US embassy cable - 05THEHAGUE2175

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 THE HAGUE 002175 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/04/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PINR, ECON, NL, EUN 
SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/EU: FINANCIAL PERSPECTIVES AND TURKEY 
KEY ISSUES FOR BRITISH EU PRESIDENCY 
 
REF: A. VIENNA 2626 
 
     B. PARIS 5350 
     C. PARIS 5307 
 
Classified By: DCM CHAT BLAKEMAN FOR REASONS 1.4(B) AND (D). 
 
1. (C) SUMMARY:  According to a senior Dutch MFA official, 
the Dutch hope to see the debate on EU finances concluded 
during the British EU presidency, but will hold out for a 
system that lowers the Netherlands' high per capita 
contribution.  On Turkey, the Dutch continue to support 
starting accession talks on October 3 despite the Turkish 
declaration of non-recognition of Cyprus and subsequent 
European reactions.  Croatia could be a complicating factor 
in the Turkish debate if key Christian Democrat leaders 
elsewhere in Europe decide they cannot stomach "big, Muslim" 
Turkey getting a date before "little, Christian" Croatia.  In 
coming months, the Dutch government will make an effort to 
sell the benefits of the EU to the Dutch public in order to 
overcome the negative fallout from the referendum on the 
Constitutional Treaty, even though many members of the 
current cabinet are themselves Euro-skeptics.  END SUMMARY. 
 
2. (C) DCM, accompanied by POLCOUNS, paid an introductory 
call on Pieter de Gooijer, the new Deputy Director General 
for Political Affairs at the Dutch MFA, on August 3.  (Note: 
De Gooijer began his new assignment on August 1;  prior to 
that, he was the Director of the MFA's Department of European 
Integration, where he was one of the key players in 
coordinating the Dutch EU Presidency.)  Over the course of a 
wide-ranging discussion, de Gooijer offered his personal 
perspectives on the major issues facing the EU in the next 
several months, including:  the financial perspectives 
debate; Turkish accession; Croatia; and the fallout from the 
French and Dutch "no" to the Constitutional Treaty.  De 
Gooijer also offered candid, off-the-record observations 
regarding different approaches to the EU within the Dutch 
government. 
 
FINANCIAL PERSPECTIVES: 
---------------------- 
 
3. (C) Asked which questions should be high on the agenda for 
the British EU presidency, de Gooijer quickly identified 
reaching agreement on an EU budget ("financial 
perspectives").  The EU's failure to agree on a budget during 
the Luxembourg presidency, he added, was bad for the EU's 
image and also posed practical problems.  Although the EU 
does have a mechanism, similar to a continuing resolution, to 
permit expenditures at current levels if no agreement is 
reached by January 2007, this mechanism does not allow money 
to be spent in some critical sectors, such as infrastructure 
development.  Thus, countries receiving funds in these areas 
-- which includes many of the newer members -- would suffer. 
De Gooijer joked that some in the Dutch government wouldn't 
mind not having to pay into EU coffers for a year, since the 
Dutch are already the top per capita donor and get little in 
return.  He stressed, however, that the damage to the EU's 
prestige and ability to function if it remains unable to 
adopt a budget would be considerable. 
 
4. (C) De Gooijer would not predict whether the British would 
be able to forge an agreement on this issue during their 
presidency, or even if the British would make it a top 
priority.  He noted, however, that since it normally takes 
about 100 days implement a budget agreement after it has been 
adopted, time was running out.  With regard to the Dutch 
position in the negotiations, de Gooijer reiterated the Dutch 
believe all countries contributing above a certain amount 
should be eligible for a "rebate" comparable to that enjoyed 
by the British.  Unlike some countries, he continued, the 
Dutch have no problem with the British rebate per se, but 
feel strongly that other net contributors, like the Dutch, 
should have a similar arrangement. 
 
TURKISH ACCESSION TALKS: 
----------------------- 
 
5. (C) Turning to Turkey, de Gooijer emphasized that the 
Dutch still support beginning accession talks October 3 and 
do not agree with French FM Villepin's recent comments 
calling this date into question.  At the same time, de 
Gooijer believed the Turks had opened a "Pandora's Box" by 
issuing their declaration on non-recognition of Cyprus in 
connection with signing the Customs Protocol.  Noting that he 
had just met with the Turkish Ambassador to the Netherlands 
(Note:  He was actually leaving de Gooijer's office as DCM 
and POLCOUNS arrived.), de Gooijer said that he had delivered 
a firm message to the Turks that they were responsible for 
the consequences of their own actions.  It was completely 
unrealistic, he added, for Ankara to have expected such a 
declaration to go out without provoking a response from 
Cyprus, and now others, including France and Austria, who 
were compelled to react because of their domestic political 
situations.  It would have been relatively easy, he 
continued, for the Turks to have issued a short, anodyne 
statement "reserving their rights" or noting that the 
signature was "without prejudice" to other Turkish positions, 
which would have made it more difficult for Cyprus to react 
negatively. 
 
6. (C) The Turkish Ambassador, according to de Gooijer, had 
tried to argue -- apparently on instructions -- that the EU 
must "stick to the letter" of its agreement last December. 
De Gooijer responded bluntly that such an approach badly 
misjudged the nature of dealing with the EU.  He recalled 
that the Turks had tried similar tactics during the 
negotiations last December and had almost lost everything as 
a result.  A far more effective strategy, he continued, would 
be for the Turks to "go the extra mile" as often as possible 
in order to put the Cypriots on the defensive. While other EU 
members were prepared to "sit on" Cyprus if necessary, he 
added, they couldn't do it without some help from Ankara.  De 
Gooijer also dismissed the Turkish Ambassador's argument that 
signing the protocol and issuing the declaration was "neither 
a step forward nor backward" by noting that, in that case, 
"it's nothing." 
 
7. (C) De Gooijer predicted that, thanks to the Turkish 
declaration and the French reaction, the issue of Turkish 
recognition of Cyprus could no longer be "left off" the 
agenda for the informal GAERC ("Gymnich") meeting in early 
September, and would also be discussed at the COREPER meeting 
in late August.  Although the recent developments had 
complicated the situation, de Gooijer felt it should still be 
feasible to reach agreement on the EU's negotiating framework 
by October 2 and to open talks on October 3.  Getting there, 
however, would be more considerably more "difficult" than 
before. 
 
CROATIA: 
------- 
 
8. (C) In response to a question from DCM, de Gooijer said 
that the Dutch remained firm on holding Croatia to the 
standard of "full cooperation" with the ICTY before beginning 
accession talks.  It was up to Chief Prosecutor Carla del 
Ponte, he added, to determine whether "full cooperation" 
required the presence of Gotovina in The Hague or not.  De 
Gooijer expected the EU to maintain its consensus in support 
of the ICTY, but observed that several Christian Democrat EU 
leaders, including Juncker and Schuessel, were uncomfortable 
with the idea of starting talks with "big, Muslim" Turkey 
before "little, Christian" Croatia.  Dutch Prime Minister 
Balkenende, he added, was personally sympathetic to this view 
but was being guided by Foreign Minister Bot, who took a much 
tougher line on maintaining the credibility of the ICTY. 
While it was not fair for Turkey's accession talks to be 
linked to Croatia's in this way, this was a political reality 
-- and all the more reason for Turkey not to give any 
European leaders any excuses to delay, he added. 
 
POST-REFERENDUM REALITIES: 
------------------------- 
 
9. (C)  De Gooijer observed that Luxembourg's "yes" vote to 
the EU's Constitutional Treaty, following the resounding 
French and Dutch "no's," could be taken as a sign that the 
Treaty "was not yet buried."  Over the next several months, 
he added, the EU needed to figure out how to deal with the 
Treaty -- should it be scrapped entirely, or revived?  Within 
the Netherlands, de Gooijer added, the first step was to 
rebuild confidence in Europe and European institutions, as 
the referendum demonstrated a clear divide between the 
political elite and general public.  One of his last jobs as 
Director for European Integration, he said, was to draft the 
first version of the annual Dutch "State of the European 
Union" report for submission to Parliament along with the 
national budget.  This year's report, he continued, would 
focus more than previous versions on "the vision thing" and 
include clear arguments for why a strong, united Europe is 
good for the Netherlands. 
 
10. (C) As a committed Europhile, de Gooijer said he had been 
struck by the high level of Euroskepticism in the Netherlands 
revealed by the Dutch referendum.  Even the Dutch cabinet, 
while maintaining a united front in public, was split. 
According to de Gooijer, Foreign Minister Bot and Economic 
Affairs Minister Brinkhorst were the strongest supporters of 
the Treaty (and, by implication, the EU), while Finance 
Minister Zalm, Defense Minister Kamp, Interior Minister 
Remkes, Health Minister Hoogevorst (all VVD), plus Education 
Minister ven der Hoeven and Agriculture Minister Weerman 
(CDA) were more nationalistic and "provincial" in their 
outlook.  Prime Minister Balkenende, as a former Economics 
Professor, appreciated the benefits of the Eurozone but 
initially had little enthusiasm for the EU in general; his 
positive experience during the EU presidency, however, had 
eventually convinced him of the value and importance of the 
EU, de Gooijer concluded. 
 
COMMENT/BIO NOTE: 
---------------- 
11. (C) During the Dutch EU Presidency, de Gooijer was one of 
the key decision makers within the MFA on EU issues.  He 
played a critical role in bringing the Turkish accession 
talks to a successful conclusion in December, working 
directly with the Foreign Minister Bot and Prime Minister 
Balkenende.  Although he is still coming to grips with the 
much broader portfolio of his new position, we anticipate 
that he will continue to be a well-connected and reliable 
source regarding current Dutch thinking on a wide variety of 
issues. 
BLAKEMAN