidential nomination for the 2007 elections. 
Makarfi also revealed the PDP would retain its current 
pro-Obasanjo national leadership at the party convention 
tentatively set for November as a way to hamstring Vice 
President Atiku and his presidential ambitions.  Obasanjo 
opposes both Atiku and former head of state Babangida and no 
one would capture the PDP nomination without Obasanjo's 
imprimatur, asserted Makarfi.  Despite the imbroglio 
regarding resource control, Markarfi deemed the recently 
concluded National Political Reform Conference a success. 
Although a northerner, Markarfi stated he would advise 
President Obasanjo to agree to the South-South's demanded 
increase for their derivation fund from 13 to 25 percent. 
End Summary. 
 
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Obasanjo Maneuvering to Thwart Atiku and Babangida 
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2. (C) On July 27, Kaduna governor Makarfi told the Consul 
General the PDP would make no major changes in the party's 
national leadership positions during its 2005 convention, 
tentatively set for November.  The party plans to defer those 
decisions until after the presidential candidate is selected. 
 That selection, predicted the Governor, would not happen 
until the second quarter of 2006, at the earliest.  Under PDP 
rules, the president and key party officials must come from 
different geo-political zones.  Selection of the presidential 
nominee should be first, then the party would know how better 
to zone the party chairmanship and other positions in the 
National party secretariat. 
 
3. (C) By making the 2005 convention a "non-event," Obasanjo 
was attempting to straitjacket his Vice President, explained 
Makarfi.  The vice president desperately needed to overhaul 
the PDP hierarchy to get "his people" in position in time to 
support his 2007 bid.  By preventing this, Obasanjo is 
keeping the Vice President in limbo. Obasanjo was purposely 
dilatory in order to postpone until after the presidential 
nomination the showdown between his faction and Atiku over 
the national secretariat.  Obasanjo even wants to delay the 
presidential nomination as late as he possibly can.  This way 
he keeps Atiku in a box.  Atiku is unlikely to bolt the party 
while the nomination is a possibility.   Makarfi believed 
that Atiku would form a new party if he lost the PDP 
nomination. However, if maneuvered to remain in the PDP until 
after failing to attract a presidential nomination, Atiku 
would be forming his new party with the negative momentum of 
a loser and not much time to alter that perception, the 
usually reserved Makarifi beamed.  In addition to hobbling 
Atiku, the President told Makarfi that former head of state 
Babangida's journey to the party nomination would be 
roadblocked. 
 
4. (C)  Due to the good news on debt relief, Obasanjo's stock 
has soared appreciably and the political temperature has 
likewise cooled, Makarfi analyzed.  As long as he does not 
attempt to succeed himself and if he can maintain this 
elevated standing, Obasanjo will have sufficient power to 
checkmate his opponents from the nomination and will be the 
single most important factor in determining who will be the 
ultimate victor. 
 
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If Not Those Guys, Then Who? 
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5. (C) Assuming the next PDP candidate will be a northerner 
and that Obasanjo trips Atiku and IBB, Makarafi said the PDP 
northern governors constituted the most likely candidate 
pool. Makarfi dismissed members of Obasanjo's cabinet as 
technocrats, not politicians who have mastered the hurly 
burly of Nigerian electoral politics.  Furthermore, no one in 
the National Assembly has sufficient gravitas to sustain a 
run for the presidency. 
 
6. (C) Himself a member of this gubernatorial pool, Makarfi 
thought he stood a fair chance.  He cautioned he was not 
actually pursuing the grail, but merely positioning himself 
to be in the right place at the right time.  He assessed his 
primary competitors to be Governor Muazu of Bauchi State and 
Governor Adamu of Nassarawa.  Makarfi stated that his state's 
size, its history as the political capital of the North, and 
his good relations with other PDP governors would put him in 
good stead. Conversely, while Obananjo liked Adamu most PDP 
governors disliked their Nassarawa colleague and thought him 
even too corrupt by their lax standards.  Muazu, on the other 
hand has done a good job but Bauchi is a small state and he 
is viewed as a bit of a jester by too many of his colleagues 
to be a serious presidential candidate.  By process of 
elimination that leaves me, Makarfi stressed. 
 
7. (C) Makarfi contended a southern governor would be the 
most likely vice president.  Because Obasanjo is from the 
Southwest, a governor from that zone would be excluded. 
Obasanjo would prefer River State Governor Odili but he is 
highly controversial and unpopular in his South-South region. 
 Governor Duke from Cross River is the most likely if the VP 
is to come from the South-South. The distrust between 
Obasanjo and the four other South-South governors is mutual 
with no sign of relenting.  Sam Egwu of Ebonyi is the likely 
one should the VP slot get zoned to the South East.  The 
other Southeastern governors are erratic and, save for 
Governor Nnamani of Enugu, not close to Obasanjo. However 
Nmamani is immature and feared to be unstable.  Both Duke and 
Egwu enjoy Obasanjo's confidence. 
8. (C) Makarfi termed the National Political Reform 
Conference successful despite the controversy regarding 
resource control.  In the end, the debate, albeit heated, was 
healthy, he believed.  Makarfi said he would counsel Obasanjo 
to increase the South-South's allocation from 13 to 25 
percent, however with some strings attached to ensure the 
added funds were spent on health, education and key 
developmental needs. 
 
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Comment 
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9. (C) Makarfi correctly assessed that the news on debt 
relief has strengthened Obasanjo's domestic political hand. 
The bandwagon effect is alive and well in Nigeria.  Right now 
the pendulum swings in the president's favor, but it can 
quickly reverse course. In any event, VP Atiku is in a 
strategic bind.  The longer the PDP tarries in changing party 
leadership, the less time Atiku will have to mobilize people 
and resources for his candidacy within the PDP, or with a new 
party.  Makarfi's view that a Northern governor may be the 
nominee rings plausible, albeit infected by a degree of 
self-interested thinking.  While trying to soft pedal his 
ambition, Makarfi wants the nomination.  He has been working 
on things like the Political Reform Conference to improve his 
relationship with President Obasanjo. Obasanjo and Makarfi 
have also identified a mutual enemy - Atiku - and are working 
together to undermine him.  End Comment. 
 
10. (C)  Makarfi apparently views the path to the nomination 
as a war of attrition, not a quick sprint to glory.  He 
appears content to let, and to abet where possible, the 
process of elimination remove bigger named rivals like Atiku 
and IBB, and then make his move afterward.  Whether this 
strategy succeeds is uncertain but it is probably based on a 
decent hunch.  Obasanjo likely wants to be the last of his 
generation to be president of Nigeria.  He wants to be 
Nigeria's elder statesman and he probably would feel quite 
comfortable knowing the next head of state is younger and 
beholden to him. This would help Obasanjo achieve his legacy 
as a reformer.  This view of Obasanjo's is one of the factors 
that informs Makarfi's strategy and actions. 
BROWNE