Disclaimer: This site has been first put up 15 years ago. Since then I would probably do a couple things differently, but because I've noticed this site had been linked from news outlets, PhD theses and peer rewieved papers and because I really hate the concept of "digital dark age" I've decided to put it back up. There's no chance it can produce any harm now.
| Identifier: | 02RANGOON1253 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 02RANGOON1253 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | Embassy Rangoon |
| Created: | 2002-09-27 09:14:00 |
| Classification: | CONFIDENTIAL |
| Tags: | EFIN ECON BM Economy |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RANGOON 001253 SIPDIS STATE FOR EAP, EB COMMERCE PASS ITA JEAN KELLY TREASURY PASS OASIA JEFF NEIL CINCPAC PASS FPA E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/27/2012 TAGS: EFIN, ECON, BM, Economy SUBJECT: IMF: TAKE YOUR ADVICE AND... Classified By: COM Carmen Martinez for Reasons 1.5 (B,D) 1. (C) Summary: IMF proposals for marginal economic reforms in Burma have been brushed aside by the government. Japanese efforts to stimulate interest in reform in return for limited adjustment aid will likely get a similarly cold reception. Nonetheless, international financial bodies and donor community experts should maintain contacts. They need to rebuild their knowledge of the Burmese economy. They also need to continue their economic education of the Burmese technocrats who will one day be called on to administer an economically viable state. End summary. Show Me the Money 2. (C) Traditionally the IMF's suggestions for incremental economic reform fall on deaf ears here. We understand that the IMF will once again propose that the Burmese government take marginal steps to: (1) begin to unify the market and official exchange rates, (2) liberalize agricultural exports, (3) improve tax collection, and (4) improve state-owned enterprises' budgetary discipline. Although the IMF's report of its July mission to Burma is not yet published, already the word is that the Burmese government will ignore its proposals. The official line of the Burmese government has long been that no economic reforms will be possible without a large structural adjustment loan. The IMF, restricted by U.S. policy from extending new funding to Burma, has repeatedly tried to convince the naysayers in Rangoon to undertake limited, incremental reform measures that would not require a large financial investment. 3. (C) A top Burmese businessman and former government finance official said the regime was unlikely to shift its position any time soon. He said that the ruling generals are fixated on national pride. The government will dismiss all IMF or World Bank advice as long as those institutions "patronize" Burma and refuse to treat it like a full member -- that is by giving it access to funding. He admitted that the Ministry of Finance had discussed repaying its International Financial Institution (IFI) arrears as a "sign of good faith," but ultimately rejected the notion on the grounds that the gesture would not result in any new loans coming Burma's way. Japan, Asia's Answer to the IMF 4. (C) The Japanese government is also getting in on the economic advice game. A large team of technical consultants and scholars has been regularly visiting from Tokyo to work with Burmese government officials on economic reform. One of the team's leaders, a professor of international studies from Yokohama, told us that the Japanese government has had some success in the region in the past where the IMF has failed, getting Vietnam to accept conditionality for a 20 billion yen bilateral economic adjustment loan. Ideally, the team leader claimed, the Japanese government would like to arrange for Prime Minister Koizumi and Senior General Than Shwe to sign off on a similar structural adjustment loan agreement during the upcoming ASEAN leaders meeting in Cambodia. 5. (C) The team leader was not optimistic that the current Burmese regime would adopt economic reform measures. However, he was concerned that if no effort was made to push reform, and to support the few reform-minded technocrats here, then any new democratic government would inherit a country with very dim economic prospects. He felt that such support would only be possible through a carefully monitored and disbursed structural adjustment loan. Further sanctions or economic isolation, he posited, would sound a death knell for budding reformers. Comment 6. (C) No one is surprised that the ruling junta scoffs at the IMF proposals. Despite this, we think that the U.S. government should encourage IMF and World Bank technical missions to Burma, as long as they are not tied to any new funding. Even if the government will not listen to reason, at least these IFIs can rebuild their knowledge base with a view to providing critically necessary adjustment funding quickly when and if a political change occurs. Likewise we think the Japanese should continue with their efforts. Although we are dubious that the government will listen to Japan any more than it will to the IMF, it is important for communication to continue between Burma and donors on issues of economic reform. End comment. Martinez
Latest source of this page is cablebrowser-2, released 2011-10-04