US embassy cable - 05VIENNA2663

C O N F I D E N T I A L VIENNA 002663 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR SA/RA, SA/INS, NP, EB/ESC/IEC, EUR/PGI AND 
 
EUR/AGS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/08/2015 
 
TAGS: ENRG, ETTC, KNNP, PARM, PREL 
SUBJECT: U.S.-INDIA CIVIL NUCLEAR COOPERATION: AUSTRIAN 
 
RESPONSE 
 
REF: STATE 133163 
 
Classified By: ACTING ECON/POL COUNSELOR MICHAEL DE TAR 
 
REASONS: 1.4 (B), (D) AND (F) 
 
1.  (C) Following receipt of reftel (and a specific MFA 
 
request for a briefing), Acting Econ/Pol Couns met with MFA 
 
Director for Disarmament, Arms Control and Nonproliferation 
 
Alexander Kmentt to discuss U.S-India Civil Nuclear 
 
Cooperation.  Kmentt said he had been studying the initiative 
 
intensively since release of the joint statement by President 
 
Bush and Prime Minister Singh.  Kmentt emphasized that 
 
Austria would review the initiative carefully.  The 
 
implications were far-reaching ("a tectonic shift").  Austria 
 
was seeking clarifications about some aspects of the 
 
agreement, and wanted to share concerns about possible 
 
political ramifications. 
 
2.  (C) Kmentt volunteered that India had been responsible 
 
about not acting as a proliferator, clear about its view that 
 
the NPT was "discriminatory" -- and "fairly transparent" 
 
about its intentions.  Technically, the distinction between 
 
Nuclear Weapons States (NWS) and Non-Nuclear Weapons States 
 
(NNWS) only applied to states parties to the NPT.  Still, 
 
opponents of the cooperation initiative would argue that it 
 
amounted to de facto recognition of India as a NWS.  On the 
 
other hand, Kmentt said, one had to be pragmatic - this was 
 
just acknowledging reality. 
 
3.  (C) Kmentt voiced concern that countries of concern - 
 
specifically, Iran and North Korea - would seek propaganda 
 
advantage from the U.S.-India initiative.  They would assert 
 
that the NPT was inherently unfair, and then allege that the 
 
U.S. was applying a double standard, he feared. 
 
4.  (C) Kmentt raised further questions and concerns in the 
 
following areas: 
 
-- Additional Protocol (AP): What kind of AP was under 
 
consideration, Kmentt asked?  Clearly, it would have to be 
 
limited, he thought, rather than based on the model AP for 
 
non-nuclear weapons states. 
 
-- Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG): The current guidelines for 
 
the NSG would not permit exports of nuclear technology and 
 
materials to India, Kmentt noted, and so would have to 
 
change.  He was concerned that China, a member of the NSG, 
 
might then seek some special status for Pakistan as well. 
 
There would have to be a debate within the NSG, which could 
 
begin at the Consultative Group meetings in October. 
 
-- Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR): Kmentt asked 
 
whether the U.S. would also raise the subject of the 
 
initiative at the September MTCR plenary? 
 
-- Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT): Kmentt was 
 
intrigued by the commitment of the U.S. and India to support 
 
conclusion of an FMCT.  Did this represent a shift in the 
 
U.S. position that such a treaty was inherently unverifiable, 
 
he wondered?  Austria thought an FMCT could be verified, he 
 
said, and believed that the absence of verification 
 
mechanisms would seriously diminish the value of such a 
 
treaty. 
 
-- Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT): If India was willing 
 
to continue its unilateral moratorium on testing, Kmentt 
 
asked, would it go the extra mile and ratify the CTBT?  This 
 
would be the logical next step, he said. 
 
5.  (C) Kmentt that that even if there was no consensus 
 
within the NSG and other fora for countries with advanced 
 
technologies, "market forces" would encourage others, such as 
 
France, to follow the U.S. lead.  Kmentt also noted that the 
 
EU Nonproliferation Working Group (CONOP) would debate the 
 
issue, but was not sure that EU could find a consensus on how 
 
to address it. 
 
van Voorst