US embassy cable - 05TAIPEI3293

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 TAIPEI 003293 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EAP/RSP/TC, EAP/PA, EAP/PD - ROBERT PALLADINO 
DEPARTMENT PASS AIT/WASHINGTON 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL, KPAO, TW, Cross Strait Politics 
SUBJECT: "UNITED DAILY NEWS" EDITORIAL ON TAIWAN'S CROSS- 
STRAIT POLICY 
 
Summary: The pro-unification "United Daily News" urged in an 
August 5, 2005, editorial that the government implement a 
more proactive cross-Strait policy, liberalize the three 
direct links as soon as possible, and not only make partial 
policy decisions.  The following is a full text translation 
of the editorial by AIT's Public Affairs Section. 
 
"`Loud Thunder Overriding Firecrackers': a Macroscopic way 
of Thinking for Cross-Strait Policy" 
 
Taiwan fruit exportation to the mainland has brought the 
government into an embarrassing position, in which it was 
first supercilious and then deferential as well as 
threatening in manner but cowardly at heart. 
 
In order to break through the dilemma, the Executive Yuan 
(EY) made several policy announcements, including opening up 
Taiwan to mainland tourists, promoting Penghu as a transfer 
point for cross-strait transportation, allowing Taiwan 
aircraft to fly over China's airspace, and agreeing to 
negotiate with China simultaneously on chartered flights for 
passengers and cargo. 
 
When put into perspective, the authority has been so 
insistent on "small matters," such as fruit exports to the 
mainland, with repetitive mentioning of "sovereignty," 
"united front tactics," and "traps," however it has 
maintained a positive attitude toward the obviously more 
complicated "bigger matters" such as opening up Taiwan to 
mainland tourists, promoting Penghu as a transfer point, and 
allowing aircraft from Taiwan to fly over China's airspace. 
One did not hear warnings about "sovereignty," "united front 
tactics," or "traps." 
 
Although this is certainly self-contradictory, it is the 
correct direction for development.  Under the macroscopic 
structure of cross-Strait interactions, fruit exportation is 
only a "small matter."  Unfortunately, the government has 
been caught in a very embarrassing, passive situation, 
because of inappropriate operations.  In order to seek a 
breakthrough, the authorities have placed their hopes of 
regaining control of the negotiation of relatively higher- 
level matters, which involves a wider range of issues, such 
as cross-Strait chartered flights.  This kind of "resolving 
of the small by the large" or "changing from passive to 
active" strategic way of thinking is the right direction for 
development. 
 
There is a good metaphor: cross-Strait policies in the past 
were like setting off firecrackers sporadically.  This 
cannot change the general atmosphere.  It is necessary at 
this time to make major moves similar to "loud thunders 
overriding firecrackers" so that the sound of firecrackers 
can be silenced and the bigger picture be turned around. 
 
From Lee Teng-hui to Chen Shui-bian, [our] cross-Strait 
policy in recent years has generally been like "seeing the 
small rather than the large" and "seeing only the trees 
rather than the forest."  It seems that [we are] "trying to 
keep every inch of the territories."  But, in fact, [we have 
been] "losing inch by inch."  The policy is superficially 
"no haste, be patient" but in reality "the people are hasty 
and can not wait."  Now, the magnetic effect from across the 
Strait has moved from high technology to agricultural 
products.  The authorities seem to be finally alerted, for 
the first time, that the trees have been destroyed, and that 
the whole "forest" is caught in a storm now.  At this 
crucial moment, although it is already too late to adopt the 
"loud thunders overriding firecrackers" and "resolving the 
small by the large" way of strategic thinking, it is still 
better than being impenetrably thickheaded. 
 
Therefore, while the government keeps nagging about Taiwan's 
fruit going to the mainland and saying it is a disgrace to 
"sovereignty," or that farmers should be cautious of 
"traps," we should turn our attention to promoting Penghu as 
a transfer point for cross-Strait transportation or 
simultaneous negotiations with China on chartered flights. 
This is because nagging about fruits is "virtual," "small," 
and "partial."  Allowing aircraft of Taiwan to fly over 
China's airspace and having simultaneous negotiations with 
China on chartered flights are "substantive," "big," and 
"general."  This is the "thunder overriding firecrackers" 
tactic. 
 
In fact, the reason why fruit exports to the mainland cannot 
be prevented is that this big trend cannot be stopped.  The 
way to respond is never to obstinately focus on the fruits, 
but to reexamine and make changes as well as to re-recognize 
and control the bigger trend and situation.  Not to "see 
only the trees without the forest."  So the EY's several 
just-in-time major policy turnarounds should be applauded. 
But there is also much to be done. 
 
First, the policy goals should be elevated to the level of 
the "three direct links."  For example, the transitional 
period for weekend chartered flights should not be too long. 
The goal should be moving toward "regular flights" as soon 
as possible.  Also, the idea for Penghu to be a transfer 
point is nothing but a "partial" viewpoint.  If the three 
direct links will be implemented sooner or later, then there 
is no need to waste Penghu's time. Furthermore, one has 
learned from Kinmen and Matsu's "mini three links" that, 
with its economic and social conditions, Penghu's opening as 
a transfer point may not be beneficial to the country as a 
whole.  Instead, this will quickly increase Penghu's 
dependence on the mainland, just as what has happened to 
Kinmen and Matsu.  This definitely cannot be considered a 
good strategy.  As a result, we should give up the 
"maintaining partial and harming the whole" way of thinking 
and adopt the "stabilizing the whole to save the partial" 
strategy. 
 
The so-called "stabilizing the whole to save the partial" 
strategy is to implement the "three direct links" as soon as 
possible and try our best to pursue the goal of developing 
Taiwan into an "Asian-Pacific  platform."  Only then can we 
build a so-called "cross-Strait peaceful and stable 
interactive development framework."  Regarding the political 
dimensions, we should realize that there is no possibility 
for "name rectification and a new constitution" or "de jure 
Taiwan independence."  Taiwan should play the role of "a 
beacon for democracy and freedom" and maintain a 
relationship of mutual encouragement and mutual appreciation 
with the 1.3 billion people on the mainland.  It is really 
not appropriate for those in charge of political affairs to 
face the 1.3 billion mainlanders as "Taiwan independence 
activists".  This will only intensify cross-Strait hatred. 
Only by doing this can cross-Strait economic and political 
interactions gradually bring about mutually beneficial 
results.  Taiwan can thereby avoid the predication of 
continual marginalization of its economy and the increasing 
political hostility toward the other side across the Strait. 
 
[Our] cross-Strait policy is in a difficult circumstance 
now.  The authorities cannot indulge themselves in the 
practice of dealing with fruits when fruit farmers want to 
go to the mainland or deal with Penghu when Penghu wants to 
participate in mini three links.  It must conduct overall 
planning and operations on [a wide range of issues] from 
constitutional thinking of "non-Taiwan independence" to the 
interactive mechanism of the "three direct links."  Only by 
doing so can the authority restructure the bigger situation 
and avoid repeating the awkwardness of being unable to 
handle too many problems at the same time. 
 
If the big noise of loud thunder is lacking, then no matter 
how many firecrackers are set off, it will be impossible to 
change the destined cross-Strait trend and situation. 
 
PAAL