US embassy cable - 05BOGOTA7415

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BOGOTA 007415 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/05/2015 
TAGS: KJUS, PHUM, PREL, SNAR, CO 
SUBJECT: U/S BURNS MEETS WITH PEACE COMMISSIONER RESTREPO 
 
Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood for reasons 
1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
1. (U) July 27, 2005, 7:00 - 8:30 am, Ambassador's residence, 
Bogota 
 
2. (U) Participants: 
 
U.S. 
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R. Nicholas Burns, U/S for Political Affairs 
Ambassador William B. Wood 
Jeffrey DeLaurentis, Political Counselor 
Cynthia Echeverria, P Special Assistant 
Sarah LaGier, notetaker 
Luis Guio, Interpreter 
 
Colombia 
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Luis Carlos Restrepo, Peace Commissioner 
 
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Summary 
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3. (C) Under Secretary for Political Affairs Nicholas Burns 
discussed the paramilitary peace process, Justice and Peace 
Law, extradition, and the U.S. hostages held by the FARC with 
Peace Commissioner Luis Carlos Restrepo on July 27.  U/S 
Burns expressed admiration and support for the GOC's efforts 
to establish peace and security after a 40-year conflict.  He 
warned that many U.S. Congressmen and human rights NGOs 
believed the Justice and Peace Law was too lenient and that 
changing this perception was key to U.S. assistance.  He 
underscored that the law could not harm the excellent 
U.S.-Colombia extradition relationship.  He inquired if 
Restrepo had any information on the three U.S. hostages. 
Restrepo asserted that the Justice and Peace Law put in place 
all necessary mechanisms to hold ex-terrorists accountable 
for their crimes, including confession, investigation and 
trials, time in confinement, and reparations to victims.  It 
would not impede extradition, although the President could 
suspend certain extraditions while AUC commanders fulfilled 
their obligations under the peace process.  He expressed 
concern for the logistical and security challenges presented 
by demobilizing the remaining 60 percent of the AUC before 
the end of the year.  Restrepo assured Burns that the GOC 
would demand the release of the three U.S. hostages under any 
humanitarian accord reached with the FARC.  End summary. 
 
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The AUC Peace Process 
--------------------- 
 
4. (C) U/S Burns asked for Restrepo's views on the 
paramilitary peace process, including what motivated the AUC 
to negotiate and the GOC's long-term security strategy. 
Restrepo explained that military pressure from the security 
forces and political pressure from the international 
community had forced the AUC to negotiate.  He noted that 
extradition had been a key source of pressure.  According to 
Restrepo, the AUC had grown at an alarming rate for the 10 
years before Uribe took office.  He emphasized that 
paramilitaries posed an even greater threat to democracy than 
the guerrillas because they attempted to disguise themselves 
as allies of the government when, in reality, they were the 
government's worst enemies.  President Uribe's strategy was 
to demobilize the AUC and secure former AUC territories while 
simultaneously applying military pressure on the FARC and ELN 
until they agreed to negotiate under GOC conditions. 
 
5. (C) Restrepo expressed confidence that all paramilitaries 
would demobilize, bloc by bloc, by the end of 2005. 
Approximately 40 percent (5,800 paramilitaries) had already 
demobilized and seven more bloc demobilizations were planned 
in the next weeks.  He expressed concern for the security and 
logistical challenges presented by demobilizing the remaining 
60 percent within in two to four months.  Each bloc 
demobilization required at least 400 government and security 
officials.  Without additional resources, the GOC could only 
manage four demobilizations per month.  Providing security in 
the former AUC territories presented an additional challenge. 
 Restrepo estimated the GOC needed 5,000 to 10,000 new police 
to secure the areas and conduct specialized counternarcotics 
operations to prevent traffickers or guerrillas from taking 
over former paramilitary drug routes.  He warned that even 
one guerrilla massacre in a former AUC area could halt the 
entire peace process and expressed hope the U.S. could 
provide support for security. 
 
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Justice and Peace Law 
--------------------- 
 
6. (C) U/S Burns acknowledged that finding a balance between 
peace and justice was difficult, but warned that addressing 
concerns in the U.S. Congress that the law was too lenient 
was key to U.S. assistance to Colombia.  He noted that many 
in Washington saw a direct link between human rights 
certification and the Justice and Peace Law.  He encouraged 
Restrepo to visit the U.S. to explain the law in detail. 
7. (C) Restrepo asserted that the Justice and Peace Law put 
in place all the necessary mechanisms to hold demobilized 
terrorists accountable for their crimes.  He expressed 
confidence that the justice system would apply the law fully 
to prevent impunity.  The law offers demobilized terrorists a 
five to eight year sentence followed by a 2.5 to four year 
parole period only if they fully demobilize, turn over all 
illicit assets, release all hostages and child soldiers, and 
give reparations to victims.  Individuals or groups organized 
for drug trafficking or illicit enrichment would not be 
eligible for reduced sentence.  Only crimes committed during 
membership in, and in the service of, the illegal armed group 
were eligible.  The GOC could nominate potential 
beneficiaries, but judges would independently decide if the 
nominee met all the law's requirements. 
 
8. (C) Restrepo explained that paramilitaries would have to 
confess all their crimes to benefit.  Although the 
constitution required these confessions to be given freely, 
the ex-terrorist would be tried under the normal criminal 
code for any crimes he did not confess unless a judge 
determined that the omission was unintentional, and the 
ex-terrorist had fully collaborated with authorities and 
committed to giving reparations to victims.  In this case, 
the ex-terrorist would still receive a 20 percent higher 
sentence.  Restrepo emphasized that all the demobilized 
paramilitaries (not just those already known to be guilty of 
major crimes) would be advised to confess their crimes. 
Later, if they were discovered to be guilty of a crime they 
did not confess, they would be tried under the normal 
criminal code.  Restrepo estimated that 300 to 400 AUC 
commanders were implicated in major crimes, but said he 
expected the number to rise once confessions began. 
 
9. (C) Restrepo noted his job was to disarm, identify and 
demobilize the paramilitaries, and turn them over to justice. 
 He warned, however, that the AUC leadership had not yet 
realized just how tough the law was.  Applying the law before 
the entire AUC had demobilized could lead the remaining, 
armed paramilitaries to abandon the process. 
 
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Extradition 
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10. (C) U/S Burns expressed appreciation for the excellent 
U.S.-Colombia extradition relationship and emphasized that 
the Justice and Peace Law should not block extradition in any 
way.  The U.S. would pursue the extradition of any 
demobilized terrorist who had violated U.S. law or harmed 
U.S. citizens.  Restrepo agreed that extradition was a 
powerful tool in combating the illegal armed groups and had 
been a key factor in getting the AUC to demobilize.  He 
assured Burns that the law would not block extradition in any 
way and that extradition would never be negotiated with any 
terrorist group.  However, on a case by case basis, President 
Uribe could decide to suspend extradition for certain AUC 
commanders while they fulfilled their obligations under the 
peace process and Justice and Peace Law.  The GOC would 
revoke this suspension at any time if necessary.  He likened 
the threat of extradition to a guillotine that would come 
down if the paramilitaries violated the terms of the peace 
process.  (Note: There has never been a legal or political 
commitment to extradite every criminal requested.  President 
Uribe has always had the ability to suspend or refuse 
extradition of any individual or class of individuals at any 
time.  His decisions have produced the best extradition 
record in the world.) 
 
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U.S. Hostages 
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11. (C) U/S Burns noted that the safe release of the three 
U.S. hostages being held by the FARC remained a key USG 
priority and inquired if Restrepo had any news he could pass 
on to the families of the hostages.  Restrepo assured Burns 
the GOC would insist the three U.S. hostages be released 
under any humanitarian exchange reached with the FARC.  He 
explained that the FARC held 63 political prisoners, 
including the three U.S. citizens, a German, and Ingrid 
Betancourt, a dual Colombian-French citizen.  In exchange for 
their release, the GOC had offered to release imprisoned FARC 
guerrillas who pledged to not return to crime and who were 
eligible for pardon because they were guilty only of 
rebellion or who met the Justice and Peace Law requirements. 
In order to negotiate a release, the GOC had offered to meet 
with the FARC and guarantee safe passage to the meeting 
place, verified by the international community. 
 
12. (C) So far, the FARC had refused.  Instead, the FARC 
demanded the release of all imprisoned guerrillas without any 
conditions and a demilitarized zone of two municipalities in 
Valle del Cauca Department.  Restrepo explained that these 
two municipalities had 110,000 inhabitants and connected FARC 
strongholds in southern Colombia (currently under heavy 
pressure from the military) to the drug trafficking corridors 
on the Pacific coast.  The GOC would not demilitarize this 
area under any circumstances. 
 
13. (C) This cable has been cleared by P. 
DRUCKER